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Abstract 
  End-User privacy concerns surrounding use of Social Networks present new and complex 
problems for research. Specifically, a phenomenon known as “the Privacy Paradox” has been 
observed where end-users stated concerns, attitudes and intended behaviour are not consistent 
with the actual behaviour within the network. Numerous causes have been proposed as 
potentially being the root of the problem of this paradoxical phenomenon including a lack of 
user awareness of privacy issues, a low level skill in using technology or a lack of privacy 
salience within the social network itself. However, the role of the User Interface (UI) in 
contributing to, and potentially providing a solution to, poor privacy behaviour is under-
explored. A potentially fruitful avenue of enquiry given that behaviour is considered to be a 
reaction to environmental stimulus and the UI provides the environment within which the 
user is interacting. 
  This thesis implements a two phase approach to furthering understanding of privacy 
behaviour in social networks. First, a survey is implemented exploring the relationship of 
concepts within the privacy paradox identifying that users stated needs are not being met by 
their observable behaviour. Secondly, two experiments are implemented in order to explore 
this behaviour as an interaction with the network; these questions are answered to build a 
social network profile and can be grouped according to their potential sensitivity. A model of 
social psychology, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), is used to develop such 
experiments in order to examine the cognition behind these interactions. Each of the salient 
influencers defined by the TPB is used to inform a series of UI treatments and form the basis 
for experiment groups. An initial experiment explores the method and is used to inform the 
design of the second, which also introduces a factorial design to explore the relationships 
between treatments. These experiments show that participants within the treatment groups 
disclose less information than the control, with statistical significance. Within the first 
experiment this non-disclosure took place across all questions sensitivities, possibly due to 
limitations in the experimental method. However, participants in experiment two appear far 
more selective in their disclosure, choosing not to answer more sensitive questions suggesting 
that they thought of their privacy while interacting with the system.  
  Findings within this thesis suggest that the UI plays an important role in influencing end-
user behaviour as it can inform the context of the interaction as it happens.  
  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction – Privacy and the Privacy Paradox 
  The rise of the Internet and, in particular Social Networking Sites (SNS’s), has produced 
new and complex problems for end-user privacy. Privacy is an already complex social 
concept which is difficult to define successfully for the individual as the concept itself can be 
very different from person to person and within varying contexts (Ackerman and Mainwaring 
2005). Indeed, the problem has been described as “inherently complex, ill-defined and 
seemingly insolvable” (Ackerman and Cranor 1999). This makes research into privacy issues 
difficult as there is no unifying way of thinking of a problem which is different depending on 
the individual and the context in which the problem exists. The extension of privacy into the 
new technologies mentioned previously has added to the complexity of the problem for 
research.  
  One such example of a privacy related phenomena is the “Privacy Paradox” which describes 
a disconnect between user’s stated privacy concerns and their actual behaviour within online 
services (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004); where it has been observed within e-commerce sites 
(Norberg, Horne et al. 2007) and SNSs (Barnes 2006). That is, users are observed using low 
levels of protection and disclosing large amounts of personal information despite stating they 
are highly concerned of their privacy when using such systems. However, the paradox itself is 
under researched where each observation of it examines it in a different way and according to 
a variety of definitions of it; hence there is a need to unify the research into the paradox and 
ask the questions: why does it occur within a technological environment and what are factors 
which influence it? Furthermore, how can the complexity of the privacy concept be explored 
within the research field in such a way that the field can be unified behind a single definition?  
  Answers to such questions shall be proposed within this study where a variety of methods 
are designed and implemented; a survey instrument is designed to provide a full and recent 
view of the paradox within the context of this study and two experiments designed and 
implemented with the aim of exploring the role of the User Interface (UI) in understanding, 
contributing to and solving the privacy paradox.  
  The phenomenon of this paradox is used to frame this study which is aimed at providing a 
more complete understanding of the observable aspects of privacy within Social Network 
Systems answering the above proposed questions. Observable properties of the phenomena 
are important to this study as they can be quantified and examined for causal relationships to 
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introduced treatments. Rooting the work in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) allows an 
exploration of the UI and its role in influencing these observable properties that make up the 
privacy paradox. Such an exploration could provide an understanding of how UI’s can be 
designed to solve the privacy paradox and encourage more considered privacy behaviour.   
1.1 The Role of HCI 
  HCI is ideally suited to exploring such a phenomenon as it is a cross-disciplined field 
combining elements of psychology, computer science and User Interface Design (UID). As 
such, it allows the work to study the behavioural outcomes of the privacy paradox with a view 
to understanding the effect of the system itself. Therefore, a new understanding of, not only 
the privacy paradox, but also privacy behaviour in general can be obtained for use in the 
design of systems which encourage pro-privacy behaviour.  
  The field is suggested as being uniquely suited in helping the design of systems which 
satisfy the need to protect sensitive information and can help understand the notions of 
privacy that individuals have (Iachello and Hong 2007). It is therefore, well placed to shed 
new light on the privacy paradox through the study of users and their interaction with the 
system in question (in this case Social Networks). Furthermore, HCI incorporates elements of 
cognitive theory within it and, through appropriate research methods, models of cognition can 
be generated which explain computer use (Lyytined 2010) and hence can be used to explain 
the behaviour seen in the privacy paradox which frames this work providing an understanding 
of the role of the UI.   
  Work in the field of visualisation suggests that the User Interface can be embedded within 
appropriate models of cognition in order to provide assistance with the analysis of data within 
a computer system (Tory and Moller 2004). Although this is dealing with the visualization of 
complex data, the idea is easily applied to the arguably equally complex area of privacy 
conceptualisation. For example, it is suggested that users should be informed of potential risks 
to their privacy (Fogel and Nehmad 2008) within social networks and HCI provides the 
means to examine how this should be done and explore the effects of it. Indeed, the Social 
Network Site Facebook has (after the research work in this thesis was carried out) introduced 
more salient privacy related information to their system interface (see figure 1). Interestingly, 
the changes to Facebook’s UI include some of the privacy salient information proposed 
within this thesis, which are based on models of cognition. Research has suggested a potential 
cause of the privacy paradox and poor privacy behaviour in general is a lack of such privacy 
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salient information in the SNS environment for the users to take into account when interacting 
with the system (Houghton and Joinson 2010). However, what is privacy salience and how 
should it be embedded into the UI with a theoretical foundation?    
 
Figure 1 – Facebook UI changes 
  One final point for the appropriateness of using HCI to tackle privacy problems should be 
made. HCI allows for the users themselves to be targeted in applying their own personal 
privacy preferences. Privacy is individually oriented where one person’s idea of privacy may 
not be the same as another person’s; furthermore, that idea may shift and change depending 
on the context at any one time (Palen and Dourish 2003). As such, technical solution to 
privacy would need to be adaptive enough to cater for the range of individual preferences 
from potential users. Research has suggested that there may be no technical silver bullet to 
solving the range of privacy problems which are present in social networks (Rosenblum 
2007).  
  HCI then, has several advantages in tackling the privacy problem. For example, User 
Interfaces can be adapted to enable “learnability” through their interaction (Johnstone 2003); 
that is, UIs that promote user learning during interaction. The question is what should be 
embedded within a SNS UI in order to promote privacy learning and enable the user to 
implement their individual personal privacy preferences and this where the models of 
cognition described earlier will be useful.  
  Users have been described as the “weakest link” where the security of computer systems are 
concerned (Sasse 2007) and as security and privacy are closely related, it is a reasonable 
assumption to make that user need to be tackled in a similar way in order for them to safely 
user the technology in question. Methods of tackling the use of computer systems can be 
embedded and tested within HCI research; for example, elements of privacy salience that 
remind users of their privacy safety, information aimed at increasing privacy awareness and 
manipulation of the way in which sensitive data is presented can all be implemented in the UI. 
Literature has noted that the role of user cognition is vital in safeguarding user security 
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suggesting that while practitioners have spent years developing complex systems, 
psychologists have noted ways in which people consistently misperceive and misunderstand 
things (Smith 2012). Could it be that social network users misunderstand the scope and 
complexity of privacy within a digital environment leading to unintended disclosure? Their 
reported levels of concern would suggest that they are aware of privacy issues but perhaps are 
not enabled to act accordingly within the network environment. 
1.1.2 Are Social Networks a Persuasive Technology? 
  Within HCI is the emerging field of persuasive technology which suggests that software has 
the ability to alter the habitual behaviour of users if it is designed to do so (Fogg 1998); and 
indeed, Facebook has been suggested as being one such technology (Fogg and Iizawa 2008). 
The research direction for this field of study proposes the use of well-established models from 
the field of behavioural psychology in line with the research direction proposed for HCI in 
general mentioned earlier. Hence, the need for models of behaviour within research 
approaches is demonstrated and this thesis shall provide a review of appropriate models for 
consideration within HCI and propose an approach to utilising them to examine privacy 
behaviour. The question then, is what it is within the Facebook UI that persuades users to 
behave paradoxically (or if, indeed, it is persuasive in the suggested way)? The paradox’s 
existence would suggest that the UI is being persuasive in some way as the behaviour 
observed is unexpected, that is, it is altered from the way in which the user states that they 
would normally behave.   
  Behavioural psychology itself proposes that all behaviour is a reaction to the environmental 
stimulus within which that behaviour takes place (Breakwell 2006). As such, the role of 
cognition within the context of the UI as it has been described thus far would appear to be a 
fruitful area of research for understanding paradoxical privacy behaviour and ascertaining the 
design features which should be included within a pro-privacy persuasive system.  
  This work therefore, proposes to examine models of cognition and test the ability to improve 
privacy behaviour within social networks using HCI designed experiments. Results from such 
can be used to create general assumptions about privacy behaviour and, hence, a view of the 
privacy paradox and its causes from a UI perspective.  
  Proposed within this thesis as a suitable model for informing experiments that aim to 
understand privacy behaviour is the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1991) which states 
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that there are three main influencing factors behind behavioural intention and actual 
behaviour. The model itself is described in greater detail later in this thesis and has several 
advantages to the research field which make it ideally suited. First, its classification of salient 
properties into three distinct groups allows for the design of three separate experimental 
treatments so privacy behaviour can be explored from a variety of angles for a greater degree 
of richness. Secondly, its experimental foundation as a tool for examining behaviour is well 
founded providing the study with reliable methods allowing for general and justifiable 
conclusions to be drawn.    
  The appropriateness of such will be further outlined in this thesis; first however, the need for 
the study shall be provided.  
1.2.1 Outlining Need 
  The focus on the “privacy problem” within social networks has been well documented since 
their introduction and rise in popularity. Figure 2 shows a collection of news articles collected 
over the first year and a half of this study. 
 
Figure 2 - Example of Media Attention 
  This is by no means an exhaustive list and reports were only added when they were 
encountered during daily routine; however, the idea is to give a general overview of the 
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attention paid to the notion of privacy within social networks. The news articles collected 
range from concerns over the control afforded by the system over protection of an 
individual’s privacy to the problems that users have experienced in their personal lives due to 
poor privacy behaviour on their part. Hence, it would appear that there is real world problem 
with privacy in social networks and that the technology itself is producing an area of concern 
that has not been seen before.  
  The paradox then is significant as it is an observable manifestation of this new problem and 
has significant implications in and of itself. Taken at face value the paradox suggests that an 
end-user’s perceived needs are not being met within the actual network. This could, therefore, 
result in an individual’s personal (and potentially sensitive) information being disclosed to 
unintended third parties, possibly to the detriment of the user. A range of implications of the 
privacy paradox are therefore presented that could possibly affect the user. 
1.2.2 Implications of the Privacy Paradox 
  There are numerous implications to the privacy paradox varying in their level of risk to the 
user. If elements of the privacy paradox are in evidence then it can be concluded that an 
individual’s stated privacy wants are not being met and, therefore, privacy risks within social 
networks apply all the more. Indeed, some of the reported incidents of perceived poor privacy 
behaviour can be viewed in the previously illustrated figure detailing news reports. First, 
users could face embarrassment should their information be disclosed to those who are not the 
intended recipients of the information (Strater and Lipford 2008). This is potentially a “low 
impact” implication of poor privacy behaviour yet is still an avoidable unpleasant experience 
if users control their information flow appropriately. In the same vein of low impact risks a 
user could suffer annoyance from targeted advertising developed from their disclosed 
information; an occurrence which has been noted as annoying to consumers in research 
(Johnson 2010).  
  Secondly, research has noted that users should be wary of information revelation within 
social networks due to the increasingly popular practice of checking user profiles of 
employees by potential and current employers (Gross and Acquisti 2005). Therefore, users 
who show evidence of the paradox and poor privacy behaviour could face disciplinary action 
from employers depending on the information they disclose (or potentially not get an 
employment offer if employers implement social network checks).  
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  Thirdly, the most severe potential implication of the privacy paradox and of poor privacy 
behaviour in general deals with breaches in the law either toward users or by users 
themselves. For example, users could be susceptible to identity theft depending on the extent 
of their personal information disclosure to unintended parties (Donath and Boyd 2004). 
Furthermore, users could admit to breaking the law through the information they disclose; for 
example, users who disclose evidence of substance misuse could face legal ramifications if 
the authorities are unintentionally disclosed to (Morgan, Snelson et al. 2010). The same work 
suggests that users who engage in this, view the disclosure of such information as a positive 
thing as they build desired social ties; however, this would only be the case if the appropriate 
parties are the sole recipients of the information revelation. Further research however, would 
suggest that this is not the case as users are often unable to manage their information in terms 
of who can see it (Fang and LeFevre 2010).      
  However, is the paradox a phenomenon which should be expected? That is, should self-
reported concern, attitude and actual behaviour be inline within each other. Acquisti and 
Grossklags (2004), state that this is a dichotomy that should not be expected; that the sheer 
magnitude of data from experimental and survey based research shows that users often state 
levels of privacy concern yet consistently trade-off their privacy for a variety of rewards. 
Hence, this is still a problem for research to examine given that research as recent as 2010 is 
still observing instances of the paradox (Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 2010). 
1.3 Summary & Contributions 
  This chapter has introduced the topic area under discussion and exploration within this thesis 
and justified the need and approach to studying it.     
  The questions which therefore arise from the topics introduced thus far can be summarised 
as the following: 
1. What is the privacy paradox and how are its constituent parts related; indeed is it still 
an issue today? 
2. Are social networks persuasive and if so, in what ways are such systems (e.g. 
Facebook) influencing users (either intentionally or not) with regard to their privacy? 
3. Can models of cognition be implemented within HCI research which seek to provide 
an understanding of the privacy behaviour observed within social network systems? 
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4. If so, what are the models of cognition and how could they be implemented within a 
UI to provide users with the information required to make the right privacy choice for 
their individual needs? 
5. Research mentions a lack of privacy salience; if so, what is salient privacy information 
based on the models of cognition mentioned? 
6. What therefore, is the causal relationship between UI elements and privacy related 
behaviour? 
This work therefore, proposes the following contributions to the wider research field; 
 A more complete view of the privacy paradox and privacy behaviour in general where 
social network system use is concerned (note, that although this work deals with the 
paradox as a framework, the results can be generalised to privacy behaviour in 
general).  
 This is done through the design of a more holistic survey instrument than has currently 
been used.  
 A review of models to be introduced to the field in order to understand that behaviour 
and draw conclusions from it.  
 An application of the elements of behavioural psychology into Experimental User 
Interfaces aimed at examining the effect of UI features on end-user behaviour. 
 A set of results examining the potential causal relationships between the treatments 
introduced and resulting behaviour.  
  The rest of this thesis takes the following structure: a literature review examining the 
concept of privacy and the privacy paradox with the aim of highlighting a way of thinking 
about privacy within this work and highlighting the need for an examination of the UI. A 
methodology chapter shall outline the approach taken and the driving philosophy behind it 
with a following chapter designing the methods to be utilised in this study. These include a 
survey examining the paradox in a more holistic way than the research field currently offers. 
Justification for the theories used will follow the results chapter from the survey so as to be 
informed by the survey results. Finally, the results from the experiments are discussed and 
conclusions drawn.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review – Defining the Problem 
2.1 Introduction 
  The aim of this chapter is to examine a means of thinking about privacy that is conducive to 
HCI research, to bring together work studying the privacy paradox and to explore the 
potential causes of poor behaviour that maybe influenced through the UI. 
  An examination of how privacy has been explored in the field could also highlight the 
problems of the concept and demonstrate the need for a unifying idea of privacy for use 
within HCI research. As mentioned by Masiello (2009), privacy is complex and we need a 
simple way of thinking about it.  
2.2 Defining Privacy 
  The concept of privacy has been described as one “which is in disarray” and one which 
suffers from a variety of meanings (Solove 2006). Pinning down a single definition for use in 
research is therefore difficult and the field itself could be skewed from work to work if the 
concept of privacy driving them differs. Indeed those concepts could be fundamentally in 
opposition to other definitions of privacy. For example, privacy has been described as a 
boundary regulation process (Palen and Dourish 2003) and as the right to not be identified 
(Woo 2006); each of these could produce very different driving ideas for research were one 
focuses on the privacy being a constant redrawing of lines and the other one deception and 
anonymity to protect the user.  
  Each of the above definitions share an ideal of privacy; that it is highly individual and up to 
the user to implement according to their own needs. Indeed, another definition found within 
literature finds privacy to be “the ability of the individual to personally control information 
about oneself” (Smith, Milberg et al. 1996). A similar definition is provided by Westin where 
privacy is the right of individuals to determine what information about him or herself should 
be known to others (Westin 2003). These definitions may feel like something of fence sitting 
ones, deciding that privacy is too complex to define and implement in technology successfully 
and must instead be left to the individual to implement. There would certainly be some cause 
to consider such a view with literature describing the concept as a whole as one that is 
inherently complex, ill-defined and seemingly insolvable (Ackerman and Cranor 1999).  The 
question, then, is how can technology make this sort of provision while maintaining the 
complexity of privacy?  
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  Within a legal context privacy is normally described as the “right to be left alone” (Levi and 
Wall 2004); however, this is the antithesis to the very idea of social networks where the goal 
is to connect and share information with other people. If the concept is then applied to social 
networks specifically the problem grows and evolves as the context of the situation then 
becomes a factor in determining the sensitivity of information. For example, what is not 
considered sensitive at the point of disclosure may become so over time and when taken into 
account with other pieces of information, something which is possible due to the persistency 
within social networks. Hence, privacy needs on the web and social networks are time 
dependant (Lanheinrich 2002) and context dependant (Gandon and Sadech 2004, Masiello 
2009). 
  Considering this point and the individuality of privacy then the conclusion can be drawn that 
privacy requires a user’s constant thought and attention in order to be maintained as they are 
required to be able to analyse, understand and react to the context they are within at the time. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that users are required to use their knowledge of privacy to 
inform an intuitive process of self-disclosure day-to-day (Lederer, Hong et al. 2004). Indeed, 
a privacy protective mechanism known as P3P, requires users to have a fixed idea of their 
privacy needs to check against site policies (Ackerman, Cranor et al. 1999); however, further 
research within the social sciences suggest that users do not have stable, coherent preferences 
where their privacy is concerned (John, Acquisti et al. 2009). Indeed, is it possible to have 
stable preferences given the complexity of the concept of privacy as outlined? 
  There is an inherent difficulty in applying a specific definition into the design of 
technological solutions as privacy itself is too complex and individualistic to be adequately 
designed for. Indeed, it has been suggested that there is no silver bullet solution to privacy 
(Rosenblum 2007) and that instead users must be given the means to implement their own 
privacy needs. Consider a tutor based system aimed at providing a perfect privacy solution for 
the individual. Such a system would have to be as complex as the problem of privacy, 
maintaining an awareness of an individual’s context and their needs within a context as it 
shifts and changes. Clearly such technology is difficult and the users must be relied upon to 
implement their own desires as they see fit. Why then, within social networks, do users not 
implement their privacy as they wish?     
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2.2.2 Privacy in Social Networks 
  As well as the persistency of data in SNS’s adding to the complexity of the privacy context 
there are other problems which are introduced by the problem domain. Prominent sociologist 
Erving Goffman described individuals as requiring different social “masks” to cater to the 
audience in which they are dealing with at any one time (Goffman 1959). So, the individual 
tailors who they are to suit who they are talking to; an individual may act differently when 
interacting with their employer than with their friends and this is entirely appropriate. Within 
social networks, applying such intuitive practices is difficult due to the restrictions of the 
technology and of the users themselves within that technology where practiced skills and 
knowledge is required to implement effectively. Given that users do not just add their friends 
to their social network profiles (Aimeur, Gambs et al. 2009), adding work colleagues, family 
and even strangers, managing their social spheres present a new problem to the privacy 
research field. Hence, a requirement of privacy in social networks can be said to be the ability 
to manage social spheres (Binder, Howes et al. 2009) through identification of relevant 
spheres and appropriate information revelation to them. This is in some way related to the 
boundary negotiation process alluded to in other definitions mentioned earlier and is clear 
example of how this becomes a problem.  
  Therefore, the element of control becomes ever more important within an SNS in terms of 
actual information flow (Chen and Williams 2009) as each piece of information is open and 
available to all depending on the settings applied to it. Users have to be aware of what is 
disclosed, who it is disclosed to and what could be inferred from it; added complexity is 
gained when these granules of information could be compiled together to infer something else 
entirely. However, it has been suggested that granular controls are not utilised sufficiently by 
users with SNSs (Acquisti and Gross 2006); hence, the environment as it exists is not 
sufficient in providing users with the control they require. Research suggests that if privacy 
technology is too complex the features which protects one’s privacy are ignored (Grandison 
and Maximilien 2008). Given the extent of this complexity, how can users be encouraged to 
make the right decisions? 
  Research within social networks often states no formal definition of privacy and instead uses 
the term as a catch-all for privacy risks and issues. In line with the issues discussed thus far, 
research typically focuses on the information and the users of social networks rather than 
technological solutions. For example, the “PrivAware” system (Becker and Chen 2009) 
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analyses potential privacy issues and makes recommendations to the user for improving their 
privacy. Other research has focussed on the extent of information revelation (Lipford, Besmer 
et al. 2008) by introducing an “audience” view to allow users to see their profiles as others do. 
This would suggest that users need to be given extra information and perspective in order to 
appropriately manage their privacy. Further research explores the use of “friends only” 
settings as a highly protective form of privacy (Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 2010). Each of 
these show varying ways in which the concept of privacy has been considered within social 
networks; however, without a clear definition of what privacy actually is and an idea of how it 
manifests itself, makes the design of a method to explore privacy difficult.  
2.2.3 Pin-Pointing a Definition 
  So, the concept of privacy is complex and providing users with a holistic solution that caters 
for that complexity if difficult. Given that it is also individualistic in nature users must be 
enabled to make their own decisions amidst that complexity. So where do the problems 
begin? Solove (2009) provides a taxonomy of privacy: 
 
Figure 3 – A taxonomy of privacy (Solove 2009) 
  This taxonomy of privacy states that all privacy problems begin with the invasion of the data 
subject or the data subject giving out information about themselves. If this taxonomy is 
tailored slightly for a social network focus then all potential problems begin with the 
disclosure of data to the network and, to a lesser extent, with the poor application of privacy 
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settings which also cause unauthorised parties to gain access to that information. This shifted 
taxonomy can be seen in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  Note, the assertion could be made that access is always authorised to user data in a social 
network as the user agreed to the site policy and set their own policies for access; however, 
the paradox states that this is not actually what the user wishes to happen according to their 
own levels of concern and intention. Hence, the above taxonomy would suggest that all 
privacy problems stem from the act of disclosure and from poor settings application and the 
paradox would suggest that users disclose more than they wish and protect as little as they 
want.  
  It would appear therefore, that focussing on a solution that addresses what users put on a 
social network and the settings they apply would be beneficial. Furthermore, both disclosure 
and settings are discrete aspects of privacy behaviour that users could be reminded of at the 
point of interaction and what could be the focus of a UI based solution. 
2.3.1 The Privacy Paradox 
  This section aims to bring together literature which deals with the way in which the privacy 
paradox has been explored and the findings put forward. As mentioned in the introduction the 
privacy paradox is generally described as a disconnect between a user’s desire to protect their 
privacy and their actual behaviour within the network (Boyd and Ellison 2007).  
  The paradox has been observed within e-commerce and SNSs as well as online 
environments in general where each work has used a variety of methods and differing 
definitions as the parts of the paradox. For example, the aspect of concern has been described 
as having measures which are too varied across literature (Norberg, Horne et al. 2007) 
creating a significant challenge to the research field.  
Disclosure Data 
Subject 
Social 
Network 
Authorised 
Access 
Unauthorised 
Access 
Figure 4 – A taxonomy of privacy 
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  Studies within e-commerce examined the potential link between a user’s stated level of 
concern and their recorded behaviour; a survey method was used to measure participant’s 
concern and then compared this to their behaviours within an experimental ecommerce 
scenario (Jensen, Potts et al. 2005). Concern was given a rating based on the Westin scale of 
privacy concern, as in similar studies (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005), where users are given a 
classification according to their responses of privacy fundamentalist, pragmatist and 
unconcerned. The assumption being that privacy fundamentalists would demonstrate stricter 
privacy related behaviours (disclosing less, consult policies etc.).  This study would therefore 
describe a relationship between concern and behaviour where an increased level of concern 
should correlate to more careful privacy behaviour: 
 
 
   
  The study found, however, that these two were not negatively correlated. A similar 
ecommerce study examined the link between reported levels of intention to disclose with 
actual disclosure using a quantitative survey method (Norberg, Horne et al. 2007). 
Participants were asked what they would willingly disclose and several weeks later asked 
related questions in a follow up survey, showing that participants freely disclose information 
about themselves despite their prior intentions. Hence, the Norberg study assumed a 
relationship between intention to disclose and the discrete behaviour of disclosure: 
 
 
  
  Again, the study found a the link in figure 6 was not as expected as the two were 
disconnected as concerned users disclosed information despite their initial, stated intention 
that they would not.  
  In each of these studies behaviour is described as the act of disclosing information within the 
environment. If behaviour is a reaction to environmental stimulus (Breakwell 2006) it is 
possible that the environment itself is acting upon users to produce the response seen; as it is 
evident in two studies where two different assumed relations are studied this is a reasonable 
assumption to state at this stage. For example, a user could go into a system with certain 
Concern Behaviour 
Intention Behaviour 
Figure 5 – Concern link 
Figure 6 – Intention Link  
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ideals which are subverted or influenced by the UI (potentially sub-consciously) leading them 
to act paradoxically.  
  Moving onto instances of the paradox within social network study; similar to the studies 
mentioned previously, two pieces of research focussing on SNS environments examined the 
link between concern and behaviour, where behaviour is information disclosed to the network 
(Acquisti and Gross 2006, Tuekci 2008). Again, the Westin rating system was used in the 
Acquisti paper while a more general statement of concern was used by Tuecki. The results 
from each of these papers are interesting in terms of describing the paradox as, although they 
seem similar on the surface, each offers slightly varying differences in the findings.  
  Acquisti and Gross used a survey method to analyse privacy concerns and self-reported 
behaviour, this was then compared to data mined from the SNS Facebook for each participant 
in the study. In terms of concern there was no link between the level of concern, membership 
of the network and the amount of information disclosed. That is, participants with a higher 
level of concern still joined the network and still disclosed much of their personal 
information. However, the work found that self-reported information disclosure (this thesis 
will refer to this as intention from this point forward) matched fairly closely to what 
information was actually in participant’s profiles even if this was not correlated with concern. 
The paradox was evident in that participants were more visible than they believed themselves 
to be. The Tuecki paper also found that privacy concern and information disclosure are not 
related when compared as perhaps might be expected (hence, the paradox). 
  To focus on the idea of control within a social networking environment for a moment; the 
Acquisti paper used the profile settings which have been assigned to a participant’s network 
presence. Recall, the paper found that participants were more visible than they thought they 
were and therefore demonstrated an aspect of the paradox (this did not seem to be examined 
against their levels of concern). Tuecki expands upon this finding by examining the link 
between concerns and perceived network visibility using a purely quantitative, survey 
approach (i.e. no network observations). The work finds that concern is managed through the 
setting of higher levels of privacy protection. However, as there is no direct behavioural 
observation of the network itself it is unknown if these reported settings are evident in 
actuality. The paradox would suggest that they would not be and, indeed, the Acquisti study 
proposed such as part of its findings. 
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  Before continuing a brief review and conceptualisation is required; first, the Acquisti paper 
explored the link between intention and disclosure, finding that the two matched up well:  
 
 
   
  Notice that this is a similar concept map as illustrated through the Norberg (2007) paper 
mentioned previously but the two found different results. Norberg’s data pointed to the two 
being inconsistently linked, unlike Acquisti’s, showing the variance in research within this 
field.  
 
 
 
 
  The study also found that the perception of visibility did not match how visible participants 
actually were in terms of the protection settings applied; hence their intended privacy settings 
did not match the actual settings applied.  
  Tuecki, meanwhile, explored the link between concern and both disclosure behaviour and 
visibility finding that participants reported that they protect themselves more if they are 
concerned yet this did not play any bearing on the amount of information disclosed: 
 
 
 
 
  Again, the above conceptualisation represents an assumed relationship; higher concern 
should lead to a higher intention to non-disclose and protect more. As this was dealing with 
self-reported behaviour each of the two elements studied can also be described as intention to 
disclose and intention to be visible.  
  Each of these studies would suggest that the application of privacy settings and disclosure 
behaviour are two separate entities holding a different relation to concern in terms of the 
Matched 
Intention Disclosure 
Disconnected 
Perceived 
protection 
Visibility 
Intended 
Disclosure 
Concern 
Intended 
Settings 
Figure 7 – Acquisti Study’s Assumed Relationship 
Figure 8 – Paradoxical Variation 
Figure 9 – Tuecki’s Assumed Relationships 
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findings offered. Perhaps this is to be expected as an individual may not be concerned about 
their privacy if they only believe their close friends to be the recipients of their information. 
Indeed, there is literature that suggests that disclosure and control are not negatively 
correlated (Christofides, Muise et al. 2009); the results of this came from a pure survey 
approach, again with no direct network observations. This link between control and disclosure 
is further explored through experiments in an online survey where increased control over data 
was shown to increase levels of disclosure which would suggest that there is a relationship 
between the two (Brandimarte, Acquisti et al. 2012). Here less control decreased disclosure 
and increased concern despite risks decreasing. Already here, it is beginning to become clear 
that research in the area is mixed in terms of findings offered; although all studies 
demonstrated paradoxical information they all came from within different places of the 
elements studied and occasionally contradicted other studies. For example, ecommerce 
research (Norberg, Horne et al. 2007) found that participants disclosed more than they thought 
they did, while Acquisti (2006) stated that participants knew how much they disclosed but the 
amount was not related to concern. 
  A more recent work suggests that users do implement their privacy settings to manage their 
privacy expectations, but struggle to manage their friends circle within the network itself 
(Johnson, Egelman et al. 2012). This is at odds with a separate work that found that despite 
users saying they understood and implemented comprehensive settings, they actually did not 
(Debatin, Lovejoy et al. 2009). Clearly, then there is a need to further examine this 
phenomenon and understand the actual behaviour in question. If the application of settings 
themselves is inadequate in addressing privacy needs then perhaps more careful disclosure 
habits should be considered. Such shall be the focus of this thesis. 
  To bring together the literature studied here, figure 10 offers a summative model of the 
expected relationships where privacy is concerned; concern, attitude and behaviour were 
suggested as potential relationships by Jensen, Norberg and Acquisti, while, behaviour can 
manifest itself in terms of the granular, discrete observations of disclosure and settings 
applications within the network.  
 
 
 
Intention 
Disclosure 
Settings 
Concern 
Behaviour 
Figure 10 – Privacy map 
 19 
 
   
  Evidence for the paradox was found where these causal links where not as expected; note 
that all studies examined privacy in terms of the two behaviours suggested by the privacy 
definition section. Not one study examined the paradox in the entirety illustrated here or used 
a variety of measures to do so. Furthermore, empirical evidence for privacy behaviour is also 
severely limited, as behaviour, in relation to privacy, is granular in nature. That is, SNS 
privacy deals with individual pieces of sensitive information, with each behaviour being an 
isolated interaction with a data granule (Krishnamurthy and Wills 2008). Granular control is 
how behaviour is exercised within a social network (Stutzman 2006), so participant 
perceptions and actions at this level are relevant to a more holistic use of the system.  
 Figure 10 matches the aspects of the taxonomy in figure 4 in that the observable 
manifestations of the paradox are disclosure and settings. However, it is unclear whether the 
paradox occurs between concern and behaviour or intention and behaviour and as such further 
work is required (as either or both can be influenced by the UI).  
2.3.2 The Causes of Poor Behaviour 
  The role of user awareness has been questioned as an influencing factor of the privacy 
paradox. For example, one such paper examining the “posting paradox” states that users 
disclose information in spite of awareness that inappropriate parties may be viewing their data 
(Miller, Salmona et al. 2011) and proposes that disclosure can be reduced via increasing 
privacy concern. However, the paradox shows users tend not to act according to their personal 
level of concern. So the question is raised: how should concern be raised and what exactly is 
the kind of concern that needs to be treated in order to positively affect behaviour? 
  Awareness is also proposed as a solution, specifically to the paradox, from a separate 
proposal paper (Pötzsch 2009) which offers the view that users forget their privacy concerns 
and knowledge during system use and reminding them is a way of closing the disconnect. 
Interestingly, the paper recommends solutions taking into account the cognition and 
behavioural aspects of privacy to support the intentions of users. However, the paper suggests 
that such a tool for raising awareness would need to have knowledge of shifting contexts, 
something which this thesis proposes adds too much complexity to an already complex 
problem. This work agrees with the view that reminding users at the point of interaction could 
encourage consistent privacy behaviour and goes further in suggesting that awareness is too 
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vague a notion to simply apply successfully; awareness of what precisely, what of instances 
where intention matches one aspect of behaviour but not another, etc.? 
  To demonstrate further; users have been described as being unaware of privacy issues and 
inexperienced regarding the concept in general (John, Acquisti et al. 2009, Kolter and Pernul 
2009).  They could, also, be unaware of the “openness of the Internet in terms of who can 
view their profiles” (Barnes 2006) or due to a lack of comprehension, awareness or concern 
for privacy within the context of an open networked system (Stutzman and Kramer-Duffield 
2010). Clearly then, the cause from a user perspective is varied even within research and lacks 
any empirical basis for formally exploring the problem satisfactorily. Would an increased 
awareness improve behaviour? Would an increase in skill level or a guide to privacy settings 
improve privacy protection? Understanding the cognition behind behaviour is vital in 
answering such questions. For example, hyperbolic discounting suggests that users favour 
short term gain over long term risk and this has been suggested as being a cause of poor 
privacy behaviour (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004). Although these relate to the user’s context 
(how much they know, how much they are swayed by cognition), they are also coupled to the 
system and the UI as this has the potential to increase awareness through design. Would user 
behaviour be influenced if they are made aware of the extent of long term risk explicitly 
during interaction? 
  Moving away from the user’s individual awareness brings the review to external influences. 
Heightened feelings of concern can be elevated by sensationalist news reports and increased 
media attention (Norberg, Horne et al. 2007); hence, the reported levels of high concern in 
survey data could be caused by users knowing what response they should have. Demonstrated 
here is the problem of studying a phenomena by separating it into components (behaviour and 
concern), each with their own context which could be influencing responses and action 
independently. Behaviour, for example, could be influenced by peer-pressure and herding 
behaviour (Strater and Richter 2007) which increases the amount of information disclosed 
within a social network. This is also supported through the theory of social capital which 
suggests that users in social networks would disclose particular pieces of data in order to build 
social ties with particular peers (Valenzuela 2009).  
  Finally, and most relevant to this study, factors based in the system have been proposed as a 
potential cause of the privacy paradox. Social networks themselves are designed to be open 
(Fogg and Iizawa 2008, Livingstone 2008), indeed their business model depends on it; 
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however, how they are designed to be such is unexplored within literature with empirical 
backing. Some work suggests a lack of privacy salience within the environment so privacy is 
not a part of the privacy making process (Houghton and Joinson 2010). What salience is and 
what form it should take is unclear and shall be explored further in this work. Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that the aspect of granular control is too complex for users to 
appropriately implement (Fang and LeFevre 2010) and that users require aid in understanding 
the complexity of the network environment they are using. This could be tied to the idea of 
signal detection theory which describes the extent to which a “noisy” environment prevents an 
individual from making “correct” decisions (Heeger 1998). This could explain the potentially 
related phenomena of the control paradox (Bandimarte, Acquisti et al. 2012) where increased 
control leads to increased disclosure of personal information. Hence, it would seem that the 
technology itself plays a significant role in influencing user behaviour.  
Cause Description Literature 
A lack of privacy concern Users are aware that unintended parties may 
view their data and are not concerned about 
the risk 
Miller et al, 2011 
A lack of privacy awareness at the point of 
interaction 
Users “forget” their privacy concern when 
disclosing information and do not use it in 
the decision making process 
Potzsch, 2009 
A lack of awareness of privacy issues Users are not educated about the risks of 
privacy or of the concept when placed in a 
technical setting 
John, Acquisti et al, 2009 
Kolter and Pernel, 2009 
Hyperbolic Discounting Users forego long term risk in favour of 
short term gain. 
Acquisti and Grossklags, 2004 
Peer pressure and herding behaviour Users do as their friends do in order to fit in Strater and Richter, 2007 
Media Attention Increase media attention may artificially 
inflate concern giving the results seen in 
privacy surveys 
Norberg, Horn et al, 2007 
System persuasion Social Networks are designed to be open 
and encourage poor privacy behaviour 
Fogg and Iizawa, 2008 
Livingstone, 2008 
A lack of privacy salience The system does not include privacy 
information to be used in the decision 
making process 
Houghton and Joinson, 2010 
System complexity The granular nature of privacy control is too 
confusing for users to successfully adopt 
and confuses the system interface 
Fang and Lefevre, 2010 
Bandimarte, Acquisti et al, 2012 
Table 1 - Assumed Causes of the Privacy Paradox and Poor Behaviour 
  This brief review of the causes of the paradox (summarised in table 1) demonstrates the 
complexity of the problem and the lack of defining research within the field. Also missing is 
the role the environment itself plays, although this is hinted at by the references in the 
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previous paragraph there is no formal declaration that the UI could play a vital role both 
causing and finding a solution to the paradox.  
2.3.3 Further Impact of the UI 
  Given that behaviour can be considered a reaction to environmental stimulus (Breakwell 
2006) and UI provides that environment then it is reasonable to assume it can play a role in 
causing and solving the paradox. Indeed, it has been suggested that Facebook is a persuasive 
technology, designed to alter habitual user behaviour (Fogg and Iizawa 2008). How is it 
designed such and how can it be designed to achieve the opposite? 
  It maybe that defining privacy salient UI features that influence users could be a viable and 
potentially simple solution. It has been suggested that the UI must be designed with societal 
issues in mind in order to encourage user engagement with those issues (Lederer, Hong et al. 
2004, Hochheiser and Lazar 2007). How should these societal issues inform design and what 
should they look like? 
  Users may be driven by some pre-conceived goal when interacting with computer systems 
and it has been suggested that user will complete numerous sub-goals in pursuit of a single 
goal possible to their detriment (Jacko and Sears 2003). Indeed, privacy has been suggested as 
being a secondary goal problem (Bonneau and Anderson et al. 2009) so users will not 
consider it during interaction. How can it be made a primary goal? 
  There appears to be a need for greater focus on the UI design where privacy is concerned 
(Masiello 2009). It is well placed to provide solutions in its role as an environmental stimulus; 
particularly as it has been suggested that altering intention through intervention strategies has 
a weak influence over actual behaviour (Webb and Sheeran 2006). Furthermore, it has been 
found that behaviour is more likely to be altered as it is happening rather than through 
increasing general awareness (Camp, McGrath et al. 2006).  
  There is a need however, for a greater notion of cognition in order to address the 
increasingly complex problems facing HCI today (Lyytined 2010) such as the privacy 
paradox. Such an understanding can inform the design of UIs that address the causes of poor 
privacy behaviour illustrated in table 1. This research, then, proposes to provide a greater 
understanding of the paradox through the following contributions: 
1. An examination of the figure 10 as a complete view of the privacy paradox. 
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2. An examination of appropriate models of cognition that explain privacy behaviour 
found in social network users. 
3. A definition or privacy salience that addresses the causes listed in table 1 and that can 
influence the discrete privacy behaviours outlined previously. 
4. An interpretation of that salience into User Interface features. 
5. An exploration of the potential effect of that privacy salience in controlled 
experiments. 
2.3.4 Other Related Work  
  Finally, a brief look at some related work and a statement of where this work fits within the 
HCI and privacy research field. Related work is considered as pieces of research where the 
aim has been to examine the effect of the UI changes on related privacy behaviour.  
  The work of Ackerman and Cranor deals with the creation of privacy tutors to aid in the 
privacy awareness of end-users (Ackerman and Cranor 1999, Cranor and Reidenberg 2002, 
Cranor, Guduru et al. 2006). The results obtained from this work and the conclusions drawn 
will provide empirical evidence for the effect these tutors could have and will inform the 
design of such tutors, providing a way forward for how they can be embedded within the UI 
of systems. For example, Cranor et al, (2006) proposed the “Privacy Bird” which aims to 
match user privacy preferences with web site privacy policy. This work aims to examine how 
to design such a tutor which does not require users to have pre-set preferences but instead 
aims to remind users that they should think about their privacy when deciding to disclose 
information (and examine what effect this will have). Hence, there is a need for a pre-cursor 
to such tutor systems which inform and allow users to develop and identify what their privacy 
preferences are.    
  So with relation to work examining the role of environmental changes on end-user behaviour 
the following are taken as examples to show that there is the potential for change. First, the 
control paradox resulted from changes to the UI, were extra elements of control were added 
resulting in an increase in levels of disclosure (Brandimarte, Acquisti et al. 2012). This was 
observed through altering how questions were asked in online surveys and altering the 
perceived control over the resulting information requested; participants could either publish 
themselves or allow an unnamed researcher to control the resulting information. The work 
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found that more control over the publication of information led to a decrease in privacy 
concerns and an increase in their willingness to disclose information demonstrating that 
changes in the network being interacted with can result in changes in behaviour and 
perception. While the Brandimarte study is similar to the one proposed within this thesis (a 
faux social network used), the reasons for the observed effects are not covered with empirical 
validity. The approach proposed within this work aims to examine the role of the UI with a 
foundation in cognitive models, thus explaining the reason certain UI elements have an effect 
on users of social networks.  
  A further example of some related works is that of Hui et al (2006) and LaRose et al (2007); 
each of which examined the effect of the presence of privacy seals and privacy statements on 
privacy behaviour. The first of these studies placed these elements on a company’s website 
thus using a field experiment to examine their effects, finding that a privacy statement 
induced increased levels of disclosure, as did a monetary incentive and finally, that an 
information request had a negative effect on disclosure (Hui, Teo et al. 2006). The second of 
these studies examined the effects of privacy warnings on user’s privacy perception and 
behaviour. These warnings were “clear, conspicuous and concise presentations of the benefits 
and risks associated with database information practices” (LaRose and Rifon 2007). The work 
found that warnings increased perceptions of risk and decreased disclosure unless a privacy 
seal was also present and therefore recommends that development of privacy warnings as an 
appropriate method of tackling poor privacy behaviour.  
  Work within personalization has found that users can be grouped into “disclosure groups” 
where some users are more likely to disclose certain kinds of information but not others 
(Knijnenburg, Kobsa et al. 2013). The work further suggests that a recommender system 
could remind users of their particular preferences based on which group they fit into. Further 
work explored the use of justification messages, describing the reasons for and the benefits of 
disclosure within a recommender system finding that they did not increase disclosure but did 
decrease satisfaction and trust in the service (Knijnenburg, Kobsa et al. 2013). This would 
suggest that additions to the UI must be carefully considered and themselves not off putting to 
users. Indeed, statements of privacy are usually not read and privacy seals not well understood 
according to surveys and so, there is no silver bullet for enhancing the privacy friendliness of 
a system (Kobsa 2007) so small enhancements are necessary. 
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  One final example of related work examined the effect of additional options when 
information is requested by a service (Joinson, Paine et al. 2007). The work added a “prefer 
not to say” option when asking questions among the appropriate responses finding that this 
lessened the amount of disclosure where it was present. This was noted as a form of privacy 
salience as it is embedding some privacy related information into the environment. 
Furthermore, a chance to “blur” information was also offered (e.g. giving an age range rather 
than a specific age) which also reduced levels of specific disclosure, particularly among 
males. Again, this is an example of how changes to the UI can invoke a behavioural response 
from end-users providing justification for this study. The cognitive reasons will be explored 
adding to the level of understanding which is currently available regarding the privacy 
paradox and privacy behaviour in general. This is an important point to note, although the 
privacy paradox is framing this study, the results exploring it will also give a broader 
understanding of behaviour in general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
  This chapter is concerned with detailing the research philosophy driving this work in terms 
of answering the questions posed in the literature review chapter and filling the gaps which 
exist within the field. These questions are aimed at further understanding the privacy paradox 
through the study of its constituent parts and the relationship they hold with each other with 
the aim of building a view of the entirety of the phenomenon. This would inform a study of 
behaviour and its relation to the User Interface within which the behaviour is performed and 
reacted to; again, as the role of the UI has not been fully explored with a theoretical 
foundation.  
  The type of questions this research asks are vital in identifying an appropriate research 
philosophy so the aims of the questions can be answered fully. This chapter takes this into 
account, as well as the researchers’ own personal philosophy and that of the field the research 
is taking place within.  
3.1 Research Philosophy 
  The research philosophy dictates the way in which the research questions are explored and 
answered; providing justification for the methods implemented, data gathered and the way in 
which that data is then analysed. Philosophies can be broadly split into two main camps: 
Interpretivist and Positivist with each underpinning different approaches to exploring research 
questions. Positivists hold the belief that the world can be divided into quantifiable observable 
phenomena which can be measured objectively; understanding of these simple, observable 
laws can explain the complexity which they often produce. Hence, the bigger picture can be 
explored by reducing it to the manageable and measurable factors that make it up.  
  The second philosophy, Interpretivism, holds that many interpretations of reality are possible 
and that reality can only be understood by acknowledging, subjectively, one’s own 
interpretation of the phenomena being studied. Furthermore, that interpretation can be 
constructed into scientific knowledge of the problem being researched. This tends to focus on 
aspects of phenomena which are not measureable but instead understanding must be 
constructed from subjective interpretations of complex and, usually, qualitative data (Oates 
2006).  
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3.2 Research Questions and Philosophy 
  Taking an initial look at the research questions and the definitions of research philosophies 
shows that a positivist approach to this study would be most aligned. In the first instance, 
understanding the privacy paradox, the relationships between the identified components need 
to be identified and explored. As such, a positivist approach allows for the individual 
components to be classified as appropriately measurable, allowing for statistical examination 
to identify causal relationships. For example, measurements of concern can easily be 
compared to measurements of intention and the relationship quantified in terms of statistical 
relevance (i.e. if there is a relationship or not). The difficulty lies in identifying an appropriate 
measure of subjective phenomena which the following chapter seeks to resolve. Furthermore, 
empirical evidence for the presence of the paradox in general can be provided through such an 
approach and the disconnect identified with scientific certainty.  
  Looking at the second question shows that a positivist approach is also necessary in 
exploring the role of the User Interface in producing privacy behaviour. The causal 
relationship between the UI (and specified UI elements) and any privacy related behaviour 
can be measured, demonstrated and test against hypotheses; again, this would show that there 
is empirical evidence for the role of the UI in influencing the privacy paradox. The nature of 
the study shows this is an easy fit as this research is, ultimately, concerned with clearly 
defined behaviours which are both measurable and observable.  
  So, the main aim of the research is to examine what UI elements produce what behaviours 
more frequently and a positivist approach would allow such an aim to be achieved with 
comparative measurements of defined behaviours.  
 Indeed, the hallmark of HCI research is rooted in behavioural psychology (Lazar, Feng et al. 
2010) and typically follows the positivist approaches taken within that field (Haslam and 
McGarty 1998). This is ideal for this study in particular given that it is, fundamentally, an 
observation of behaviour within a social networking system.  
3.3 The Role of Reductionism in Research 
  This brings the chapter to an important point regarding the philosophy of the work; the role 
of reductionism. The previous chapter made clear the complexity of privacy and the concept 
itself has been described as difficult to research within (Ackerman and Cranor 1999). 
Examining privacy in the way proposed in this thesis gives the advantage of reducing the 
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problem to a manageable snapshot where privacy is represented as the behaviour that it 
manifests as. Hence, assumptions about the wider concept can be generated from the 
empirically true data gathered here. This research then is concerned primarily with privacy 
behaviour and not with the complex concept itself; furthermore, the work is dealing with 
behaviour within the bounds of the privacy paradox. However, assumptions can be inferred 
about behaviour in general and about privacy in general from the results presented. Indeed, 
such a view of studying privacy has been noted as typical within the research field of HCI 
(Dourish and Anderson 2006). 
3.4 Initial Limitations 
  A purely positivist approach to studying a research problem has well documented limitations 
which could be placed upon the work. Namely, that the why of the positivist results are 
unexplored; for example, while the main aim of the work is to identify what behaviour is 
related to what UI elements and to identify what the relationships are within the privacy 
paradox, why those relationships exist and how the user feels about them is not covered within 
the philosophy driving the work. So, an appropriately designed UI element could affect 
behaviour (where both affect and behaviour are measureable); however, why there is an effect 
is not covered within a positivist approach.  
  Therefore, where possible, a mixed method approach should be implemented; that is, while 
the main driving philosophy behind the work will be positivist in nature (as the main question 
demands it) some interpretivist approaches shall also be utilised. Such an approach has been 
highlighted as necessary (Russo 2000) in the past where descriptions of practice must be 
coupled with interpretations of it.  
3.5 Initial Summary 
  This initial review of research philosophies in relation to the specific questions of this work 
has shown that a positivist approach is favoured in exploring the topic area. This is 
summarised in the following points; 
1. The work is primarily dealing with defining and providing relationships within the 
privacy paradox as put forward by literature. 
2. This also includes examining the effect of UI elements on behaviour. 
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3. Each of these are measurable and, furthermore, require measurements for a definitive 
answer. 
4. Hence, a positivist approach is favoured in driving the main arguments of the work. 
5. However, due to limitations of a “pure” approach, where possible mixed methods 
should be implemented.  
  These five points summarise the main arguments of this section. The following sections 
describe the methods generated from taking such an approach. Points initially raised here 
regarding benefits and limitations of the approach used shall be expanded upon and address 
within the appropriate sections.  
3.6 Overview of Methods 
  This section shall expand on the methods available and the methods to be selected for use in 
exploring the problem areas illustrated in this thesis. The following table illustrates the typical 
approaches found within positivism (Galliers 1991): 
Table 2 - Positivism 
Positivism 
Experiments 
Field Experiments 
Surveys 
Case Studies 
Theorem Proofs 
Forecasting 
Simulations 
 
  The first area to be explored is the conceptual model of the privacy paradox which is 
important in informing and underpinning the work that follows it; that is, examining the role 
of the UI in the phenomena.  
  The goal of this conceptual model and the research surrounding it is to examine the 
phenomena in greater detail and more holistically than other works have done so thus far. 
This examination is required to test the proposed relationships proposed by literature and 
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identify any causal relationships between them; e.g. does concern match intention and how is 
this related to specific and observable behaviours.  
  A positivist approach offers an ideal method in examining these relationships through a 
survey based method (as can be seen in the above table) which identifies patterns within 
samples taken in a systematic and standardised way (Oates 2006); hence, relationships can be 
quantified and evidence for the paradox empirically justified (Gable 1994). Surveys within 
HCI are typical and can most effectively capture an overview of system usage and how users 
are interacting with it (Lazar, Feng et al. 2010). In terms of this study, this system use can 
easily be compared to user perceptions and intentions; thus examining the relationships 
proposed to exist within the privacy paradox. Such a survey instrument shall be developed 
based on existing research (Govani and Pashley 2005, Acquisti and Gross 2006, Stutzman and 
Kramer-Duffield 2010, Brandimarte, Acquisti et al. 2012) with the aim of examining the 
privacy paradox in greater detail, bringing together literature within the field and informing 
further study.  
  Surveys are often used within behavioural research also where they can be used to gain a 
snapshot of what participants are thinking at one point in time. Furthermore, surveys are 
useful in measuring the relationships between variables in order to examine attitudes and 
behaviours over time (Cozby and Bates 2012). Each of these points shows how well the 
method in question pairs up with the research problem at hand. A snapshot of the problem 
may seem limited, however, the complexity of privacy has been noted and by producing an 
observable snapshot of the problem it is put into a form which can be studied in such a way 
that allows for falsifiable assumptions to be made. However, as surveys deal with self-
reported behaviour and not actual, this work seeks to examine its efficacy in exploring the 
complex concept of privacy and by extension the privacy paradox. 
  In keeping with the fields which drive this work (HCI and behavioural psychology) 
appropriate experiments examining User Interface elements forms the second and major part 
of this research; namely, the role the UI plays in influencing and contributing to the privacy 
paradox. Experiments are essential within HCI to examine user reaction to the technology 
being studied (Lazar, Feng et al. 2010) which is clearly ideally related to this research. 
Similarly, controlled experiments are a hallmark of research within behavioural psychology as 
causal relationships between treatments and observed behaviours can be identified and 
measured (Breakwell 2006). Again, this is in keeping with a positivist methodology, as 
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illustrated by the above table, where the research is focusing on the examination of causal 
relationships between certain UI elements and the privacy behaviours. In this case it is 
behaviours of personal information disclosure and the application of certain privacy settings 
onto that information.  
  Such an approach allows for statistically reliable results for the sample taken and, if validity 
is assured, are immediately relatable to a variety of contexts (Haslam and McGarty 1998); 
hence, the complexity of privacy can be studied through internally and externally valid 
experiments offering a “true” snapshot of a particular aspect of privacy. In reference to 
behavioural psychology, behaviour specifically is ideally explored through pre and post 
experiments comparing observable behaviours across appropriately conceived sample groups 
(Somekh and Lewin 2009). Such experiments are required to be designed such that observed 
differences are a result of any treatment applied to the groups under study (Acquisti and 
Grossklags 2004). Therefore, the treatments, which are the salient privacy features designed 
by the research, need to be clearly defined with justifiable choices made regarding their 
makeup and composition.  
  However, it was mentioned that a purely experimental approach driven by positivism has its 
limitations; namely a lack of exploration of the why observed behaviours occurred within the 
experiments according to the users perceptions. Such an approach could highlight dissonances 
between behaviour and understanding. For example, cognitive dissonance, where people 
explain conflicting views they may hold (Lee, Jung et al. 2011) can only be identified if 
perceptions are identified which differ from the behaviour and examining how those 
perceptions are explained by the participant. Therefore, where appropriate qualitative 
interviews shall also be conducted after the experiments in order to gather a richer set of data 
aiming to user thoughts towards to the experiments they participated in. Furthermore, during 
the experiments, observations shall take place examining how users interact with the systems 
put in front of them. The addition of these extra methods to the research makes the approach 
taken a semi mixed-method one; such an approach is recommended as appropriate within 
system work to allow for data triangulation, i.e. for one method to corroborate or add to the 
findings of another (Oates 2006).   
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3.7 Methodology Summary 
  This section has outlined the broad approach being taken by the research to answer the 
questions posed in the literature review. The work is to be driven by a mainly positivist 
approach which allows for the measurement of perceptions and behaviours to allow them to 
be easily and objectively compared to each other. This ideology is carried into the second 
portion of work where behaviour is objectively compared to a set of pre-defined UI elements 
acting as group treatments in a set of experiments. Observations and interviews shall also be 
added to this section to add a greater degree of data richness to the work and allowing for 
more reliable conclusions to be drawn from the resulting data sets. Hence, the work shall be 
gathering a mix of quantitative (from positivist approaches) and qualitative (from the 
interpretivist interviews) approaches. The details and design of these approaches shall be 
discussed later in the thesis in appropriate chapters.   
  At this stage, some questions remain open; for example, salience is again mentioned in this 
section. However, what it is and what it looks like remains unclear. This thesis shall need to 
find a justifiable way of identifying and dealing with this concept to aid the design of the 
experiment. Furthermore, the appropriate design of privacy salient UI features should aid in 
the drawing of sound conclusions from the data should they be embedded into experiments 
with validity. They are therefore, vitally important to this work and will be the theory upon 
which the experiments in particular will depend. 
  The following chapter begins exploring this point by outlining the survey and designing an 
appropriate instrument for use in examining the privacy paradox and in informing the design 
of experiments. Following the survey a review of the field of behavioural psychology shall be 
conducted in order to create a framework for the assumed causes of the privacy paradox 
within a well tested theory. From this, concepts of salience can be dawn, thus informing the 
design of the experiments and analysing the data from the surveys in a novel way. 
Furthermore, an appropriate behavioural theory should allow for more justifiable conclusions 
to be dawn as any observable behaviours can be explained using the composition of the well-
tested theory.  
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Chapter 4 – Survey Approach Design 
  This chapter deals with the design of the survey instrument aimed at exploring the privacy 
paradox in greater detail than currently exists within literature and to ascertain that the 
paradox is still in evidence within the sample to be chosen within this study. To review then, 
the literature review section dealing with the paradox identified a conceptual model of the 
phenomenon based on the elements studied within the research field. These elements included 
concern, intention and behaviour (disclosure of information and the application of settings) 
where a disconnect can exist between any. Using this model as a basis for exploration the 
survey instrument has the following aims; 
1. To identify where precisely the phenomenon of the paradox exists. 
2. To provide statistical evidence for this phenomenon 
3. To examine behaviour granularly as it exists within social networks and as it is 
enacted upon by end-users. 
  So, this survey instrument is aimed at gaining a more complete picture of the privacy 
paradox using figure 10 as the basis for exploration. In keeping with, and advised by, a 
positivist philosophy the survey shall quantify the relationships between elements so causality 
can be examined. Specifically, figure 10 suggests that concern should hold a relationship with 
attitude and behaviour (observable as disclosure and privacy settings applied). As such, 
measures are required for concern, attitude and perceived behaviour and a follow-up measure 
of actual behaviour. 
  This chapter then shall deal with the design of the instrument itself, examining each element 
requiring a measure and discussing an appropriate selection of questions for use in the final 
instrument.  Furthermore, the approach taken to the research shall be discussed with a 
statement of method made in terms of sample selection and analysis techniques to be 
implemented. Finally, limitations to the method and approach taken shall be mentioned with 
appropriate acknowledgements made of the issues to be aware of in this regard. The full 
instrument developed as a result of this chapter can be found in appendix 2. 
4.1 Survey Design 
  So, the purpose of the survey is to measure concern/attitude and intention (observed 
behaviour is also examined within this approach but not by the survey; this is discussed later 
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in the chapter). Hence, measurements are required for concern where the participant’s view of 
privacy is measured, for attitude where their views of social networks are defined and of their 
intention where reported behaviours are examined in terms of privacy settings and granular 
data control.  
4.1.1 Assessing Participants’ Privacy Concern 
  Typically within research assessing privacy concern the Westin measurements (Westin 
1991) are implemented (Ackerman, Cranor et al. 1999, Stutzman 2006). These measures have 
evolved over the years into a variety of privacy related questions assessing concern differently 
based on the problem area at hand (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005).  For example, in an 
extensive study of the concepts of concern and attitudes while online (Cranor 2000), the 
Westin privacy rating was used to measure the concern of participants in the study. This 
measurement is a collection of three questions, the answers to which group participants into 
three clusters of concern (unconcerned, pragmatic and fundamentalist). A review of studies 
where this instrument was used found that samples of participants were typically broken 
down as 18%, 57% and 25% respectively (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005). Similar approaches 
have been utilised in several papers where part of the aim of the survey instrument is to 
measure concern (Consolvo, Smith et al. 2005, Jensen, Potts et al. 2005). Consolvo’s work 
examined the use of the measure as an indicator of location disclosure behaviour, while, 
Jensen’s (as mentioned previously) used it to explore paradoxical behaviour. Hence, its 
applicability within this research field is demonstrated as it has a history of use. The following 
are the questions as conceived by Westin: 
1. Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used 
by companies.  
2. Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a 
proper and confidential way. 
3. Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for 
consumer privacy today. 
  For each question, participants answered by indicating their agreement to the statement from 
strongly disagreeing to strongly agreeing in a 5-point Likert scale. Should participants agree 
in any way with the first question and disagree any way to the second and third they would 
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receive a rating of privacy fundamentalist. Unconcerned participants would answer the 
opposite and pragmatists are the remaining participants.  
  As this is considered a typical method for measuring concern this research shall also 
implement a version of the Westin question tailored to online study (Westin and Interactive 
1999). This will maintain consistency with the larger research field and also is required as this 
aim of this survey is to bring together research dealing with privacy and behaviour.   
  The following set of questions is indicative of the Westin set utilised within this survey 
instrument: 
1. Users have lost all control over how their personal information is collected and used 
by social networking sites. 
2. Social Networking sites handle personal information they collect in a proper and 
confidential way. 
3. Existing laws and site policies/practices provide a reasonable level of protection for 
user privacy today. 
  Again, the same clusters apply where fundamentalists are thought to be strictly private and 
exhibit this through their behaviour (e.g. low levels of self-disclosure), pragmatists are more 
flexible in their privacy outlook (e.g. behaviour fits the context) and unconcerned individuals 
have a lax outlook towards privacy (e.g. protecting little and disclosing much).  
  However, the literature review made a point of the complexity of privacy and hence, the 
complexity of the concept of privacy concern. As such, this survey instrument should use 
multiple measures of concern for a deeper exploration of the privacy problem as perceived by 
the end-user. Therefore, a second measure of concern shall also be implemented within the 
instrument examining the users self-assessed level of concern. An example of such is found 
within literature from various other sources. For example, such a question may take the 
following form: 
1. “In general, how often are you concerned about your privacy while you are using the 
internet?” (Dwyer, Hiltz et al. 2007). 
  Westin derived a similar question where the possible responses required the participant to 
declare themselves as: very concerned, somewhat concerned, not very concerned and not 
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concerned at all (Westin, Maurici et al. 1998). Hence, a similar question and response is 
adapted and utilised in this instrument and takes the following form: 
1. How concerned are you about your personal privacy when using a social networking 
site? 
  This is combined with another Westin oriented question ascertaining whether the user has 
been a victim of a privacy invasion and shall be present in the survey as follows: 
1. Have you ever been the victim of a perceived invasion of your personal privacy? 
  Participants shall respond with options: yes, someone I know, no and do not know.  
  Finally, for measuring concern, it has been noted that thinking about privacy and becoming 
aware of certain features of social networking sites can raise participant concern and possibly 
promote a change in action (Pötzsch 2009, Tuunainen, Pitkanen et al. 2009). Therefore, a final 
question segment of the survey shall test if new knowledge raises concern and if this shall 
produce a self-reported intention to change behaviour. This shall have the obvious benefit of 
providing some indication of the potential effect of awareness on behaviour which informs 
and justifies the second portion of this thesis dealing with behavioural experiments.  
  As in the Tuunainen, et al (2009) paper the questions shall be focussed on a piece of 
Facebook’s privacy policy dealing with the ownership of data and shall be posed as follows: 
1. Are you aware that Facebook owns any information uploaded into the site (i.e. are you 
aware that it owns your information)? 
2. If yes, does this affect your behaviour on the site (i.e. are you less likely to put certain 
information on there)? 
3. If no, will you now modify your behaviour (i.e. are you less likely to put certain 
information on there)? 
  The goal of the above is to examine how aware participants are of some pressing and 
contentious privacy concerns surrounding the use and practices of Facebook. If they are 
aware, does that affect their perceived behaviour? This is to explore the idea that users 
behaviour is informed by their knowledge and their view of that knowledge.  
 39 
 
  Following this, is a final measure of concern reiterating the self-reported question described 
earlier; the aim here is to ascertain whether concern has increased over the course of the 
survey or in the face of new knowledge. These measures of concern shall be interspaced 
throughout the survey instrument and the complexity of privacy and concern shall be explored 
through the variety of measures implemented.  
4.1.2 Measuring Attitude 
  Recall, an element of the paradox, as explored within past research, included measures of 
attitude; that is, how participants view the use of social networks by examining of usage 
patterns (Acquisti and Gross 2006). Hence, for a holistic view of the paradox and a complete 
picture of end-users privacy perceptions this instrument is required to include measures of 
social network use. Again, this keeps the work in line within the current research field 
providing greater validity of data.  
  This work sees attitude as a participant’s use of social networks in terms of the extent to 
which they are active within the network. As such, typical questions here would include 
ascertaining if they are members of the network, how often they use the system and how 
many other users are in their friends lists. The style and types of questions implemented 
within this instrument shall be similar to those found within Jones and Soltren (2005), where a 
comprehensive survey was conducted to ascertain the threats present within Facebook. The 
survey included questions relating to who they add as friends, familiarity with the privacy 
policy, how many friends the participant has and how often they utilise the service. This 
specific research was not conducted in relation to the privacy paradox; however, the style and 
type of questions can easily be adopted and, indeed, are relevant to this research also.  
  A similar line of questioning was used by Strater (2007) which did deal specifically with the 
paradox; here, the focus of the study was disclosure within social networks. Furthermore, 
similar questions have also been implemented to measure awareness of privacy issues within 
social networks (Govani and Pashley 2005), where awareness was measured against the 
attitude questions to be implemented here. Hence, a complete picture of the paradox would 
not be possible without the application of a similar line of questioning. Therefore, the 
following table summarises the questions and responses found within literature and to be 
implemented in this study’s instrument: 
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Table 2 – A summary of questions and responses 
Questions Responses 
How regularly do you use a Social 
Networking Site? 
A. Many times a day 
B. Once a day 
C. Many times a week 
D. Less than once a week 
Have you read the privacy policy 
related to the Social Network System? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
Why do you use it 
(tick as many as apply) 
A. Keep in touch with friends 
B. Keep in touch with colleagues 
C. Get to know new people 
D. Easily obtain information regarding work/university 
E. Show information about myself/advertise 
F. Make it convenient for people to get in touch with 
me 
G. Build relationships   
H. Find Jobs 
I. Other, please specify; 
How many friends do you have listed 
in the Social Network System 
A. 0-50 
B. 50-100 
C. 101-200 
D. 201-400 
E. 400+ 
What type of people do you add as a 
friend on Social Networks? 
(tick as many as apply) 
A. Close friends 
B. Family members 
C. Friends you may not consider close 
D. Colleagues you may not consider friends 
E. People you know but do not consider friends 
F. People you have met but once 
G. People you have never met 
H. Other, please specify; 
Do you use the “custom” feature to 
group you friends list into types of 
people? 
A. Yes         
B. No 
 
If no, why not? A. Unaware of ability to do so 
B. Aware but do not know how 
C. Do not want to utilize feature 
D. Too time consuming to do so 
E. Other, please specify; 
What would a person not on your 
friends list be able to see do you 
believe? 
A. My Friends 
B. My Groups/Networks 
C. My Info 
D. My Pages 
E. My Photos 
F. My Wall 
G. Do not know 
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The previous table details the questions to be implemented in order to study the attitude of 
social network users. Attitude is defined here as their view of social networks which is 
indicated by their general use (i.e. not their specific behaviours) if social networks; so, how 
often do they use, how do they use it, do they read the privacy policy. The assumption from a 
privacy paradox point of view is that increased concern should be linked with having a lower 
number of friends or using the service less than others. Such an assumption is, in part, what 
this research is exploring by using a wider view of the phenomena.  
One final question is added to this section which aims to build on the examination of the 
concept of privacy and inform future efforts to define the concept from a user point of view. 
This is an open-ended question asking the user for their definition of the concept of privacy 
summed up into one sentence. Such a question is introduced by this work to examine how the 
end-user views personal privacy. This question shall be posed thus: 
1. Please write a brief sentence on what you believe privacy means to you. 
  It is left deliberately open in order to allow user to explain what privacy as they see it and 
how they relate to it; i.e. either generally or specifically to social networks.  
4.1.3 Measuring Behaviour 
  The final two measures required by the survey concern behaviour. Specifically, a measure is 
required for self-reported behaviour in terms of privacy settings and self-disclosure of 
personal information (the second measure required shall be discussed in greater detail in the 
approach section).  
  Recall, there is a need for the study of behaviour to be granular in nature as behaviour within 
social networks is performed and protected individually; for example, a user date of birth is 
entered into a field on its own and separately from other pieces of data. Such aggregation of 
data is how the “digital person” is constructed within these social network environments 
(Solove 2009) and users are therefore required to deal with their personal privacy individually 
and granularly. Furthermore, granular information control is how the observable elements of 
the paradox are exhibited; i.e. an observed behaviour is either a piece of disclose information 
or the application of protection to individual pieces of data or groupings of data.  
  Stutzman (2006), talks about an issue with social networks being that new types of data, not 
normally thought of as private, are introduced requiring individual control and when taken 
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into account with various other pieces of information produce privacy problems. Hence the 
need for a granular study is suggested. Starting with disclosure behaviour; within the 
Stutzman study participants were asked to declare if they disclose individual pieces of 
information about themselves within social networks. A list of typical pieces of information 
found within services such as Facebook was generated and used as the question set within this 
study and this instrument shall adopt a similar approach. Therefore, within the survey to be 
used in this study the typical granular pieces of information found within Facebook shall be 
used as a complete question set examining the likelihood of disclosure as perceived by end-
users.  
  However, differently from other studies this instrument intends to combine this exploration 
with the complexity of social privacy (continuing the theme of privacy complexity found 
throughout this instrument). For example, the role of conflicting social spheres has been noted 
previously (Binder, Howes et al. 2009) as a problem within social network as users tend to not 
only add their close friends to their network (Gross and Acquisti 2005). In order to encompass 
this into the survey participants shall be asked to measure their likelihood of disclosure to 
certain groups of people; namely, friends, colleagues and strangers. The following is an 
example of questions and responses which shall constitute the final instrument: 
Full Name         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Date of Birth         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
   
Note, the use of a Likert scale to for participant to grade their likelihood of disclosure; this 
carries benefit of allowing users to grade their perception giving a finer grain of responses. 
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  Finally, for self-reported behaviour is the application of privacy settings. As in the Tuekci 
(2008) paper exploring the paradox, participants shall be asked to report on their privacy 
settings within social networks. In keeping with the idea of granularity participants shall be 
asked to report on what they believe their settings to be in a set of question derived from the 
granular controls present within Facebook. The response to such questions shall be based on 
the options available to be applied found within the system as the following example of the 
instrument shows: 
 
  Note these granular groupings, in terms of their presence within Facebook, were true at the 
time of the surveys administration to the sample group. 
4.1.4 Observing Behaviour 
  The final requirement of this phase of the study is to gather observed results from actual 
network use in order to ascertain whether the paradox is still in evidence within the sample 
available to this research as a whole. Therefore, a portion of the sample must be analysed for 
their actual behaviour within the network. Using the same table for reported behaviour (to 
maintain consistency) a sample of the participants who responded to the survey shall be 
examined in person by the researcher. If there is data present and available to the review of 
their profile then it is said to be disclosed and open to strangers; this can then be compared to 
the reported answers given within the survey. So, a Facebook profile shall be used which 
holds no relation to the sample taken. If a piece of information is visible on their profile when 
visited, say their date of birth, it is present to strangers. This then is compared to whether they 
reported as such in the survey. As the information on a profile falls into several categories of 
settings it is therefore possible to determine whether their profile is as open as they believe. 
Any information governed by a setting other than “open to Everyone” should not be visible to 
the profile examining the samples profiles.   
 
 
Primary Information Everyone Friends and 
Networks 
FOAF Only Friends Custom Not Sure 
Full Name       
Date of Birth       
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4.2.1 Detailing the Approach 
  The research will be conducted within the University of Salford and shall focus on first year 
undergraduate students for a number of reasons. First, the paradox has been noted as being a 
particularly strong feature of young users of social networks (Barnes 2006) within the age 
range of a typical undergraduate. Secondly, the research shall use convenience sampling and 
approach participants within lecture sessions as undergraduate classes will offer larger 
numbers of potential participants than other methods. Convenience sampling is utilised due to 
the researcher’s access to student within the university, this will allow maximisation of 
potential participant numbers.  
  Therefore, lecturers in charge of modules with large student numbers shall be approached 
via email to request their cooperation with the research. Those who respond shall arrange a 
date and time for when the research can take place within one of their sessions; either before 
lecturing or after. The survey shall be administered as agreed upon alongside consent forms 
for participation in the research. Those participants who indicate a willingness for further 
involvement in the work shall be used for an expert evaluation of their social network profiles 
in order to ascertain actual behaviours. These evaluations will be conducted immediately after 
the survey administration to ensure a current (in terms of data collection) snapshot of user 
perception and behaviour.  
  The reported settings from users shall be collated and turned into a “privacy score” and the 
observed settings given the same treatment. This shall allow for the scores to be compared 
using statistical tests giving greater validity to the results set. Scores are generated thus: a 
point of 1 is added if the information grouping is reported to be available to strangers and if it 
is available to strangers when reviewed. Hence, a higher score would indicate an increased 
amount of available information either reported or observed. For example, Facebook’s default 
privacy settings (at the time of data collection) would have a score of 4; name, photos, basic 
information and friends lists are available by default. Incidentally, this score shall be used 
when analysing data to ascertain deviation from the default.  
  The full survey instrument described thus far can be found in appendix 2. 
4.2.2 Initial Limitations 
  The sampling method chosen is not without limitations. First, focussing on a specific 
population for the sampling method may not be representative of social network users as a 
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whole. However, it is noted that the paradox is a phenomenon typically related to teen users 
of the service; therefore, such a focus is entirely appropriate. It is also noted that the response 
to the email may not be all encompassing of the student population present in Salford. For 
example, a survey including only those students on technical based courses, such as computer 
science, may not present paradoxical privacy behaviour which is representative of a SNS 
population as responders may be more technically aware and privacy savvy than other users. 
The results therefore, could suffer from a lack of generality to the wider research field. This is 
an acknowledged limitation of the approach and steps shall be taken to ensure a range of 
courses are involved in the research to enable a range of participants. Specifically, when 
approaching potential participants, courses from across the university shall be targeted.  
  Finally, the limitations of a survey method have been noted in the philosophy section; 
however, it is worth reiterating the need for such an approach in this work. The main concern 
here is to quantify and measure the aspects of the paradox in order to empirically explore the 
relationships which exist within it (either finding causal relationships or not). Furthermore, 
consistency must be maintained with the theme of the study as a whole which is exploring 
observable and quantifiable behaviour through HCI experiments.  
4.2.3 Summary 
  This chapter has described the creation of an approach to studying the privacy paradox 
phenomenon in a way that is more complete than any implemented within research thus far. A 
survey instrument is developed that measures each aspect of the paradox identified, but not 
completely studied, by literature; concern, network use and reported behaviour. The approach 
also details a method of behavioural observation to allow for comparisons to the survey 
responses; hence, all appropriate aspects of the phenomenon can be recorded and examined 
empirically. A sample shall be obtained for the study from the undergraduate first year 
population within the University of Salford following a convenience sampling method.  
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Chapter 5 - Privacy Perceptions Survey 
5.1 Introduction 
  Figure 10 from the literature review chapter provides an outline of the relationships being 
explored through this survey. Specifically, literature often assumes there should be a 
correlation between concern and attitude and between concern and behaviour (higher concern 
the less likely users are to disclose information and to apply protection). Literature also 
assumes that intention should match actual behaviour. This survey shall therefore test the 
following statements using the measures outline in the design chapter previously: 
1. Measures of concern are associated to the level of protection reported and applied 
within Facebook. 
2. The settings reported by users match those that they apply within a real world social 
network. 
  The survey is aiming to quantify the privacy paradox as it exists within sample (if it does) 
and clarify where the paradox potentially takes place and to examine if varying measures of 
concern give rise to varying relationships. Furthermore, the survey method is explored as an 
appropriate tool for exploring the concept of privacy and the paradox.  
  As per the research methods outlined, the survey was conducted prior to lectures during 
teaching time with the assistance of the lecturer leading the session. Out of around 400 
potential participants, 340 responses were obtained from the following modules; English 
literature, Spanish, French, Research Methods (Nursing), Analytical and Research Skills 
(Law) and Foundation Module (Nursing). A response rate of around 85% was, therefore, 
gained for this survey. Furthermore, 151 of the survey responses where checked for actual 
privacy behaviour within the social networking system Facebook, this accounted for 43% of 
the participants who took part in the survey.   
5.2 Participant Overview 
  This initial section shall briefly go over the participant details for the sample used in this 
study (full details can be found in appendix 3). Mentioned in the introduction, the full number 
of responses was 340 with the following table breaking down the gender split; 
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Table 3 – Gender Breakdown 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Male 70 19.9 20.6 
Female 270 76.9 79.4 
Total 340 96.9 100.0 
Missing System 11 3.1  
Total 351 100.0  
 
   The number of females taking part in the survey far outweighs the number of males; this 
could be due to the convenience sampling method used where the courses who responded to 
the request for participants mainly came from the nursing school which predominantly is 
female oriented within Salford. This is a noted limitation of this sampling method.  
  Participants were also profiled according to their age and can be broken down as such; 
Table 4 – Age Classification 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Non M’ 201 57.3 59.1 
Mature 139 39.6 40.9 
Total 340 96.9 100.0 
Missing System 11 3.1  
Total 351 100.0  
 
  As per the University classification system, a participant is classed as mature if they are over 
the age of 21; which shows a 60/40 split in the participant group. 
The following table shows the breakdown of participants who reported that they are users of 
social networking systems; 
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Table 5 – Social Network Users 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Yes 301 85.8 88.5 
No 39 11.1 11.5 
Total 340 96.9 100.0 
Missing System 11 3.1  
Total 351 100.0  
 
  As can be seen, the number of users in the sample far outweighs the non-users showing the 
prevalence of social network today. To further make this point the following table shows just 
how often such systems are used, with nearly 80% of the sample reporting at least daily visits. 
Table 6 – Regularity of Use 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Many a day 139 39.6 46.3 
Once a day 92 26.2 30.7 
Many a week 52 14.8 17.3 
Less one a week 17 4.8 5.7 
Total 300 85.5 100.0 
Missing System 51 14.5  
Total 351 100.0  
 
  The final table to be considered when examining the sample details the number of reported 
friends participants reported as having in the social network.  
  This table is interesting as the average number of Facebook friends (in 2011, when this 
survey was conducted) was around 130 (Quercia, Lambiotte et al. 2012). As shown in this 
study the most selected grouping of participants was in the 200-400 range, which is 
considerably higher than the average.  Again, this could be put down to the convenience 
 50 
 
sample and the fact that this sample is from only a particular segment of Facebook’s 
demographic. However, this does match with statistics from the Pew Research Institute where 
the average was 226 friends (Hampton, Goulet et al. 2011). Furthermore, research shows that 
younger users (of which this sample comes from) tend to have much larger friends lists than 
other demographics (Ugander, Karrer et al. 2011).  
Table 7 – Reported numbers of friends 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid 0-50 13 3.7 4.3 
50-100 27 7.7 9.0 
100-200 74 21.1 24.7 
200-400 98 27.9 32.8 
400+ 87 24.8 29.1 
Total 299 85.2 100.0 
Missing System 52 14.8  
Total 351 100.0  
 
5.2.1 Detailing Concern 
  The survey contained three separate measures of concern: the Westin rating, a simpler self-
classification measure and a similarly worded question at the survey’s conclusion. The goal of 
using three approaches to measuring concern was to examine the complexity of it from a user 
perspective; would there be a consistent measure throughout? Furthermore, a greater chance 
of causal relationships would be possible through more than one measure; i.e. if one does not 
relate to behaviour then would another? 
  First, then, the Westin rating (which assigned a rating based on the response to a set of three 
questions) is detailed in the following table: 
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Table 8 – Westin Spread 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Valid Unconcerned 60 17.1 18.1 
Pragmatist 195 55.6 58.9 
Fundamentalist 76 21.7 23.0 
Total 331 94.3 100.0 
Missing System 20 5.7  
Total 351 100.0  
 
  When conducted in wider research, the Westin rating typically is split across sample in the 
following way: 25% Fundamentalists, 57% Pragmatists and 18% are Unconcerned 
(Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005). Studying the above results shows that they fit very well with 
the research field at large matching the percentages very closely; in terms of measuring this 
degree of concern, therefore, the research has been shown to have validity through generality 
of results.  
  The following measure of concern came immediately after this one on the survey and was 
also designed by Westin. It is, however, a much simpler rating of privacy allowing the 
participant to declare for themselves whether or not they are worried about their privacy in 
social networks.  
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Table 9 – Concern Spread 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Concern 206 58.7 62.6 
No 
Concern 
123 35.0 37.4 
Total 329 93.7 100.0 
Missing System 22 6.3  
Total 351 100.0  
     
  Interestingly the amount of self-reported no concern is higher than the Westin rating of 
Unconcerned; illustrating the variance that different method of measuring concern can 
introduce. However, the two do hold an association according to a Chi-Square test (x=33.7, 
p<0.0001). Figure 11 illustrates this.  
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
  Figure 11 suggests that the Westin Unconcerned (on the x-axis) have a much higher degree 
of self-reported unconcerned (represented by the green bars) people and the opposite is true 
Figure 11 – Westin – Concern Relationship 
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for the other Westin ratings. While this result is unsurprising it does show that the two 
measures are related. 
  Notice the green bar in the Fundamentalist category showing users who reported that they 
are unconcerned about social network use. Although only 12 participants fell into this 
paradoxical category, it nevertheless shows the problem with concern as a measurement or 
influence of SNS use. For example, of the 12, 7 had the lowest score for their reported privacy 
settings (i.e. the strongest level of protection) which is perhaps to be expected going by the 
Westin Index. Their actual scores (of those involved in further study) were actually higher 
than their reported, suggesting the privacy paradox at work in some way.   
  A similar analysis of the Pragmatist rated participants better illustrates this point with little 
difference between the reported scores and the actual scores of the self-described participants 
in this rating. 
  First, the reported scores (scores are marked out of 10 and bracketed in a score out 5 
represented by the RepPBracket). A low score indicates a high level of wanted settings and a 
high score a low level.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  The graph is showing the reported scores for the Pragmatist rated participants split into self-
reported concerned and unconcerned. Note, that the spread across the two groups is very 
similar in terms of what settings participants believe they are applying regardless of their level 
Figure 12 – Reported settings – Self-described concerned and unconcerned pragmatists 
Pragmatists 
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of concern (a score of 1 would be achieved through everything being available to friends 
only). Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference between the two as may be 
expected (Mann Whitney U p=0. 84). 
  The graph for actual, observed, scores is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Again, there is a very similar spread with no statistically significant difference (Mann 
Whitney U p=0. 342), although the unconcerned group had some scores which are slightly 
higher, this was not significantly the case. 
  So, what does this imply? By studying the pragmatists in the survey the two graphs show 
that, regardless of concern, participants have very similar levels of reported behaviour and 
actual behaviour where their privacy settings scores are concerned. That is, regardless of their 
level of concern there is a consistent spread of how participants want to act and how they do 
act and their respective levels of concern play little part in influencing. One might expect, for 
example, that there be far higher “PScore” in the unconcerned groupings of participants. This 
has been a slight deviation from the chapter flow and shall be picked up again later, first, 
however, what else can be inferred from reported concern? 
 
 
Figure 13 – PScores for Pragmatists 
Pragmatists 
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5.2.2 Reported Concern and Social Network Use 
 Given that concern forms a part of the privacy paradox according to literature, each of these 
above measures shall be examined for relationships between themselves, general network use 
and reported behaviour. 
  The Westin measure of concern held a Chi-Square association with the number of friends 
participants reported (x=21.119, p=.007); similarly, the self-reported level also did (x=11.324, 
p=.023). Interestingly, Westin rated Unconcerned participants held fewer levels of the top-tier 
number of friends (400+) than the other two groups; this could imply that participants are 
occasionally unconcerned about their privacy if they are confident in their ability to protect it; 
i.e. they know that they have a restrictive and trusted friends list and as such are unconcerned 
about the risk. More work would be required in order to research this potential phenomenon 
further; however, it is not unreasonable to assume that confident, skilled user would be 
unconcerned about their privacy. 
  This theme is, in some way, continued in the next relationship where pragmatists and 
fundamentalists are more likely to report that they are unsure of their privacy settings; 
although, this is with a p value of .05 so may not be a statistically significant relationship 
(x=5.97, p=.05). This is similarly true in regards to the self-reported measure where 
concerned participants are more likely to admit to being unsure of their settings (x=5.48, 
p=.019). This could lead to the following conclusion, that concerned participants are aware of 
their own limitations and this informs their level of concern. Hence, the flexibility of concern 
is by no means a definitive indicator of behaviour as participants could, feasibly, be 
concerned due to their own knowledge and awareness of privacy and, also, have lax privacy 
settings due to this.  
  The Westin concern rating held no other relationships with reported use of social networks 
for the sample as a whole. Self-reported concern, however, had a few more. First, concerned 
participants are more likely to have read the policy of Facebook (x=10.04, p=.002) and are 
slightly more likely to report implementing custom privacy settings (x=4.09, p=.043). Each of 
these relationships makes sense if it is assumed that concern is a valid indicator of a more 
careful privacy outlook of social network use.  
  This brief section has explored concern and its relationship to a variety of simple social 
network usage indicators. It is by no means exhaustive but does highlight some interesting 
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points regarding the idea of concern. First, concern itself, like the concept of privacy, is 
changeable and means different things to different people. One participant’s concern could be 
low as their skill level is high leading to limited disclosure. In this instance concern is not an 
indicator of behaviour without knowing more about the participant in question. Secondly, 
how concern is measured is indicative of the relationships it could form with other elements 
in social network usage; some measurements hold relationships, while some do not. Hence, 
due to the nature of concern it is perhaps unreasonable to assume that clear indications of 
behaviour can be gained from any one definition concern alone.  
  This is further exemplified through the final concern measurement which deals with 
ownership of data. The response is classified in the same way as the self-reported measure of 
concern previously dealt with and, as it deals with an element of Social Networks, concern of 
it will indicate a concern while using the system. Hence, an initial report of unconcerned and 
a final measure of concerned could indicate a change in that participant’s perception of social 
network use. 
  First, then, the results themselves; as can be seen from the following table there is a 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks p<.0001) increase in the number of 
participants reporting concern compared to the first measure at the start of the survey. Recall, 
table 9 detailing the initial, self-reported measure of concern and compare it to the second at 
the end of the survey in table 10.  
Table 10 – Self-Reported Concern, Measure 2 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Valid Concerned 217 61.8 76.7 
Unconcerned 66 18.8 23.3 
Total 283 80.6 100.0 
Missing System 68 19.4  
Total 351 100.0  
   
 Wilcoxon is used as it is a repeated measure using the same participant group (Ott, 
Longnecker et al. 2001). Therefore, a significant number of people became concerned about 
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an aspect of social networking when they became aware of new information (specifically that 
Facebook owns the data stored on it). In total 74 participants who were initially completely 
unconcerned about their privacy in social networks expressed a final concern regarding this 
point (non SNS users did not answer this question, hence the decreased total).  So concern is 
changeable depending on how the question is being asked and on the, possibly changing, 
perception of the question from users. 
5.3.1 The Privacy Paradox 
  In terms of Figure 10 the previous section has preliminarily explored the element of concern 
as an indicator of general social network use which may be considered an aspect of user 
behaviour. However, disclosure and settings are the defined, observable behaviours which 
have been defined as discrete manifestations of privacy behaviour in social networks. This 
section shall now deal with examining if users are acting as they say they are (link between 
intention and behaviour). 
  Profiles were analysed according to the presence of data from 10 pre-defined groups 
representing the privacy settings found within Facebook. A score of 1 was added to an overall 
score if one of these groups was open to everyone visiting the profile and the final score 
divided by 2 to provide a manageable spread. For example, Facebook’s default settings have a 
score of 4 (the following groups are open to everyone: wall posts, friends list, photos, and 
basic information) which is bracketed to 2. The reported settings scores are detailed figure 14.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Privacy Score 
Figure 14 – Reported Scores spread 
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  The graph shows that the reported scores of 80% of the participants are in the lowest bracket. 
Indeed, as can be seen in the table found in appendix 3, the modal score across the sample is 4 
for all settings except full name. That is, the most select setting for all information groups was 
“friends only”; therefore, the majority of participants felt that their actual information was 
open only to friends except for their full name (so profile can be found but not viewed).  
  From these results it can be seen that the majority of participants in this sample believe their 
privacy settings to be fairly high, that a stranger idly viewing profiles would only be able to 
see their full name (and only 36% of the sample chose “Everyone” in this category; so, while 
modal, it is not as large an amount as other information groups).  
  Comparing these results to the settings scores gained from actual observations reveals 
evidence for the privacy paradox: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Immediately, it is clear that the scores are, on average across the sample, increased from the 
reported scores. This is a statistically significant increase with a Wilcoxon score of P < .0001; 
it is, therefore, a highly significant increase from the reported behaviours. Note the most 
common score here, with around 40% of the sample, is in the 2 bracket. Recall, that the 
bracketed score for Facebook’s default settings was 2; this would suggest that participants are 
simply leaving the system in its default state. Indeed, this is in keeping with the finding of 
wider research where it is estimated that around 80% of users in social networks leave their 
settings at default (Bonneau, Anderson et al. 2009). This work suggests that the figure is not 
Privacy Score 
Figure 15 – Observed Scores (PScores) 
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quite so high yet does provide evidence that leaving the settings at default is an issue within 
this sample.  
  Therefore, point two in the introduction is not true, as the reported settings scores and the 
actual scores do not match, but in fact increase with statistical significance providing evidence 
for the paradox.  
5.3.2 Specific Cases 
  In order to fully appreciate this point in greater detail, a few specific cases shall be examined 
for the increases they hold. 
  First, participant ID#17 seems to demonstrate the hallmarks of the privacy paradox evident 
in end-users. A reported score of 1 does not match with the actual, observed score of 3 shows 
that the participants profile and information contained within it are actually fairly open. 
Furthermore, it is actually higher than the default suggesting that the participant changed the 
settings to a more open level which is not reflected in the reported levels. Examining concern 
further clouds the issue; with a pragmatist rating and a self-reported measure of concerned 
while using social networks, the reported scores are perhaps to be expected. These obviously, 
however, are in no way indicative of actual behaviour. Furthermore, the participant reported a 
friends list of greater than 400 and this is the case with up to 1700 friends listed in the 
observation; this not what would be expected from a concerned participant. However, the fact 
that this is reported accurately, while settings are not, is interesting.  
  Another interesting participant (ID#203) for further study exhibits somewhat different traits 
to the first. Similar to the above participants, a score of 1 was reported for their perceived 
privacy settings. However, the observed score is placed in the highest bracket of 5 showing a 
large increase from the perception. A reported level of unconcerned would explain the 
observed behaviour if using the usual assumptions. Although, when considering the reported 
scores the case makes less sense but can be (potentially) explained thusly; the participant’s 
unconcerned attitude relates to the confidence from their perceived settings scores as this is 
based on a lack of awareness, this level of concern is ill-informed. Hence, the lack of skill and 
awareness of privacy is manifested in the loose privacy settings. This is further demonstrated 
through the final measure which records the user as concerned at the end of the survey.  
  Each of these two participants exhibit the same level of reported concern with an increased 
level of observed (actual) concern; however, their levels of reported concern are polar 
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opposites. This would demonstrate the pitfalls of assuming certain behaviours can be derived 
from any one measurement of concern. If examined across the sample some interesting results 
are found which are demonstrated and discussed in the following section. 
5.3.3 Concern and Behaviour 
  The theme of this section was touched upon earlier with the examination of a sub-set of 
concerned participants and their related settings scores and shall be expanded upon here. To 
review the central finding from that section; there was consistent results across the sub-sets of 
concern studied in terms of the reported and observed behaviour. The aim here is to explore 
point one from the introduction based on the assumed link between concern, intention and 
behaviour illustrated in figure 10.  
  Dealing first with the Westin rating there is no association (chi-square) recorded with either 
reported settings scores or observed scores (x=2.67, p=.953 and x=6.06, p=.641); therefore, 
no significance at all for these two measurements. The following graph demonstrates this for 
the reported privacy settings: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
And for the observed scores: 
 
Figure 16 – Reported Scores across Westin 
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  Notice, in the two graphs the spread across the three Westin groups is very similar. 
Although, in the observed scores chart the fundamentalist group has less no scores in the 
highest bracket, the difference is negligible and not statistically significant.  
  So, what can be summarised from these results? Regardless of the Westin rating given it has 
little to no bearing on a participant’s likely scores for either of the two measures available 
(reported and actual). Also striking is the number of participants that feel their settings are 
“friends only” throughout the SNS profile, again, regardless of the level of concern they hold. 
It could be that having a belief in a high privacy setting would lead to a user being less 
concerned about their privacy as they believe it to be well protected. Or, to state the opposite 
(and assumed relationship) a participant who is highly concerned will have high privacy 
settings due to their worry. The potential flexibility of concern in these two cases could be a 
reason why the above two graphs are the case; that is, no relationship with either.  
Figure 17 – Observed Scores across Westin 
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  To further explore this, the self-reported measure of concern shall be subject to the same 
analysis. In terms of relationships the chi-squared test, again, found no statistically significant 
link between this measure of concern and reported settings or actual settings (x=6.86, p=.143 
and x=3.59, p=.466 respectively).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Initially, notice how the spread is very similar to the comparative chart in the Westin 
evaluation from earlier. The concerned scores are slightly lower than the unconcerned; as 
before, however, this is not statistically the case.  
  The following displays the spread for the observed scores: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 – Reported scores across concern 
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  Notice, the scores do increase slightly for the unconcerned group with a greater amount of 
participants holding the middle bracket with their settings score; also, the concerned group 
held more participants in the higher bracket than unconcerned  and this could be for some of 
the reasons outline earlier (low skill increases concern if the user is aware of it). Again these 
findings are without any statistical significance.  
  In order to further explore this point, two sub-sets of participants shall be compared; those 
who are concerned in both rating and those classed as unconcerned in the two ratings 
(essentially those participants who are very clear on their level of concern either way). In the 
first category (fundamentalist in Westin and concerned in self-reported) held 62 of the 
participants from the sample. Furthermore, the second category (Westin Unconcerned and 
Unconcerned in self-reported) held 39 participants from the sample. The following two graphs 
show the reported scores for the two polar opposite groups. 
Figure 19 – Observed scores across concern 
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Notice that, even here, the two groups are very similar in their reported scores despite their 
very clear view on their level of concern. However, should this be an expected result? A 
concerned person is very likely to have a perceived or desired high settings score. 
Furthermore, an unconcerned person may very well be that way due to their perceived level of 
high protection. 
  Following this analysis further to the actual scores for the two groups gives the following 
graph: 
 
 
Figure 20 – Reported Scores – opposite groups 
Figure 21 – Observed Scores – opposite groups 
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Again, the spread across the two groups is very similar and there are no significant 
differences between the two despite their clearly opposed ideas of privacy. It should perhaps 
be expected here that concern should play a role in how users actually behave and yet it 
clearly does not; with patterns of use being very similar across all measurments of concern.  
What is clear, however, is that the paradox is very much in evidence. Participants actual 
behaviour rarely matched the reported behaviour across the sample as a whole. Given that the 
effect is equal across all groups and measurements of concern, it is a fair assumption to make 
that a consistent entity is having an equal effect on all. That is, whatever is causing the 
paradox is enacting on all participants equally and, when talking about it, the essence of 
concern plays a smaller part in the phenomena than originally thought (within this sample).  
  The reported scores show that, regardless of concern, the majority of participants  perceive 
their settings to be friends only (or want them to be) and therefore, the pieces of information 
they disclose on the social network is to their only friends. This could nullify any concern 
users have if there is confidence in the use of the system and the protection it has while 
unconcerned participants may very well be that way because they are confident.  
  Therefore, point 1 from the introduction is also not true as their appears to be no assocation 
between measures of concern and desired and observable behaviour as described by figure 10. 
However, there is a consistent desire for a certain level of protection acorss all measures of 
concern implemented.  
5.4.1 Granular Privacy Perceptions 
  The questions dealing with likelihood of disclosure (measured on a Likert Scale of 1 to 5) to 
various social spheres are detailed within this section. This produced a large data set which is 
broadly represented by the following graph: 
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  From this graph the differences in social sphere perceptions is demonstrated. Participants 
rated themselves as very likely to disclose any granule of information to who they perceive as 
their close friends. Indeed, the modal selection for each of the granules in this category is 5 
(very likely). This is in line with the perceived or desired reported P-Scores from the previous 
section where participants selected “Friends Only” for nearly all information groupings. The 
social sphere of strangers, however, is at the other end of scale with modal scores of 1 (Very 
Unlikely) for all data granules. Note the varying perception of sensitivity across the data items 
where participants rated physical data as more sensitive than more intangible ones. For 
example, address and phone number which grant physical access to the person where more 
highly unlikely to be disclosed to strangers according to the graph. This difference in the 
value placed on traditional pieces of information has also been highlighted within wider 
research (Stutzman 2006).  
  With regard to colleagues however, participants were far less certain in their ratings as a 
sample as a whole demonstrating the variation in the perception of trust placed on that social 
sphere. Some pieces of information trended towards the more likely to disclose (see Address) 
while others went the other way and are more spread across the possible responses (see 
Photos) showing that varying participants place varying value on the individual items. 
Figure 22 – Likelihood of disclosure to social spheres (5=high, 1=low) 
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  A clear need for careful and personal privacy management is therefore required for the social 
spheres present within a social network. Although, participants specified their need for friends 
only settings they do not only add friends to their network as demonstrated in the following 
figure: 
 
  
  So, within the network there is a further need for social management with regards to the 
granularity of who can see what information when it is disclosed and in the future. The 
custom feature for example is one such tool that could be used to manage a user’s social 
spheres so that only close friends from the “Friends List” see appropriate information. 
However, within this sample the reported use of the custom feature is low as demonstrated by 
the following figure: 
 
 
Figure 24 – Reasons for non-utilisation of Custom use 
Unaware 
Unskilled 
Unwanted 
Time-Consuming 
Other 
Figure 23 – Who people add to the lists 
 68 
 
  Furthermore, the results from the observed P-Scores show that participant’s information is 
open to strangers as the researcher (who is a stranger in the network to participants) found 
information that they reported as being set to “Friends Only”: a paradoxical disconnect 
between perception and action.  
  This section has demonstrated the complexity of conflicting social spheres and the 
underutilisation of tools within the network to manage those social spheres. Participants do 
desire to disclose to only certain parties as reflected by their reported likelihood to disclose 
and matched by their desired reported P-Scores (settings). However, their action in the 
network does not match, perhaps because that complexity is too difficult to manage 
consistently through changing social contexts. Also, the results show individuality of the 
privacy problem adding another layer of complexity. The colleague’s social sphere, for 
example, had much more spread responses across the data sensitivity questions showing that 
the perception of trust in colleagues is different from participant to participant. This aspect of 
individuality is worth noting further as it demonstrates the need for users to meet their own 
privacy needs based on their perceptions. In short, a technological solution could be 
considered difficult as management of this individuality is only possible by the individual.  
  Other examples of this individuality were in evidence throughout. For example, Westin 
fundamentalists were more likely to report having fewer friends than their counterparts (Chi-
Squared x=21.1, p=.007).  There also existed a significant relationship (x=6.20, p=.013) 
between the self-reported rating of concern and gender were females responded as being more 
concerned of their privacy in social networks (figure 25). 
 69 
 
   
  This, therefore, is consistent with what would be expected given the conclusion drawn from 
the above graph; females in the sample have higher levels of reported concern generally and 
this is reflected in the responses to certain data granules. Indeed, wider research has found 
similar findings (Fogel and Nehmad 2008).  
  So, why demonstrate individuality? The responses to these questions have shown that, where 
certain social spheres are concerned, participants have individual perceptions of privacy some 
of which are related to the kind of person they are. This, then, shows privacy to be dependent 
on the individual and, if their needs are to be met, then a granular level of control is required.   
However, it must be one which is implemented by the individual or they cannot be catered for 
otherwise. Participants do have nuanced views of appropriate disclosure which is personal to 
them and their reported behaviours and corresponding perceptions are consistent with each 
other. However, the consistency breaks down within the social network itself which begs the 
question of why; how are participants persuaded to veer away from their reported, consistent 
beliefs?   
  What can further be taken away from this? Participants have a clear definition of who they 
wish to disclose information to and that shifts and changes depending on what that piece of 
data is and who the party is learning of that data. Furthermore, the decision to disclose is also 
Figure 25 – Gender and concern 
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dependant on who is doing the disclosing; although there are clear trends across the sample as 
to the general idea of the likelihood of disclosure to certain groups, there exists a more even 
spread where colleagues are concerned and further demonstrated through the relationships 
explored between groups and the data granules. Hence, the individuality of privacy is also 
demonstrated from the results here. Despite this, the custom tool to deal with this complexity 
is not utilised by the majority of participants for a variety of reported reasons. The main 
reported reason was one of a lack of awareness; the question, then, is what would happen if 
users were made aware of the custom tool? Or, what would happen if it was made easier to 
use? Would either of these two system changes have a marked effect on the privacy paradox? 
  Interestingly, this individuality does not extend to reported/desired settings as has been dealt 
with in detail earlier. For example, one would expect that varying cultural values are placed 
on the concept of privacy. However, when splitting the students according to their 
international status (home student and not) there is no statistically significant difference with 
each group desiring the same protection, again as has been demonstrated for other groups 
earlier in the chapter.  
 These questions would contribute towards a greater understanding of how the system itself 
can make it easier to handle privacy and, if it does, examine if there be a significant change in 
the way it is handled by participants.   
5.4.2 Back to the paradox  
  The previous section identified that the likelihood of discosure for all pieces of information 
to friends was a modal response of 1 across the whole sample (a large majority of participants 
are happy disclosing anything to their friends circle). This corresponds with the 
overwhelming response in the reported settings question were the majority of participants 
believed that “Friends Only” was their privacy setting for most groups of information in their 
profile. Hence, if the granular perceptions of privacy are taken as intentions to disclose to 
certain parties and are matched with the reported settings then it is clear that participants have 
a clearly defined behavioural agenda. They wish only to disclose information to friends and 
believe (or report) that this is the case through their privacy settings.  
  However, the results from previous sections show that this is not the case with lax privacy 
settings for the sample as a whole. Furthermore, while participants stated a fairly definitive 
stance on the sharing of information only with friends for all data granules, this is not 
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reflected in the size of participant’s friends lists (nor types of people participants reported as 
adding to those friends lists). Hence, there is a further paradox here with regard to the 
definition and treatment of social spheres within social networks. If this is the case then 
participants must actually be concerned with what they disclose within the network rather 
than believe their settings are adequate. Indeed, even with the strongest settings applied the 
varying social spheres and extent of their presence suggests that unintended parties will still 
be an issue.  
  In order to illustrate this phenomenon further, some individual cases shall again be examined 
for the traits listed in this section showing some specific examples of paradoxical behaviour. 
First, a single information granule shall be selected for study; the granule of date of birth due 
to its even spread across the sample and the studied social spheres illustrated previously. The 
most obvious form of the paradox shall be studied first; that is for a randomly selected 
participant who reported that they are not likely to share their data of birth with strangers, how 
true was this reported perception. Take, for example, participant ID#320, a privacy 
fundamentalist, who states that they would only share their date of birth with friends and are 
very unlikely to share with other social spheres. This is reflected in their perceived settings 
where they are of the belief that everything is locked to “friends only” for all of their pieces of 
information, including date of birth. However, the paradox is clearly evident as the profile is 
very open (a bracketed score of 4) and, indeed, the participant’s date of birth is also available 
to anyone viewing the profile. By focussing on specific granules and more stages of thought 
were privacy is concerned the potential causes can be inferred with a greater degree of 
reliability (which shall be done later in this work). For example, where this participant is 
concerned, the perceptions of privacy are consistent until the actual behaviour is recorded; 
hence, the paradox is enacted at system level where this consistency is broken.  
  Taking another example with another information granule; participant ID#39, a self-reported 
concerned user, stated that they would only share their home town/location with their friends 
and very unlikely to share with colleagues or strangers. They stated that their settings 
reflected this and were set to friends only and yet their privacy settings are very open and the 
home town/location clearly visible when their profile is viewed. Again here the paradox is 
demonstrated in greater detail and with greater specificity than before (by focussing on an 
individual piece of information – both disclosure and protection of that disclosure). However, 
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intention scores across the majority of participants was evenly spread regardless of their level 
of concern where the majority stated they only wanted to disclose to their close friends.  
  A static measure of concern, therefore, does not seem to be a reliable measure of intention 
within the social network. Indeed, for the reasons outlined previously in this thesis, the 
context of the response to the concern measure could differ from the context of actual 
behaviour. This has also been noted in other work within the field (Johnson, Egelman et al. 
2012). So, while a participant can have a general idea of what privacy means to them this is 
not indicative of how they want to behave in the network itself. However, there is a 
disconnect between this intended behaviour and actual behaviour within the network system. 
This would suggest that there is an influence at the point of interaction either by the UI or due 
to the role of human cognition. Consider the theory of hyperbolic discounting (Acquisti and 
Grossklags 2004) that suggests users trade long term risk for short term gain. This will 
influence end behaviour only as there is no obvious risk-reward concept in the measure of 
privacy concern but is present when choosing to disclose. However, what would happen if the 
UI informed the user of this phenomenon, would their behaviour change?  
  Recall also, literature has noted that the paradox could be caused by a lack of privacy 
salience within the network (Houghton and Joinson 2010); that is the information necessary to 
make informed privacy choices. That salience could be information that draws attention to the 
risk of disclosure or information that makes it easier to protect oneself thus ensuring the 
paradox does not occur due to a lack of skill as it has been suggested (Fang and LeFevre 
2010). Note, this thesis is not suggesting that the UI is the one and only cause of the paradox 
but it does seek to understand what kind of role it could play in influencing and solving it.  
  The paradox then as it exists within this sample can be conceptualised according to the 
following figure: 
 
 
   
  So what is concern? Within the context of this work it seems to be an arbitrary and general 
statement of worry about social network use. It does not relate to the context of actual 
behaviour; indeed, perhaps it cannot as a survey instrument cannot hope to model the 
Does not match  
Actual Application 
 
Believed Application 
Figure 26 – Paradox overview 
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variables present in a decision to perform privacy behaviour. Hence, it could be that 
participants expect a level of engagement with the network and yet are worried about the 
effects they cannot control (trust in Facebook, invasions from nefarious parties and how the 
system will protect them). This may lead to the statement of concern seen in this study; it 
certainly seems that there is a baseline expectation to how one should act in a social network 
regardless of concern. It could also be that participants have stated a response that they feel is 
expected of them. They know they should be concerned, the media tells them so, and so they 
have responded as seen. All would point to a pre-arranged measurement of concern being 
ineffectual in predicting behaviour and that the paradox is caused by the contextual influence 
within which the interaction takes place (the system, user cognition etc.).  
5.5 Justifying the Definition 
  Recall, from a previous chapter, Solove’s definition of privacy is described as the driving 
definition behind this study. From this definition the focus was placed on the actual act of 
information revelation and, in social networks, this is particularly defined as the disclosure of 
personal information. Following the act of data revelation a variety of privacy related issues 
become possible making this particular definition an umbrella term for all those issues. 
  The survey contained one open-ended question dealing with defining privacy. This was 
designed to gauge what users of social networks define privacy as in order to create solutions 
to privacy challenges which are human centred. From the responses to this question, the 
following tag cloud was created of the words which appeared in the responses with the most 
frequency: 
 Figure 27 – Definition tag cloud 
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  As can be seen from the picture the most prominent words used in the response to the 
question included: Keeping, personal, information and confidential which, fortunately, needs 
no work to turn into a workable privacy definition of “Keeping personal information 
confidential”. Immediately this ties in with the first stage of Solove’s privacy definition of 
information revelation and the fact that this is drawn from participant responses makes the 
definition more relevant to this study.   
  In order to reaffirm the point here; this definition would lend itself to one of limited 
disclosure. That is, certain pieces of information must be kept confidential and remain 
undisclosed in order for true maintenance of one’s own privacy. Confidentiality is only truly 
possible if personal information is kept secret as the moment it is disclosed to a social 
network the boundaries the information resides within are potentially limitless.  
  This definition implies that there is an ownership of personal information that must be 
protected; the word “keeping” would suggest that information must be retained and not 
released in order to maintain that implied ownership. This in itself is paradoxical to the idea of 
social networks were disclosure is encouraged and once it has taken place ownership has 
shifted and is blurred. Interestingly, therefore, the definition is evidenced in the settings 
reported from participants in this study and the goal of social networks is clearly in evidence 
when looking at the actual, observed settings. Hence, this is a good summary of the paradox 
and the problem it poses; participants are aware of privacy and can form a clear, distinct 
definition of the concept as it means to them and yet act in an opposite manner to that 
definition.  
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
  This chapter has demonstrated several interesting points from the survey conducted and has 
done so with a greater degree of detail than previously available by taking both a case by case 
view and a view of the entire sample. However, the survey also provided empirical evidence 
for other areas of privacy which have long been stated within literature. The first of these is 
the idea of complexity within the privacy concept has been demonstrated; the variation 
between classifications of privacy concern has provided data for the changeable nature of 
privacy based on context. Furthermore, the related assumption of individuality was also 
demonstrated with empirical evidence through the granular privacy ratings and the differences 
shown between varying groups of people taking the survey.  
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  From demonstrating these two points there is clear indication that there is no one-size fits all 
approach to providing technological privacy solutions; this is an assumption which has been 
made in literature (Rosenblum 2007). What is required, then, is a mechanism which facilitates 
this from an individual perspective, a mechanisms which enables participants to adhere to 
their own reported needs which, this survey demonstrates, are consistent across all concern 
groupings.  
  Furthermore, the generated privacy definition based on the open-ended question asked of 
participants has provided justification for focussing on privacy as the act of disclosure. This is 
useful for this study as the act of disclosure (and by extension protection of that disclosure) is 
clearly defined privacy related behaviour. It also raises further questions; first, why do 
participants take a clear view that sensitive information should not be disclosed yet do so 
anyway? Is this because they believe it to be well protected and available only to friends? 
Participants perceived settings would indicate this to be the case. Why, then, are these settings 
not accurately reported? 
  Interestingly the survey found that, regardless of the profiling used, the desired behaviour 
was consistent across all users (application of mainly “Friends Only” settings). Furthermore, 
in terms of perception and likelihood of disclosure there were consistent scores from across 
the sample that granules of information would only be disclosed to friends and not to 
strangers (with some variation of whether or not they should be disclosed to colleagues). This 
is despite participants freely admitting that they do not just add friends to their social 
networks. So what can be concluded from this? There is a clear need for granular controls 
when in a social network, participants only want their friends to know certain pieces of 
information and yet add more than just friends. Furthermore, their granular perception reflects 
this with varying ratings across the social spheres examined. Despite this, however, granular 
controls are not applied in the cases studied where the privacy paradox is clearly evident. 
Why this is the case is unclear and is the subject of further research throughout this work 
which attempts to examine the behaviour itself and why it is different to what users want at 
the point of interaction. The act of disclosure is arguably a more pressing issue for research 
based on these results as should controls be applied, participants still hold differing “real 
world” social spheres in the network.  
  It could be that users find it difficult to quantify potentially intangible risk and instead focus 
on the tangible outcome based reward; similar to hyperbolic discounting (see causes table in 
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chapter 2). For example, if the users has a goal of strengthening particular social ties with a 
specific friends group then the goal is clear and obvious (from a user’s perspective); they 
know the message, intent and target audience. However, the potential risks are numerous and 
potentially unknowable leading to poor privacy behaviour that is in pursuit of reward rather 
than risk. This however, does not explain poor settings application as observed within this 
chapter which could be a result of low technical skill. It is the aim of this thesis to explore this 
point further. 
  Despite the range of perceptions of granular pieces of information participant consistently 
want, or report, friends only levels of privacy settings application. This could be due to it 
being the highest level of protection offered and therefore, the most reported as participant 
know that is what they perhaps should want their profiles to be given the media attention 
privacy and social networks receives. However, it is consistent with the samples perception of 
the friends only social sphere touched upon numerous times thus far; that is, the modal results 
for all granules is, indeed, very likely to share with only friends.    
  In relation to figure 10, the concern does not negatively correlate to intention or behaviour. 
However, this may not be paradoxical as the desire for strong privacy settings is consistent 
and perhaps should not be related to concern at all. The link between intention and behaviour, 
however, did increase with statistical significance and as such demonstrates the presence of 
paradoxical behaviour where it deviates from the desired or the intended.  
  To summarise, this chapter found the following; 
 The privacy paradox is clearly still an issue and this survey has provided statistically 
significant evidence for it between participant’s desired settings and their actual. 
 Through examining the paradox granularly, greater detail is provided for its make-up 
where it is demonstrated that the disconnect lies specifically at a behavioural level; in 
particular, the importance of clearly defined social sphere has been demonstrated.  
 It can be assumed that the same effect is occurring equally on all users given that their 
settings scores are not significantly different from each other when profiled (despite 
levels of concern differing between groups the settings scores do not). 
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 Similarly, the desire for privacy protection is consistent across all groups where 
particular social spheres are concerned (the sample as a whole only want to disclose to 
close friends). 
 The complexity and individuality of privacy is empirically demonstrated showing the 
need for a flexible solution that enables users to suit their own unique privacy needs.  
  The questions still left to answer, however, include the following; 
1. Why does the consistent link between intention and behaviour break down when 
actually in the environment being considered? 
2. Does the environment, therefore, play an active role in breaking this link? 
3. What will the study of behaviour, when it happens, reveal about the paradox? 
  These questions shall guide the rest of the study in attempting to produce a more holistic and 
thorough understanding of privacy behaviour in web-based services with particular focus on 
online social networks. The role of the environment is an important one to study as behaviour 
does not match intention at a system level. Hence, more work is required to ascertain why 
people are not acting the way they report. Given that behaviour is not statistically different 
across user groupings, it is a reasonable assumption to make that the cause of the paradox (or 
one of the causes) is acting on all participants equally. As privacy behaviour (like any 
behaviour) is a reaction to environmental stimulus, the User Interface is an appropriate area to 
examine as one of the potential causes.  
  The remainder of this thesis shall examine the role the interface could play in influencing 
users during interaction with a focus on disclosure behaviour as these seem to play a more 
complex role in poor privacy behaviour. That is, settings can be applied but privacy may still 
suffer due to the potential recipients of that information. Furthermore, there may be a 
tendency for a user to consider themselves “safe” as they perceived their settings to be enough 
(especially, when they have not been implemented as perceived).  
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Chapter 6 – Models of Cognition 
6.1 Introduction 
  The field of HCI has a history of utilising psychological principles to design and implement 
experiments evaluating the use of user interfaces for the performance in achieving the 
designed tasks. For example, applied psychology has been typically applied in order to 
understand the individual user’s behaviour within a non-human environment and to supply 
performance models to the UI designer (Card, Moran et al. 1983). This study however, 
proposes using behavioural psychology to evaluate the cognition of behaviour with a view to 
understanding the privacy decision of users within a simulated social networking 
environment.  
  The aim is to examine the various behavioural models which have been created within their 
research field and implement the most appropriate for the context of this study. This has 
several benefits to the research as a whole; first, a well-tested and proven theory shall allow 
for clearer and well justified assumptions based on the acquired dataset. Secondly, not only 
will the relation of UI elements to behaviour be examined but also, with the backing of a 
cognitive model, a deeper understanding of privacy oriented behaviour in general can be 
gathered. Finally, this research proposes and tests a new method to evaluating the effect of 
user interfaces on human habitual behaviour using the field of applied behavioural 
psychology. Social networks have been identified as a persuasive technology and the area of 
PT proposes the use of psychology within it (Fogg 1998). As such a novel research method is 
proposed where the elements of behavioural models are used to guide experiment design and 
used in analysis to aid understanding.  
  This chapter shall therefore review behavioural models which have been typically applied to 
computer systems research and select the most appropriate with sound justifications; in order 
to achieve this, the causes of the paradox, as reviewed earlier, shall be taken into account as 
an appropriate model should relate to each of the causes found in some way. This is a vital 
pre-cursor to the design of experiments.  
6.2 Behavioural Models 
  This section will introduce and examine the behavioural theories which may be applicable. 
Specifically, behavioural change theories are the focus of this section given their applicability 
in examining and explaining the reasons behind behaviour and proposing ways in which that 
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behaviour can be changed (CommGAP 2009). Furthermore, only the theories which are 
immediately relevant to the study shall be considered; relevance is measured by how easily 
the model fits the context of this study.  
  The first behavioural model to be considered is Social Cognitive Theory which focuses on 
the role of self-efficacy in the learning of skills through peer observations (Bandura 1986). 
Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s confidence in their own ability to perform a particular 
behaviour which they have viewed others doing around them. Initially, this looks like an 
interesting fit to the problem area under study here; users have observed others within the 
social network disclosing information and applying settings and have followed suit. Also, 
such a model has been applied to the area of technology use where its applicability in the 
training of computer skills was explored (Compeau and Higgins 1995). However, while this 
does partially offer a background to exploring the peer effects on disclosure behaviour within 
social network the various other potential causes cannot be considered (e.g. the role of the UI; 
which this study is concerned with). Furthermore, in the study mentioned previously, it was 
found that, compared to competing theories, Social Cognitive theory performed less well in 
influencing performance and behaviour.  
  The Stages of Change Model is the next model to be considered as a potential theory to 
understanding the privacy paradox and privacy behaviour in general. This model describes 
behaviour as habitual requiring stages of intervention to change it (McConnaughy, Prochaska 
et al. 1983); for example, disclosure of highly sensitive information could be habitual within 
social networks (indeed, this would agree with the persuasive technology aspect of the area). 
However, the model is longitudinal in nature; that is, it requires constant observation within 
stages of intervention that take place over a longer period of time than is available to this 
study. Furthermore, it does not cover all causes which are listed in the literature review 
chapter and is a model more suited to clearly defined habitual behaviour such as addiction, 
making it unsuitable to application within HCI (West 2005).  
  This brings the chapter to the models developed by Ajzen starting with the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA). The TRA (shown below) describes the factors which influence the 
intention to perform a certain behaviour and thus the actual behaviour it leads to (Ajzen and 
Fishbein 1980).  
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  Attitude describes an individual’s knowledge of the consequences of performing a certain 
behaviour which influences their intention to perform it. The other factor, subjective norms, 
describes the influence others play on the intention to act; for example, the effect of expert 
opinions or one’s peers. Immediately the similarities to the paradox can easily be observed; 
attitude deals with user’s skill or knowledge, while, the subjective norms category maps 
nicely to the effect of the user’s friends within the network in propagating open privacy 
behaviour. Furthermore, Ajzen labelled these factors as salient features which are necessary in 
performing any behaviour and these are, usually, found in the environment the behaviour is 
being performed within. Recall, the lack of salient privacy information within the social 
network environment has been proposed as a potential cause of the paradox (Schneier 2009). 
However, a criticism of this model includes the fact that the intention to perform a certain 
behaviour is not always indicative of the actual behaviour which is acted (Sheppard, Hartwick 
et al. 1988). This criticism relates directly to this study where the paradox deals with precisely 
this kind of disconnect between intention and actual behaviour rendering this model 
inappropriate for use in the research of privacy behaviour.  
  In response to this criticism, Ajzen developed the Theory of Planned Behaviour (shown 
below) which added in the idea of control and perceived control (Ajzen 1991).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 28 – The Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) 
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  The added element of control here describes how easy an individual believes a particular 
behaviour is to perform and this perception influences the intention to act, while the accuracy 
of that perception influences the observable behaviour performed (represented by the dotted 
line). The addition of this feature makes this model much more applicable to this study within 
the context of the privacy paradox phenomenon. Added justification for the use of this model 
is shown with how closely the salient features proposed in this framework map to the 
potential causes illustrated in the literature review.  
  Specifically looking at each factor in isolation demonstrates how the model can be adapted 
to both explain and explore privacy behaviour; first, attitude (also called informed awareness) 
deals with the user’s attitude toward privacy, their knowledge of privacy issues and their 
awareness of the context within which they are behaving (i.e. awareness of the consequences 
of disclosing a particular piece of information to a particular person, group of people at a 
particular point in time). Secondly, subjective norms (as with the TRA) deal with the 
influence of one’s peers and experts where the behaviour is concerned. Finally, perceived 
control deals with the user’s perception of how easy the network is to use in terms how easy it 
is to identify and protect their sensitive information. Interestingly, when this model has been 
applied to marketing campaigns it was found that a focus on only information dissemination 
was not as successful as campaigns which promote a positive attitude and ease of controls 
(toward the product in question) (Martiskainen 2007). Hence, improving only awareness of 
Figure 29 – The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
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privacy issues may not be enough to promote pro-privacy behaviour and why the UI could be 
so persuasive as it is closely related to perceived control which would seem to be the most 
influential factor.  
  The addition of control also relates to self-efficacy (closely tied to perceived control) which 
has been pin-pointed in other models as essential in performing a behaviour. In the case of 
social networks, a user’s confidence in its use will be directly related to how they behave 
within it; so, the survey results seen previously could therefore, find an explanation through 
the theory of self-efficacy; namely, participants believe themselves to be confident, secure 
users of a social network which is not reflected in reality resulting in the paradox.   
    To offer a potential example; a user may believe to be aware of the consequences of poor 
privacy and report this accurately, however, protecting their privacy in the network (or 
identifying sensitive information) could be harder than they actually believe resulting in high 
levels of disclosure or poor privacy behaviour; the influence of perceived control would 
therefore be apparent. Another case may include a user who has limited knowledge of 
technology and privacy but knows they should be concerned about their safety due to 
increased media attention and panic; this may result in the reporting of high concern but little 
evidence of it in how they act. 
6.3.1 Salient Features 
  Each of these salient feature proposed by the TPB can be related to the causes stated in the 
literature review chapter (table 1). This section shall map these to the TPB to demonstrate 
applicability.  
6.3.2 Personal Attitude 
  The personal attitude salient property described the influence that the individual’s 
knowledge plays in the decision to perform a behaviour; specifically, knowledge and 
awareness of the consequences of the behaviour in question.  Recall, the causes of the privacy 
paradox listed in the literature review as being personal to the user; users were said to be 
inexperienced of privacy issues (Kolter and Pernul 2009), unsure of the openness (Barnes 
2006) or lacking in awareness of what is important to them were their privacy is concerned 
(Pötzsch 2009). Each of these issues or causes relating to the privacy paradox are covered 
within the umbrella feature of personal attitude as each of these are likely to inform the 
awareness of behavioural consequences. Furthermore, given the shifting and changing context 
of privacy within a social network (demonstrated by the granularity of information) it stands 
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to reason that this would also fall under this feature. Hence, the personal attitude aspect of the 
model can be translated thus in this privacy study: 
 
 
 
 
 
  The dissection of this feature would suggest that if users of social networks are informed of 
privacy issues or reminded of their own privacy knowledge then there behavioural intention 
will change and they may enact better privacy behaviour.   
6.3.3 Subjective Norms 
  The TPB suggests that behaviour is influenced by the views and actions of those around the 
actor. From the review of causes earlier recall that concern toward privacy issues could 
heightened due to intense media attention directed at the issue (Norberg, Horne et al. 2007) 
and users could act according to the behaviour of their peers (Strater and Richter 2007) 
(conforming to a kind of peer pressure: i.e. their friends are active so they must be as well). 
Again the fit with the TPB is well demonstrated as the subjective norms factor encompassed 
these causes well and provides a framework for them. It is proposed that the model can be 
expanded thusly: 
 
 
 
 
  This suggests that behaviour is influenced by what user’s friends are doing within the social 
network and their reported intentions may be influenced by media attention and the thoughts 
of experts in general. For example, a user may disclose much as their peers do so also and the 
theory of social capital would back this suggestion; as users disclose like their peers in order 
to strengthen social ties (Portes 1998). However, users could report being concerned about 
their privacy due to media and expert intention which would therefore give the reported levels 
of concern seen in privacy surveys (i.e. users know they should be concerned and state so).  
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  The question which arises from this section of the model is: “will users act differently if they 
are aware of good privacy practices when they are acting?” as the TPB also specifies that 
behaviour is informed by expert opinion.  
6.3.4 Perceived Control 
  The final salient factor is that of perceived control which deals with the perception of how 
easy the behaviour is to perform and how closely that perception matches reality. From the 
causes mentioned earlier it was suggested that social networks are designed to be open 
(Livingstone 2008), that they are persuasive in their design to encourage users to disclose 
information (Fogg 2009) and that the complexity of their design makes it difficult to control 
ones privacy (Heeger 1998, Brandimarte, Acquisti et al. 2012). This then is perhaps the most 
technologically influential factor; how easy does the social network make it to identify, 
control and protect sensitive information? It would seem then, that how easy users believe a 
technology is to use and how closely it is designed to promote privacy may play a role in 
influencing behaviour. Expanding upon and applying the idea of this factor to privacy gives 
the following mini-model: 
 
 
 
 
 
  The TPB therefore suggests that if users control over sensitive information is increased 
through identification and persuasion then they may enact better privacy behaviour.  
  Combining these into a complete figure gives the following: 
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Control  System Complexity 
System Persuasion 
Intended 
Behaviour 
Actual 
Behaviour 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  A note of self-efficacy: the TPB identifies self-efficacy as influential within the perceived 
control salient property. This deals with a person’s ability to perform a particular task or 
behaviour (Bandura 1977) and is related directly to some of the causes listed in the literature 
review chapter; namely, awareness and level of skill within the network. There is work that 
suggests that users who exhibit tighter control over their information are more likely to seek 
out risk-coping information and mechanisms (Youn 2009). As such, user’s self-efficacy may 
be improved through the TPB and then encouraged to ensure their privacy risk is minimised. 
  Such a framework as described in figure 30 can be used to embed the salient features within 
UI environments in order to examine if there is a relationship between the level of information 
disclosed and UI elements. This model offers several benefits to this research in such an 
exploration. First, the clear declaration of each salient feature allows experiments to be 
designed around each one offering a broader exploration of poor privacy behaviour. Secondly, 
a range of hypotheses can be used to pose questions of the research rather than just one adding 
a greater degree of validity to the data set and assumptions made based on it. Finally, the TPB 
has a solid and tested background in psychological experimentation as it robustly identifies 
the determinant factors of behaviour and shows how they relate to each other (Tonglet, 
Phillips et al. 2004).   
6.4 Potential Criticisms 
  The Theory of Planned Behaviour is a model which has seen use in Information Systems 
Research before and has been criticised as being reductionist in its approach to understanding 
complex social issues. In response, this research is dealing with privacy behaviour which is a 
reduced element of the concept of privacy; any conclusions made will be based on the 
Figure 30 – The privacy paradox determinant factors 
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behaviours observed within this study and only assumed to potentially be the case for the 
concept as a whole. Furthermore, privacy is acknowledged to be a complex problem and in 
order to study it, it needs to be simplified (Masiello 2009). This research is primarily 
concerned with behaviours relationship with the UI of social networks; therefore, an 
experimental approach within HCI is entirely appropriate and the TPB provides the ideal 
framework to this for the reasons outlined earlier (namely the clear description and bracketing 
of salient influence of behaviour).  
  Finally, in a review of competing models within Information Systems research showed that 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour provided the most specific information for developers 
(Mathieson 1991); another benefit for this work as specific, measurable information is 
required as HCI is specifically a development and testing field. The Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM), for example, is a tool which primarily deals with self-reported perception of 
the ease of system use and how this correlates with the probability of system use (Legris, 
Ingham et al. 2003). As self-reported information is inaccurate (as shown by the paradox) and 
this model is longitudinal in nature (following a systems inception to its deployment and use), 
it is inappropriate for use in this study. Furthermore, the TPB was shown to provide a fuller 
understanding of behaviour itself by focussing on factors that influence it, due to its particular 
attention on control (Taylor and Todd 1995).  
  The TPB is therefore, highly relevant to this research as a framework which has the capacity 
to explain individual and isolated behaviour observed within social networks. When 
compared to other models, the TPB is specific in its characterisation of behaviour and the 
factors which influence making it ideal for application into experiments. 
6.4 Summary 
  This chapter has chosen an appropriate framework for designing experiments which explore 
behaviour and its relationship to the User Interface within which it is performed. However, 
the model offered can also be used to provide an explanation to paradoxical phenomena 
observed, either in this study or in related works. It is a highly flexible mode due to its 
development within behavioural psychology dealing with behaviour in general and not 
specifically with technology use.  
  The salient features described by the model map nicely to the proposed causes found in 
related works demonstrating its ability to explain and inform work within the field of privacy 
 88 
 
research and as a tool for designing experiments in HCI (dealing with any behaviour 
technology may produce). The following chapter designs experiments based on this model; 
through this a novel approach to embedding applied behavioural psychology into HCI 
experiments is demonstrated. By adding these salient features into the environment of the UI 
the ability of the system environment to persuade more ethical behaviour can be evaluated 
and any causal relationships between the UI (with salience embedded) can be tested.  
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Chapter 7 – Experiment Design and Approach 
7.1 Introduction 
  This chapter describes the design of a faux social network to be used in experiments with a 
focus on a sign-up process where participants are asked a series of questions in the creation of 
their profiles in such a social network. An outline of such experiments based on the TPB’s 
salient features is proposed with an approach to implementing them in order to explore the 
research questions posed by this thesis. First, hypotheses are stated which this experimental 
procedure must explore. 
7.2.1 Hypotheses 
  The model in figure 30 maps the potential causes found in the literature review of poor 
privacy behaviour and of the privacy paradox. Direct intervention at the point of interaction 
addressing these causes may promote more careful and considered privacy behaviour. Given 
that users appear to have a clear desire for privacy, it may be the case that reminding them of 
it will improve their behaviour. As privacy is observable through the amount of information 
disclosed and the protection applied (as outline in the literature review), it is reasonable to 
posit that these behaviours may be altered. Furthermore, given the definition from the survey 
chapter (“Keeping personal information confidential”), users may be influenced to keep more 
information private. As such, based on this model the following hypotheses are proposed 
based on Personal Attitude: 
H1. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at informing or reminding participants of 
privacy consequences will influence user behaviour and decrease the amount of 
sensitive information they give. 
H2. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at informing or reminding participants of 
privacy consequences will influence user behaviour and increase the level of settings 
applied. 
Subjective Norms: 
H3. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at informing participants of preferred 
privacy behaviour will influence user behaviour and decrease the amount of sensitive 
information they give. 
H4. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at informing of preferred privacy 
behaviour will influence user behaviour and increase the level of settings applied. 
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Perceived Control: 
H5. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at aiding users in identifying sensitive 
information will influence user behaviour and decrease the amount of sensitive 
information they give. 
H6. A UI with privacy salient information aimed at aiding users in identifying sensitive 
information will influence user behaviour and increase the level of settings applied. 
  Again, in order to assess these hypotheses, measures of disclosure (what people say about 
themselves) and settings (how much they protect their digital identity) will be used as per the 
literature review. 
7.3.1 Experiment Design 
  Participants will be asked to set-up their account profiles on a new social network built 
specifically for their University. Participants are recruited from the student body with the 
focus on Undergraduates as in the survey detailed in this thesis. During this process they will 
be asked a series of questions to “build” their profile and told that the more questions they 
answer the more accurate and complete their social network would be. These questions vary 
in potential sensitivity should they be answered by participants during the experiment. They 
also vary in the kind of response they require with text-boxes, drop down menus and radio 
buttons used to provide a variety of interactions. A full list of these questions can be found in 
appendix 5. 
  The set of questions are derived from the questions which were used in the survey from the 
first phase of this study. This maintains consistency throughout the study and adds to the 
generality of the results obtained since they will mirror real world systems. Furthermore, 
included within these questions, which the user may expect as part of their past experience, 
will be more sensitive questions covering a range of topics. The idea being to test the limits of 
disclosure based on the participants privacy perception of the information requested. The 
questions to be added are partly adapted from the Brandimarte et al (2012) study where a 
variety of questions were asked of participants with varying degrees of sensitivity (split into 
three categories) and differences between groups measured (groups had a variety of extra 
options for answering questions). For example, sensitive questions would be added dealing 
with drug use, drinking habits and professional conduct.  
  After answering these questions participants are asked to set their privacy settings. 
Furthermore, an extra link will be present on this page for the participant to follow and set 
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their separate connection settings; this is kept optional in order to explore how engaged with 
the system participants are and to see if they will seek out privacy protective mechanisms.  
  The experiment procedure will follow a between group, post-test analysis design consisting 
of a control group and three treatment groups based on the salient features described in the 
previous chapter and designed in the following section. The number of questions answered, 
which questions were answered and the settings applied will be compared between groups to 
examine if the treatments influenced participants to disclose less and protect more.  
7.3.1 Control Group 
  The control group will mirror as closely as possible a real world application of a social 
network in order to make the experiments as ecologically valid as possible. Therefore, the 
first page of the social network sign up process uses CSS styling to match the feel and visuals 
of the first page of Facebook’s home page screen. The experiment is created using HTML, 
PHP, CSS and JavaScript. The following two figures demonstrate the sign-up screen for 
Facebook and for the experiment: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And Facebook: 
Figure 31 – The Salford Network 
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  Notice the similarities between the two including the request for the same pieces of 
information to sign-up to the system. The mimicking of Facebook where possible shall 
increase the generality of the experiments as there is a real world example of the choices 
made and also address the ecological validity of the experiment where experimental settings 
should resemble real world systems so the design itself does not affect results (Lew, Nguyen 
et al. 2011). The initial experiment has been named the “The Salford Network” in keeping 
with the brief given to participants about a new network for students at the University of 
Salford; note, a second experiment is also conducted using a similar procedure as outlined 
here but aimed at students at Nottingham Trent University. This first page has a total of 7 
questions asked of the user, two of which are optional. Completion of this initial page leads to 
the “profile builder” (figure 33) where the questions dealing with disclosure are found and 
completed by the participant; the idea being to answer the questions in order to create enough 
information to create a like network with their peers (that is, participants are informed that the 
more questions answered the more precise their resulting network with others will be). 
 
Figure 32 – Facebook 
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  The questions are split in to a variety of subsections with a specific focus; these are derived 
from Facebook where possible and some question groupings added for the experiment to test 
the limits of disclosure. For example, the highly sensitive questions form their own group 
which “add context” to a participant’s profile (see following figure). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  This page has a variety of interaction types including checkboxes, text fields and drop down 
selections. The idea being to test a range of interactions with a view to examining if the 
varying types influence the decision to disclose; for example, the above are most sensitive 
Figure 33 – Experiment Questions 
Figure 34 – Context questions 
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but, perhaps, the easiest to answer so will this increase the likelihood that they shall be 
disclosed?   
  The final question grouping deals with marketing information and other pieces of data which 
may be of interest to advertisers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 11 summarises the questions and their groupings with the experiment. The total 
number of questions answered by participants will be compared to the control to test H1, H3 
and H5. 
Table 11 – Experiment sections summary 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Detail 
Sign-up The first page of the experiment contains basic 
sign-up information and is not particularly 
sensitive. 
Contact Information The user is asked for contact information; 
such as address, phone, email etc. 
Education & Interests The user is asked for educational background 
information and personal interests.  
Contextual Information This section contained a variety of questions 
dealing with the personal context of the user. 
Questions ranging from relationship status to 
drinking habits were included in this section.  
Marketing data This section asked the user about shopping 
habits; favourite stores, items usually bought 
etc. 
Figure 35 – Interests questions 
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  The next screen sets the privacy settings for the participants newly created profile. As 
mentioned previously, these are split into two groupings, one of which requires navigating 
through an extra link in order to access in order to examine participant engagement (figure 
36). These settings mirror Facebook (both in content and separation) in order to promote 
familiarity. However, these do govern some information that was not asked of participants in 
the previous “profile builder” section; for example, wall posts and photos. This is because 
settings are often considered separately from disclosure and research suggests that they are 
not related (as may be assumed) (Christofides, Muise et al. 2009). The survey chapter also 
demonstrated that regardless of concern or perception the majority of participants favoured 
the application of the highest level of protection in their privacy settings.    
 
 
     
  A default button is included should the participant wish to skip this process and apply open 
privacy settings. Figure 37 details the separate connection settings which deal with who can 
contact interact with the participant in terms of friend requests, likes and other contact 
information. Responses to these match those found in Facebook at the time of the experiment: 
everyone, networks, friend of a friend and friends only. Figure 38 deals with the profile 
information settings in terms of the personal information of the participant and is the 
dependant variable used to test H2, H4 and H6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36 – Experiment settings direction 
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 And the profile settings where the responses are everyone, friend of a friend and friends only: 
 
 
  The settings asked of the participants are summarised in table 12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37 – Experiment connection settings 
Figure 38 – Experiment privacy settings 
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Table 12 – Settings summary 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Following completion of the settings applications the experiment in over and an exit survey 
is provided. Full details of experiment procedure are provided following the design of the 
treatments.  
7.3.2 Personal Attitude 
  The Personal Attitude (PA) treatment derives a UI feature from the TPB aimed at informing 
participants of the potential behavioural consequences should they disclose a piece of 
information or choose an open setting and aims to test H1 and H2. According to the causes 
from Figure 30, participants will either need to be reminded of their own privacy attitude 
(Pötzsch 2009) or their awareness of privacy issues informed (Jones and Soltren 2005). 
  The work proposes that a simple UI metaphor can be utilised to quickly indicate the potential 
consequences for particular behaviours by grouping the requested information according to 
sensitivity. UI metaphors are particularly useful as they can aid users in quickly developing 
the mental models required to correctly use a computer system (Marcus 1998). Hence, a 
simple traffic light system is proposed called “Privacy Lights” to classify data according to its 
potential sensitivity.  
  The “Green” grouping deals with low impact data that, at its worst, could lead to social 
embarrassment (Strater and Lipford 2008) or annoyance from advertisers (Johnson 2010) if 
disclosed. For example, a user’s hobby may not be sensitive but could result in 
embarrassment depending on their social group or favourite films may lead to annoying, 
targeted advertising if disclosed. 
Settings Detail 
General Settings These were explicitly presented to the user 
during the profile creation process and 
covered areas such as photos, education, 
interests etc. 
Connection settings These settings required extra exploration by 
the user (although the link was presented to 
them during the process). These covered the 
general settings of who can contact them and 
how visible they are.  
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  The “Yellow” grouping deals with more sensitive but not necessarily illegal data granules. 
For example, employers may examine social networking profiles prior to offering 
employment (Miller, Salmona et al. 2011). As such, some information could cost users a job, 
e.g. religious or political beliefs.  
  The “Red” grouping highlights data that could be in breach of the law, either by the user or 
toward them. For example, data in a SNS profile could lead to identity theft (Donath and 
Boyd 2004). Or information posted could be used in prosecution; for example, posting 
pictures of underage drinking or drug use (Morgan, Snelson et al. 2010). 
  It is important to note that these groupings are based on interpretation and the participant 
may not agree with them. However, the purpose is to suggest and inform participants and may 
remind them to enact their own needs or persuade them to follow the advice the treatment 
offers. Indeed, such a UI feature has been called a persuasive “suggestion” where an 
appropriate behaviour is mentioned at an opportune time (Fogg 2003). A full list of these 
groupings can be found in appendix 5.  
  Upon beginning the experiment the treatment is introduced to the participant in an 
informative pop-up (figure 39). 
 
 
 The lights themselves are present alongside each request for information as detailed in figure 
40.  
Figure 39 – Personal Attitude Intro 
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  Each of the questions asked of participants is given a “Light” which they may use to inform 
their behaviour. Each privacy setting is also given a “Light” based on the data the setting 
represents. When arriving at the settings portion the treatment is re-introduced with a settings 
specific pop-up box (figure 41).  
 
 
  Figure 42 demonstrate how the treatment is added to the UI for the profile settings. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40 – Privacy traffic lights 
Figure 41 – Personal Attitude Settings Intro 
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  This treatment has added a simple UI metaphor based system to inform and remind users of 
the consequences of information disclosure and settings application. It is an easily 
recognisable colour scheme that participants should be able to quickly understand and 
assimilate. The treatment itself does not add complexity to the system itself so should not 
adversely affect participant efficacy toward the system.  
7.3.3 Subjective Norms 
  The TPB suggests that behaviour is influenced by the thoughts or peers toward that 
behaviour by Subjective Norms (SN); for example, peer pressure and herding behaviour may 
influence users to act as their friends do. However, it also suggests that the opinions of experts 
also influence behaviour (e.g. from the media). Therefore, the treatment based on this 
property aims to introduce direct advice based on what others have done or suggest; one from 
other users and one from a “Privacy Expert” and aims to test H3 and H4. This will be 
introduced to the user within a pop-up box called “pAdvise” (figure 43) and “locks” the page 
requiring the participant to close the pop-up before continuing.  
Figure 42 – Settings traffic lights 
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  The peer advice states that other disclosed for all elements bar the “Red” category data 
granules defined in the PA group. The expert advice advises against disclosure for all bar the 
“Green” categories of information. A pop-up box for each question asked of participant is 
added by the treatment as illustrated in figure 44. 
 
  The settings screen draws attention to the requirement for the separate settings in order to see 
if engagement can be encouraged (figure 45). 
 
Figure 43 – Subjective Norms Intro 
Figure 44 – Subjective Advice 
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  Finally, the settings themselves have similar pop-up boxes that advise on the recommended 
setting and the settings utilised by peers (figure 46). 
 
 
  This treatment has been designed to give clear and obvious advice through the use of a pop-
up message box for each question and setting that the participant interacts with.  
7.3.4 Perceived Control 
  The final treatment interprets the TPB’s Perceived Control (PC) into a privacy salient UI 
feature and aims to test H5 and H6. PC suggests that the perception of how easy behaviour is 
to perform influences both the intention and action of behaviour. The causes listed in table 1 
Figure 45 – Subjective norms pop-up 
Figure 46 – Subjective Norms settings advice 
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suggest that a participant’s ability to identify and protect their information within a 
technological setting may produce poor privacy behaviour. Furthermore, research suggests 
that the concept of social networks themselves are designed to be open and users may 
associated them with the act disclosure (Fogg and Iizawa 2008). As such, the aim of the PC 
treatment is to aid the participant’s control over their information by helping to review, 
identify and alter sensitive data. Therefore, it will give participants the opportunity to review 
and modify their data after each form submission by placing the data out of the social network 
context and into a privacy oriented one where the data with a (potentially) higher sensitivity is 
highlighted if the user has submitted it. Figure 47 illustrates such a screen which immediately 
follows the “profile builder” screen detailed in the control group.  
 
 
  To aid with the clear impact of interactions (effect of control) a dynamic P-Score is added 
and a level of risk given based on how much has been disclosed. The advice to delete in order 
to improve the P-Score disappears should a form element be empty and the P-Score reduces in 
increments based on the data deleted. The aim of which is to give a clear impact of interaction 
encouraging users to control their data with a tangible outcome. The forms prior to reviewing 
information (i.e. the social networking aspects) in this group is the same as the control group. 
To be clear, participants will access what looks like the control and, after each form is 
completed, they will review and modify their data in the treatment. There will therefore be 
two measures for this group: before review and after. 
Figure 47 – Perceived Control Review Screen 
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  A similar screen follows the settings application which also compiles the settings into one 
screen. This is the only group where the separate “connection” settings will be explicitly 
displayed to the user during the compulsory flow of the sign-up process.  
  A full set of screenshots for the treatments can be found in appendix 4.   
7.4.1 Experiment Summary and Procedure 
  This section summarises and outlines with clarity the specific procedure the experiment 
follows to allow for replication and verification. The above has outlined the groups to be 
included in the first experiment: a total of 4 groups in experiment one following a single 
factor, between groups, post-test analysis design. Using the TPB has the added advantage of 
defining multiple groups for the exploration of multiple potential causal links aiding the 
internal validity of the experiment (Church 2008). 
  Participants will be recruited from undergraduate students using a convenience sampling 
approach. It is noted that this may not produce a sample of a social networking population 
that is representative. However, this age group, as noted in the survey section, is the most 
susceptible to the privacy paradox and is therefore suitable in this study.  
  Participants are invited to volunteer to sign-up to a new social network and are approached at 
the end of teaching labs where they can take part in the experiment. Participants are given a 
simple set of instructions (which can be found in appendix 6) that directs them to the start of 
the experiment. At this stage, the true nature of the experiment is not revealed in order to 
minimise the impact of the Hawthorne Effect and to ensure the external validity of the 
experiment (Smith, Milberg et al. 1996).  
  Participants are randomly assigned to one of the groups in the experiment where they then 
follow the sign up process. Each group is asked the same set of questions and has the same 
base UI with the treatment groups SN and PA adding to that UI and PC treatment adding 
extra review pages. The experiment is stored on a web server and given a web address for 
access, participants therefore access the experiment through a standard web browser. 
  In the Control, PA and SN groups participants will complete a minimum of 3 pages in the 
experiment, possibly 4 if they follow the extra link to the connection settings. The PC group 
will complete the same number of pages as the control but with a review screen after each 
form submission as outlined in the treatment design. Therefore, there is a minimum of 6 pages 
the participants will complete, potentially 7 if the extra link is followed. After each form 
submission, the submitted data will be inputted into a MySQL database for analysis. If the 
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extra link is followed a record is also made in a MySQL database. As mentioned earlier, there 
are two measures for the PC group before and after reviewing their data allowing the exact 
effect of the review screen to be examined. 
  Measures are taken for what participants disclose (i.e. what questions they answer) and the 
level of settings they apply. In order to test H1, H3 and H5 the amount of disclosure across 
the groups is analysed for statistically significant difference when compared to the control. 
Should participants be considering their privacy it is assumed that the more sensitive 
questions will be answered the least. Therefore, data submitted by participants will also be 
split into the pre-defined categories of data sensitivity to examine difference. It should be 
noted here, that participants may not agree with the information groupings. However, they 
may still be persuaded by the treatments to follow the advice or improve their privacy score 
and will therefore choose to leave some answers blank. 
  In order to test H2, H4 and H6 the settings applied by participants are given a score based on 
their selection in the profile settings portions of the experiment. The profile settings have a 
score of 10 for FOAF’s and a score of 20 for Friends Only with a total score of 200 possible 
based on the 10 settings that can be applied.  
  A similar score is generated for the connection settings with a score of 10 for networks, 20 
for FOAF and 30 for Friends Only with a possible score of 210 for the 7 settings present; 
although, these are to explore engagement with the system and self-efficacy. Again, the scores 
in the treatment groups will be compared to the control for any potential statistical 
significance. This multi-measure approach (disclosure and settings) is intended to avoid 
mono-measure bias and improve the construct validity of the experiment (Oulasvirta 2008). 
  The experiment should take 20 minutes to complete and a short exit-survey follows which is 
aimed at examining if concern is notably influence by the privacy salient features participants 
are exposed to (designed later in this chapter). A number of participants will also be selected 
to take part in a small interview about their experience taking around a further 20 minutes.           
7.5.1 Additional Approaches  
  The previous methodology sections outlined the need for a partial mixed-method approach 
to overcome the initial limitations of a purely quantitative one; furthermore, the need for an 
exit-survey was also mentioned to tackle the element of intention. As such this brief section 
shall outline the extra approaches implemented along with the above experiments.  
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  Following the experiments is an informal interview with some of the participants. The goal 
again is to add a greater degree of richness to the quantitative data gathered with some of the 
qualitative opinions of the participants in the study. This shall be informal in nature and does 
not necessarily have a set agenda for the interviews as unforeseen talking points could be 
present through the observations. However, a set of general question to guide the interviews 
will focus on the participant’s perceptions and thoughts of the salient features added. For 
example, did they affect their perceptions and thoughts on social network privacy? 
7.5.2 Exit Survey Design 
  Following the experiments is an exit survey with the aim of tackling intention as the 
experiments themselves can only measure the resulting behaviour. This section shall describe 
the design of this brief survey.  
  The survey itself shall be hosted online and use Google Docs which has the added benefit of 
being linkable straight from the experiment website itself. Given that the aim is to explore 
intention and that the salient features have been based on the TPB, the survey questions shall 
be based on past surveys which implement the TPB as its driving theory. First however, in 
order to maintain consistency with the early portions of this study, the Westin privacy survey 
shall be included in order to get an overall view of privacy perception as they have been 
measured thus far. 
  Questions then shall be added to measure intention, attitude, control and the subjective 
norms of the participants in the experiments. First, intention deals with their view of 
disclosure and how comfortable they are with the concept. As such, the following set of 
questions deal with measuring disclosure developed from surveys used in health research and 
follow guides published for just such a reason (Francis, Eccles et al. 2004); 
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  Typically, survey based questions which utilise the TPB take the form of a Likert scale 
response to a statement related to the perception being measured (Beck and Ajzen 1991). In 
this case, a general statement of intention of disclosure is made and participants respond with 
their measure of agreement. There are various methods for taking such a measurement within 
the scope of the TPB and the above is the most commonly used as it is the least resource 
intensive (Francis, Eccles et al. 2004). For example, a third method includes a simulation 
where a series of scenarios are used and perceived behavioural responses to them measured. 
Such an approach requires careful planning for reliability and is unnecessary within this study 
as the participants will have just been through an experimental scenario. A further alternative 
method focuses on performance; for example, asking how many patients out of ten would be 
sent for an X-Ray and comparing this to actual performance. While it may seem this is 
appropriate here, a more general question is required as the survey cannot deal with specific 
pieces of information (to avoid participant fatigue) or their varying contexts. As such, a 
question is required that deals with a participants perception of intention to disclose 
information about themselves in a more holistic way. 
The idea being is to take a general view of the participant’s perception of disclosure as 
described by the intention measure of the theory. Such an approach is taken throughout the 
design of the questions for each salient property being measured in this survey.  
  Measuring attitude involves using a set question and measuring the attitude using a varying 
range of responses. These responses are given a score and a final score calculated for a 
Figure 48 – Intention Measure 
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measure of intention (the results added up and averaged). This has resulted in the following 
set of questions measuring intention: 
 
   
  Note, the switching of the negative end-points on the scales in order to avoid the risk of set 
responses or ticking through by the participants.  
  The subjective norms measure implements a similar question set looking at the propensity of 
participants to listen to the advice or actions of others. Based on this and on literature that 
have implemented such survey questions the following has been developed: 
Figure 49 – Attitude Measure 
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  Again, the two are added and an average taken for a subjective norms score which is 
indicative of the participants likelihood of listening to others. 
  Finally, measuring of perceived control deals with the participant’s perception of the data the 
experiment dealt with, whether they thought it was easy to control their information through 
identification and control. These concepts carry straight through to the following questions:  
 
 
  The resulting scores are added and averages for a final score measuring perceived control 
where a higher score shows that participants thought that control over their information was 
easy.  
  This brief survey based much of its design on a manual developed for health researchers 
where the use of the Theory of Planned Behaviour is common (Francis, Eccles et al. 2004). 
Questions have obviously been adapted for use in this study. However one limitation should 
Figure 50 – Subjective Norms Measure 
Figure 51 – Control Measure 
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be noted; that in usual implementations of this survey style and individual behaviour is the 
subject of each question rather than the general way in which it is used here. The adaption has 
been made in order to have a brief survey with the aim of getting a general measure for each 
factor in relation to the experiment and a longer survey would run the risk of participant 
fatigue given their involvement in the experiments prior to the survey. As such, the use of 
such a survey here can be considered a test of method and the appropriateness of its use shall 
be examined in the conclusions chapter.  
7.6 Summary 
    This chapter has outlined a method of exploring privacy behaviour during a sign-up process 
to a faux social network. Participants will be split into four groups including three treatments 
and a control. The amount of questions answered each treatment group will be compared to 
the control to test H1, H3 and H5 while the settings applied at the end will be compared to the 
control to test H2, H4 and H6. Furthermore, a separate “connection settings” is available for 
participants to apply extra settings, the aim of which is to explore the engagement with the 
overall UI and the self-efficacy of the participant group. 
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Chapter 8 – Experiment One 
8.1 Introduction 
  The following chapter shall present and discuss the results from Experiment One designed in 
the previous chapter. Ultimately, the study is concerned with examining difference between 
treatment groups when compared to the control in terms of the levels of disclosure observed. 
This difference is hypothesised as being the levels of disclosure exhibited by participants in 
the experiment groups in terms of interactions with the system; i.e. how many questions did 
they answer. Recommendations are made for reworking the experiment based on the data 
gathered here and the subsequent methodological review.  
8.2.1 Overview of Results 
  A total of 45 participants where gathered for this phase of the study from courses across the 
University of Salford. A full breakdown of participants within this experiment can be found in 
appendix 7. Specifically, these participants came from the Business School (E-business and 
Information Systems) and the School of Science and Technology (Media and Networking). 
Participants were randomised between the treatment groups. 
  Table 13, below, summarises the results of the levels of non-disclosure across all the 
treatment groups. Note, there are two measures for the perceived control group, the first 
summarises the initial behaviour before it is reviewed and resubmitted as a result of the 
treatment applied to the group.  
Table 13 - Summary of Results 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
non-disclosure 
per participant 
Standard Deviation Total % of questions 
answered for the whole 
group 
% of Yes answers 
when responded (total 
answered) 
Control 
10 
3.7 4.3 
87% 53.4% 
PA 
11 
9.73 6.74 
68% 36.7% 
SN 
12 
10.17 7.32 
66% 47.1% 
PC1 
12 
12.17 9.6 
59% 41.4% 
PC2 
12 
18.58 7.54 
38% 54.1% 
  Note, PC1 and PC2 represent perceived control prior and after privacy review and is the same group 
  The table presents the average number of unanswered questions per question grouping per 
participant and gives the average per participant for the process as a whole as well as the 
standard deviation for the groups. The total number of non-disclosed items for the entire 
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group is also provided. Again, from the previous chapter, the Perceived Control group holds 
two measures, one before and one after the privacy salient review added by the treatment.  
Table 14 - Summary of Disclosure - Only "Yes" Responses 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
non-disclosure 
per participant 
Standard Deviation Total Group Disclosure 
when only counting 
“yes” responses 
Control 
10 
8.8 3.3 
68% 
PA 
11 
15.8 5.9 
45% 
SN 
12 
14.6 6.3 
48% 
PC1 
12 
16.3 5.5 
39% 
PC2 
12 
20.5 7.1 
28% 
 
  Table 15, below, details the results of a series of Mann Whitney U tests performed on the 
levels of non-disclosure for the treatment group compared to the control. The Mann Whitney 
test is chosen due to the small sample size and as result of the data not following a normal 
distribution. Hence, nonparametric tests are chosen as the statistical analysis tool for this 
experiment.  
Table 15 - Summary of Statistical Tests ran on levels of disclosure 
Group Statistical Test applied Disclosure P-Value for 
unanswered questions 
Disclosure P-Value using only 
“Yes” responses to binary 
questions 
Personal Attitude Mann Whitney U P=0.029 P=0.005 
Perceived Control (Pre Salient 
Review) 
Mann Whitney U P=.003 P=0.002 
Perceived Control (Post Salient 
review) 
Mann Whitney U P<0.0001 P<0.0001 
Subjective Norms Mann Whitney U P=0.025 P=0.043 
  
  Given that a value of p<0.05 is considered required for statistically significant results, an 
initial look at the table would suggest that participants within treatment groups answered 
significantly less questions during their account creation. This does not take into account 
which questions were answered by the participants but illustrates that, where treatments are 
present, less questions were filled in for the group as a whole. The second P-Value calculation 
does take into account what responses were made to the questions. Specifically, those with a 
binary response and deals only with yes responses (i.e. responding “no” counts as non-
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disclosure); findings, again, indicate that there statistically significant difference between the 
groups.  
  It would appear that H1, H3 and H5 have therefore tested true after an initial review of the 
data obtained from this experiment and this will be returned to throughout the discussion to 
ascertain the potential cause of the effect. A detailed breakdown of the results will be 
provided through the discussion following this section.    
  The above, initial, review of H1, H3 and H5 would suggest that changes to the UI have 
altered the behaviour of participants in the treatment groups.  Table 16 breaks down the 
responses to questions according to the sensitivity areas described in the experiment design 
chapter and used as the basis for advice offered by the treatments in other groups. The table 
details responses for both the total questions answered in each category and total when 
discounting questions where “no” has been answered. As the green category does not contain 
any yes/no questions there is no data for this section and no column for it.  
Table 16 - Location of Disclosure (Note, red indicates the least answered sensitivity grouping) 
Group % of “Green” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Yellow” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Red” 
questions 
answered  
% of “Yellow” 
questions, only 
yes 
% of “Red” 
questions, only 
yes 
Control 82% 90.3% 90% 60% 63% 
Attitude 60% 75% 67% 42% 32% 
PC1 54% 64% 57% 40% 33% 
PC2 39% 42% 33% 30% 18% 
Subjective 63% 76% 58% 48% 33.3% 
 
  If participants are considering their privacy then it is a reasonable assumption to make that 
disclosure will be the least in the more sensitive categories. The size of this effect should be 
greater in groups with salient properties embedded as they may draw attention to the 
sensitivity of information, providing participants with a “nudge” to consider their privacy. It 
would appear, from table 17, that participants did not choose to disclose based on their 
privacy due to the decreases in the green category also.  
Table 17 - Statistical comparisons of categories to control 
Group Test Green Yellow Red Yellow, only 
yes 
Red, only 
yes 
PA Mann Whitney .082 .084 .022 .033 .001 
SN Mann Whitney .131 .199 .004 .193 .005 
PC1 Mann Whitney .026 .003 .005 .014 .002 
PC2 Mann Whitney .006 .001 .001 .006 .001 
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  When examining only “Yes” responses disclosure was the least in the yellow and red 
categories when compared to the control. However, the spread when examining total 
questions answered is less clear; for example, the PA and SN group is not statistically 
different from the control for the yellow categories while the PC group held a significant 
reduction in the green category also. This may suggest that participants are not disclosing 
based on the sensitivity of the information asked for.  
  H2, H4 and H6 posited that participants within groups with salient features embedded in the 
UI would exhibit increased application of privacy settings when compared to the control. 
Table 18 details the averages for the settings scores obtained across the groups. 
Table 18 - Settings Results Overview 
Group Privacy Settings (St. 
Dev) 
Connection 
Settings 
Control 108 0 
PA 145.45 0 
SN 72.5 10 
PC1 160 13.3 
PC2 171.67 92.5 
 
Table 19 details the results of Mann Whitney tests performed on the settings scores. 
Table 19 - Settings Statistical Tests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  The treatments representing personal attitude and perceived control held increases in the 
average settings scores for their groups as a whole. However, these were not statistically 
significant as detailed in table 19. The subjective norms treatment actually held a decrease 
(trending in the direction opposite to the expected) in the group average when compared to the 
control and this, also, was without statistical significance. The reasons for this will be 
explored in the following discussion.  
Group Statistical Test Settings P Values 
Personal Attitude Mann Whitney U P=0.468 
Perceived Control (Pre 
Salient Review) 
Mann Whitney U P=0.381 
Perceived Control (Post 
Salient review) 
Mann Whitney U P=0.228 
Subjective Norms Mann Whitney U P=0.381 
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  No groups followed the connection settings with any consistency suggesting that perhaps 
self-efficacy was not affected to the extent that participants were willing to explore further 
privacy enhancing mechanisms. This will be explored later in the chapter.  
  Therefore, the null hypothesis for H2, H4 and H6 cannot be rejected from this dataset as 
there was no evidence that participants protected more when reminded of privacy when 
compared to the control group.  
8.2.1 Discussion & Limitations 
  The following discussion shall examine each group in turn by detailing the specific 
responses to questions; where appropriate information from observation and post experiment 
interviews shall be used to expand on discussion points.  
8.2.2 Control Group 
  Participants within the control answered more questions during the experiment than the 
treatment groups; specifically, participants answered 87% of the questions asked of them 
within this group. If only including answers where the participants responded in the positive 
the total percentage of disclosure for the group stands at 68%. Interestingly, the standard 
deviations for the control groups’ responses were the least when compared to the treatment 
groups (table 13). This would suggest a more consistent exhibition of behaviour from the 
participants within this group.  
  The questions asked during the experiment varied in sensitivity and the treatments group 
these into categories (described in the experiment design chapter). The treatments were 
designed to classify the questions and inform participants of them; the control group, 
however, were unaware of this overt classification and relied on their own perception of data 
sensitivity to fill in the questions. The spread of question responses across pre-defined 
sensitivities can be seen in table 16 which shows that participants actually disclosed less in 
the green category when compared to the yellow and red (if considering all questions 
answered). If only considering “Yes” responses, participants disclosed the least in the Yellow 
(marginally) category of data items.  
  However, answering a question in the negative can still be considered disclosure of the self 
in some way. If privacy is considered the right to form an identity to particular social spheres 
then answering in the negative will allow others to form an opinion of the individual 
(although, practically it may not be clearly privacy invasive). Indeed, the Theory of Social 
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Capital would suggest that anything disclosed about the self can be used to form an opinion 
about one’s identity. For example, admitting to not drinking may put an individual at a social 
disadvantage when confined to a party oriented social group. However, participants may 
mislead and lie about their submissions and it is unclear if this may be a tactic employed by 
participants in this experiment.  
  These initial results may suggest that the majority of participants within this group exercised 
high levels of disclosure during their account creation and disclosed potentially sensitive 
information in the process. This high level of disclosure could be due to participants building 
social capital with their intended peers (Portes, 1998) or due to them being driven by the 
perceived goal of the system (to create their accounts) and therefore prioritising this over 
other considerations such as privacy which may suffer from the secondary goal problem 
(Bonneau, Anderson et al. 2009). There is also precedent within research to suggest that 
participants simply answer questions asked of them with little thought within social 
networking sites (Strater and Lipford 2008). 
  Observations certainly seem to suggest that participants are focussed on the questions at 
hand as a number of them seemed to scan each individual question with the mouse cursor 
before answering. Attention was focussed on the questions specifically rather than the system 
as a whole as exhibited by no participants changing any of the connection settings which 
required exploring an optional link. Indeed, experiments with eye-tracking software have 
demonstrated that participants tend to focus more on the point of interaction (Whalen and 
Inkpen, 2005). So, participants seemed to focus quickly on the questions being asked of them. 
Again, these questions can be considered the sub-goals of the primary goal of account 
creation and hence HCI would suggest they are ignoring potential distractions in pursuit of 
their perceived primary goal (Bishop, 2007). Furthermore, research has suggested that users 
tend to forsake consequences of what is being asked of them, ignoring all else (Wu, Miller et 
al. 2006). Such an observation is in line with the Milgram effect which describes how people 
tend to act according to the whim of a perceived authority figure despite their usual 
inclinations (Milgram and Fleisner, 1974).  
  When asked post-experiment why they interacted with the system in such a way participants 
responded: “I tried to give the system what it wanted in case it would not let me to the next 
section” and when why they answered questions: “because the system asked for it”. This 
highlights a potential limitation in the experiment design as it may not have been clear to 
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participants that disclosure was optional; i.e. they had to answer the questions in order to 
finish the process.  
  Furthermore, interaction with the green category (which is not particularly privacy invasive) 
was less than the yellow and red sections (if including no responses). Work in security 
suggests that users tend to implement security features based on the ease of interaction (Sasse, 
Brostoff et al, 2001). Hence, this section may have required more user effort to fill in than 
questions with simple binary responses. Again, this highlights a potential limitation in the 
design as there are more of these open questions in the “Green” category than in the more 
sensitive sections. These points will be picked up throughout this discussion.  
  Finally, the settings obtained for the group held and average of 108 for the group with a 
standard deviation of 99.9. The highest level of protection was chosen by 50% of participants 
in the group (selecting “Friends Only” for each information grouping) with 40% of 
participants selecting no settings at all in this section of the process. So, when interacted with, 
participants tend to protect liberally as suggested as desired behaviour within the survey.  
8.2.3 Personal Attitude Group 
  From table 13, the Personal Attitude group held a decrease in disclosure with statistical 
significance; both in terms of the total amount of questions answered and when only 
responding in the positive to binary questions (68% and 45% respectively). Interestingly, the 
lowest answered category was the less sensitive green grouping of questions; although the 
yellow and red also decreased compared to the control (with statistical significance for the red 
category). There is a larger difference when examining only the “Yes” answers with the red 
category of questions having the largest decrease in disclosure when compared to the control 
and the yellow in the middle as would be expected.  
  Interestingly, of those who answered the binary questions in this group only 36.7% answered 
in the positive. This is the lowest of all the treatment groups and could suggest that 
participants are utilizing deception to manage their privacy as a result of the salient treatment. 
However, it could also be due to variation within the group and it is unclear from this 
experiment alone if this is the case.  
  So, does a decrease in the green category (when compared to the higher sensitivity 
groupings) mean that participants are not being selective in what they disclose and simply not 
filling in the questions that take more effort? It is important to remember that the traffic lights 
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aim is to inform or remind participants of their own privacy desires. Hence, it could be that 
participants are unwilling to disclose data in the green category as they are private to them. 
For example, participant’s favourite films could not match their peer group’s expectations 
leading them to leave it blank. Indeed, the literature review chapter noted the problem of “new 
data” is social networks causing privacy problems for users that had not previously. While 
disclosing ones telephone number is potentially invasive in the traditional sense that 
information will not be used to form social opinions of the discloser but social information 
(films, books, etc.) could be (depending on the individual).   
  However, it could be that the green questions took too much effort to answer as they held 
more text boxes for answering in lists or questions that people may not have an answer to. 
Indeed, participants mentioned post-experiment: “(the lights) showed that it is ok to leave 
some questions blank”. The suggestion being that, when the option to answer questions was 
clear, participants would then choose what to answer. It is, however, unclear if that choice is 
based on increase consideration of participant’s privacy or for other reasons; although, 
disclosure was the least in the red category when considering only the positive responses. 
  In the post-experiment interview when discussing the contextual questions, one participant, 
talking about their CV, stated: “everyone is going to tick yes so I shall as well”. Justifying 
their actions based on the behaviour of their peers in a phenomenon known as herding 
behaviour which has also been used as a potential reason for poor privacy behaviour (Gross 
and Acquisti 2005). 
  As in the Control group, no participant changed the connection settings. This brings into 
question the extent to which participants engage with the entirety of the User Interface and 
suggests that participants go straight to the obvious interactions of the form elements. Again, 
eye-tracking software may be useful in examining what participants look at in the UI and for 
how long. The main page of settings increased from the control without statistical 
significance. Of the participants who applied settings 55% applied friends only to all 
categories with the remainder being somewhat more selective but it would appear not in 
relation to sensitivity ratings of the settings. This would suggest a more consistent behaviour 
from participants within this group when applying their privacy settings. The relationship 
between disclosure and privacy settings is not clear from this experiment. Participants in this 
group, on average, applied a higher level protection than the control group yet disclosed less. 
Indeed, Christofides (2009) suggests that the two are different processes affected by different 
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aspect of personality and are not negatively correlated. Further qualitative work is required to 
explore this further from a participant’s point of view within this experiment.  
8.2.4 Subjective Norms Group 
  Levels of disclosure within the subjective norms group decreased with statistical significance 
compared to the control with participants answering 66% of the questions asked of them for 
the group as a whole; this is a similar level to the PA group and there is no statistically 
significant difference (p=.976 and p=.566). When only considering “Yes” answers the group 
answered 48% of the questions asked (a decrease of 20% from the control). Of the binary 
questions answered, 47% answered in the positive; this is only a 6.3% decrease from the 
control showing similar behaviour across groups. That is, there is a similar ratio of “Yes” 
responses which would suggest that participants are choosing to leave out question responses 
when answering in the negative. 
  The levels of disclosure decreased from the control across all sensitivity groupings with the 
yellow and green category of data being the most answered (Table 16). However, when only 
examining the “Yes” answers, the red category held the least amount of disclosure. The 
yellow category was the most answered with red being the least. This group did have the 
highest rate of disclosure in the green category (for the treatment groups). This is the only 
category where the advice from both the expert and others users matched providing some 
evidence that the treatment aided participants in disclosing in the least sensitive categories. 
  In the other sensitivity categories, the treatment tended to hold conflicting information, the 
aim of which was to ascertain which participants favoured. However, it could have had the 
effect of confusing users and introducing “signal noise” into the UI that prevents users from 
implementing their choices effectively. Furthermore, it is unclear from this experiment what 
the exact effect of the treatment is due to the conflicting information and the small sample 
size. Future iterations of the experiment should only include one form of advice to ascertain if 
it plays a role in persuading users to follow that advice.  
  Again, the ease of interaction played a role in deciding what to disclose for participants. One 
participant remarked in the post-interview: it is easy to answer some of the questions but a 
pain to answer the ones regarding interest; the other questions referred to were the very 
invasive questions. The participant felt that due to how these questions were asked, they were 
easy to answer (simply clicking yes/no with limited data entry); however, the interest 
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questions required time consuming attention regardless of the invasiveness of the information. 
The participant also stated that: I know I shouldn’t have answered those questions now but 
they were easy to fill in at the time.  
  Finally, another participant stated: I found answering difficult to approach, until I thought of 
it in the same way as Facebook. This would indicate that there is an element of 
conceptualisation required when the system is new to the participant; that until they are 
comfortable with it they will do as it asks unless they treat it in the same way as a system they 
are experienced in. 
  The privacy settings for this group where actually lower than the control group, the only 
treatment group to demonstrate such behaviour and it is unclear from this experiment why this 
might be the case. This could be due to the extra information provided by the treatment 
increasing the UI signal noise and causing confusion from users. This would decrease their 
self-efficacy (confidence in behaviour) so a number of participant would leave settings at the 
default for fear of incorrectly administering behaviour. Similarly, the control paradox 
(Brandimarte, 2012) described how increased control increased disclosure perhaps due to the 
participants decrease in self-efficacy.  
  How may signal noise have been increased? Participant’s perception regarding pop-ups 
seemed to play an issue. The initial message presented to the user (which locked the screen) 
seemed to cause some participants to believe an error had occurred. Upon realising the screen 
could be closed, participants did so quickly in order to continue with the sign-up; this then 
became an issue for all further pop-ups (they were not an error so could be ignored, thus 
avoiding further complexity) including the pop-up which attempted to draw attention to the 
section on the connection settings. Indeed, it has been noted that error messages within web 
browsers and web development in general often confuse users (Lazar and Huang 2003) hence 
if they have been interpreted as such then signal noise and confusion could be increased. 
  However, it could also be due to simple variation within the group due to the small sample 
size. A reiteration of the treatment is required in order to provide only one piece of advice 
allowing for comparisons to be made to this group.  
  The connection settings where only set by one participant in this group and where roundly 
ignored by participants as in other groups again bringing into question the extent to which 
users engage with a system when first introduced to it. It may require a degree of confidence 
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in using the system before it is fully explored and to gain that confidence prolonged system 
use is required.  
8.2.5 Perceived Control Group 
  Both before and after the review of data performed by participants, this group held a 
decrease in levels of disclosure that is statistically significant; this group also held the largest 
decrease when compared to the control. Before salient review, 59% of the questions asked of 
the group where answered in total and this dropped to only 38% after participants data had 
been examined and manipulated. Interestingly, the ratio of “Yes” responses where the 
questions were answered increased 41.1% to 54.1% after salient review as a greater number 
of participants who answered “No” deleted their responses altogether. So again, the 
preference toward deception or withholding information is not clear from these experiments 
alone.  
  Disclosure decreased across all the groupings of information. First, looking at total question 
responses prior to salient review (PC1) shows that the green category was the least answered 
with the yellow and the red (table 16) being similar. After salient review, the spread across the 
groupings is fairly equal when considering all question responses which would suggest that 
participants are not considering their privacy but are acting toward a subverted goal; perhaps 
influenced to gain a lower privacy score as directed by the system. However, when looking at 
the “Yes” answers the red category is indeed the least disclosed with yellow being in the 
middle as one would expect and this also the case after salient review also. 
  This group was the lowest of all the treatment groups in terms of disclosure for both yes and 
no responses. Indeed, in terms of all responses made, there is a statistically significant 
decrease from both the PA and SN groups when compared to PC2 (p=.044 and .033 
respectively). This would suggest that this treatment held the greatest sway of participant 
behaviour. However, a similar comparison when considering only yes responses does not 
yield statistically significant results (.079 and .068 respectively).  
  Given that disclosure also decreased dramatically in the green category of data, it is unclear 
whether changes in behaviour are as a result of an increased control of sensitive data or for 
other reasons. The extent of the levels of non-disclosure would suggest that the goal of 
interaction has been subverted from one of profile creation to a pure privacy oriented one, as 
mentioned earlier. In the post-experiment interviews one participant stated: I deleted 
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information to get my P-Score down. This would suggest that the interactive P-Score that 
dynamically changed when information was deleted provided a clear impetus to delete 
information and disclose less. The literature review chapter identified the goal-driven nature 
of users when interacting with systems (Jacko and Sears 2003) where users will act according 
to a perceived ultimate goal when dealing with sub-goals. This, perhaps, led to the control 
group disclosing much to achieve the perceived goal of account creation and disclosing little 
in this group to achieve the perceived goal of protecting one’s privacy. Further evidence for 
this can be found in the connection settings. This group was the only group to make changes 
to these settings across numerous participants and this was the only group where these 
settings where explicitly put in front of the user with a dynamic score that encouraged the 
highest level of protection. This group also had the highest level privacy settings applied 
(although, again without statistical significance) with a standard deviation of 24.3 showing a 
much more consistent behaviour compared to other groups and providing evidence for the 
assertion that participants were encouraged to be highly private.  
  However, whether participants are acting toward their own goals or not is unclear. The 
design of the treatment was to aid in identifying and deleting potentially sensitive 
information; however, the level of non-disclosure in the green category of information would 
suggest that they are being persuaded to be more private than they perhaps need to or, indeed, 
desire to be. The privacy score and rating level (low-high risk assessment) may be too strict 
and participants may need to delete too much information to achieve the low risk assessment. 
Hence, future iterations of the experiment should reduce this level so that it is clear that green 
data will give a low risk and other data a higher rating.  
8.3.1 Summary of Points 
  The groups with treatments present exhibited less disclosure with statistical significance. 
This decrease was present across the sensitivity ratings for all the groups but was the highest 
in the red sensitivity when examining only the “Yes” responses to questions. If awareness has 
been increased then one might expect disclosure to not lessen very much in the green category 
of data. However, this group of data items also saw decreases of similar levels to the other 
categories; furthermore, the “Yellow” category was the most answered in all the treatment 
groups suggesting a bias in the questions. It is, therefore, unclear if users chose to not disclose 
information based on their privacy preferences from this experiment alone.   
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  Of note were the increases in standard deviation within the treatment groups which would 
suggest much more variation in participant behaviour leading to less consistent group levels 
of disclosure. This could demonstrate the individuality of privacy where, when reminded, 
some participants choose to protect themselves much more through non-disclosure across a 
variety of sensitivity ratings. Incidentally, the decreases across even non-sensitive categories 
does not necessarily mean that participants are not thinking about their privacy as a “green” 
item may be private to them. However, it is unclear here if this is the case due to the potential 
limitations in the experiment design summarised in a following section.   
8.4.1 Exit Survey Results and Discussion 
  The first portion of the survey dealt with the Westin privacy rating typically used in 
measuring privacy concern; the goal of which was to examine the spread of concern across 
the groups and table 20, below, details the spread of the Westin ratings for each of the groups 
in this experiment.  
Table 20 - Summary of Westin Ratings 
Group Fundamentalist 
(number/%) 
Pragmatist 
(number/%) 
Unconcerned 
(number/%) 
Control 3 (30%) 6 (60%) 1 (10%) 
PA 1 (9.1%) 5 (45%) 5 (45%) 
SN 3 (25%) 9 (75%) 0 (0%) 
PC 3 (27%) 8 (73%) 0 (0%) 
Research 25% 57% 18% 
 
  Table 20 can only serve as an indication of the potential for salient influence due to the small 
sample size. It is interesting that the group with the highest number of fundamentalists is the 
control which also disclosed the most information. This may suggest that participants concern 
for their privacy was raised due to their realisation that they disclosed a great deal of personal 
information. The number of unconcerned was much increased in the personal attitude group; 
perhaps as participants had managed their privacy and were now not worried about it. This 
would not explain the decrease in the PC and SN group for this particular rating where no 
participant was unconcerned. They may have been influence by the treatments in question and 
adopted a more pragmatic view toward privacy; recall the PC group seemed to have been 
persuaded by the goal of privacy so may not have been representative of actual desires and the 
SN group may have been less in control of their behaviour as a result of conflicting 
information. However, the survey chapter also demonstrated that participants do not act 
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according to how they usually behave so this is may be an inaccurate measure and a larger 
sample size is required to examine if the spread of ratings are truly different in comparison to 
wider research. 
  The second phase of the survey was designed based on the surveys using the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour as a design tool. This gives three separate scores for behavioural intention, 
attitude, subjective norms and perceived control, the aim of which is to examine if the specific 
measure in the related group would be different from the others; i.e. will being exposed to a 
treatment based on perceived control give participants a greater perception of their level of 
control in the experiment. It is important to stress that a lack of increase in the respective 
measures does not mean that participants are not better equipped to deal with their privacy as 
survey measures have been shown to be inaccurate in reporting and explaining behaviour. The 
exit survey here is aimed at exploring this further; all scores are out of 7 for the following 
measures.  
 
   
   Figure 52 shows that the average score for intention was the lowest in the personal attitude 
group; a higher score would suggest a participant wishes to disclose as little as possible. This 
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Figure 52 – Group Intention Scores 
 127 
 
is perhaps expected given that this group had the highest number of Westin unconcerned 
participants within it. The standard deviation was also the highest within this group 
demonstrating variation in the reported perception of participants within the group. The 
subjective norms group had the smallest standard deviation for the treatment groups and the 
highest average intention score despite having the highest amount of disclosure within the 
treatment groups.  
  Figure 53 details the spread of attitude scores across the groups with standard deviation bars 
added also.  
  
   
  A higher attitude score would suggests a positive attitude toward disclosure according to the 
TPB. The Control group participants reported the lowest attitude despite having the highest 
levels of disclosure. Again, this may be due to influence form the experiment making them 
more adverse to disclosure having realised they may have said too much. The spread across 
the treatment groups is broadly similar with the subjective norms group again having the 
smallest standard deviation demonstrating more consistent group responses. The attitude 
group did hold the smallest attitude score out of the treatment groups; however, this difference 
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Figure 53 – Group Attitude Scores 
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is small. It is not therefore clear from this sample if participants have been influenced by the 
treatments and, indeed, the control group held the smallest attitude score. Again, surveys may 
be an inappropriate way of measuring perception and behaviour or the treatments could have 
the opposite effect of influencing the opposite direction; i.e. participant’s perception of 
positive disclosure increased as they only disclose non-sensitive data. The average scores 
across the groups for reported perceived control scores are details in figure 54 below. A 
higher score here would suggest that participants believed that it was easy to identify and 
protect their potentially sensitive information.  
  
   
  A higher score would indicate that it was easy to identify and protect their sensitive 
information. The control held the (marginally) highest perceived control score for the groups, 
again, despite disclosing the most data. This group also held the most consistent responses as 
can be seen from the standard deviation bar. However, the scores are relatively even across 
the groups and differences could be down to variation rather than treatment influence. A 
larger sample may provide a clearer view of the relationship between perception and 
behaviour and the use of the TPB as a measure for each. However, from these results thus far 
it would appear that, much like in the survey previously, perception and behaviour cannot be 
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Figure 54 – Group PC Scores 
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explored adequately through a general survey. This is a continuing theme in the measure for 
subjective norms (figure 55) where a higher score suggests that participants are more likely to 
perceive themselves to be susceptible to advice and social influence.  
  
   
  A high score would indicate that they are likely to listen to others and again, the scores are 
relatively even across the groups with the control being the highest, as before. Despite their 
being very different observed behaviours between the groups the measure employed within 
this survey suggest minute differences in perception. The survey, as it is, does not seem 
capable of capturing the granularity and context of privacy such that it is relatable to actual 
behaviour. This may be one reason for the privacy paradox and this was touched on in the 
survey chapter also. That is, a general measure of perception cannot match the specifics of 
behaviour; for example, believing that disclosure can be beneficial may not indicate if a 
participant is unwilling to disclose their date of birth within specific context leading to a 
seemingly paradoxical observation. While, an automatic survey question could be generated 
to deal with what participants actually did in the experiment, the issues is one of information 
depth and a qualitative approach is required to explore these perception further. There is, 
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Figure 55 – Group SN Scores 
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however, difficulty in implementing such an approach given that the data must be anonymised 
upon submission to protect the sensitive data being dealt with.  
  The surveys also offered no direct participant perceptions of the treatments themselves in 
terms of what they thought of them, whether they were a good thing, whether they believed 
themselves to be influenced by them or not etc.  
8.5.1 Summary of Limitations and Recommendations for Change 
  As noted in the previous discussion there are limitations in the experiment design. First, it is 
unclear whether changes observed in treatment groups are a result of a rise in privacy 
awareness or due to a limitation in the design of the control group, namely a lack of a clear 
indication that disclosure is optional. The control group should be altered to make the 
optionality of disclosure clear so that subjects are actively choosing what to disclose based on 
their perceptions rather than any obligations they may feel.  
  Second, the questions asked may not be applicable to all participants leading to unanswered 
questions for reasons other than invasiveness; this may explain the decreases in the green 
category of information. Questions should be adjusted to provide an equal chance across all 
sensitivities for a response to be made. This is difficult as not all questions will apply to all 
participants (i.e. not all participant will read so cannot respond to favourite books). So, they 
must be general enough to elicit a response but sensitive enough for a tangible risk from that 
response.  
  Third, the treatment representing Subjective Norms seemed to confuse users by offering two 
types of conflicting advice. It is therefore unclear what the effect of the treatment itself is in 
terms of if participants are following one set of advice or the other or even if treatment at all is 
a persuasive UI element. Hence, the treatment should be simplified to provide only a single 
point of advice to ascertain if participants act upon it when interacting with the system.  
  Fourth, it is impossible to know precisely what the effect is of the treatments in this 
experiment as the relationships between the independent variables (treatments) are not 
explored. For example, the Perceived Control seemed to be driven by the goal of privacy 
protection (perhaps separate to their individually desired behaviours). Would this be the case 
if the Personal Attitude treatment was also present or would the rate of change after salient 
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review still be present? A factorial experiment design is required in order to explore this 
further and, ideally, should be implemented in a follow up experiment.  
  Fifth, the testing of H2, H4 and H6 is difficult given the lack of granularity available in 
exploring privacy settings. As participants seem to apply “Friends only” when they interact 
with these elements gaining statistically significant difference is difficult. Increasing the 
sample size or the variety of options available in this category may provide a solution.  
  Finally, the post-experiment interviews and exit-survey were insufficient in examining the 
behaviour from participants. The exit-surveys measurements of the TPB properties did not 
add to the explanation of the observations; this is perhaps due to the sample size or due to the 
general measures not dealing with the granularity that privacy requires as has been mentioned 
in the survey chapter. It is unclear whether the latter is the case, so the sample size should be 
increased and extra questions added to examine participant perceptions of the treatments and 
of their behaviour directly. Furthermore, focus groups should be added to explore the 
relationships that remain unclear; for example, whether participants prefer to lie or leave 
information out, whether one needs to apply protection where there is no disclosure etc.  
8.5.2 Conclusions 
  This initial experiment has found a statistically significant difference between the treatment 
groups and the control group where the levels of disclosure are concerned. The settings 
scores, however, did not increase with statistical significance and were actually lower than the 
control in the Subjective Norms treatment group. The Perceived Control group held the 
lowest amount of disclosure compared to the other groups; perhaps due to the goal of 
interaction being very clearly oriented toward one of privacy. However, the decreases 
occurred within all sensitivity groupings and differences between them were negligible; 
although, the red category did have the highest percentage decrease from the green category 
within all groups, this was only when examining “Yes” answers. This could be due to 
participants disagreeing with the ratings of the questions asked of them and still implementing 
their own idea of privacy. However, it could also be due to limitations in the design of the 
experiment as outlined in the previous limitations section. In order to improve the value of the 
results, a further experiment was conducted taking into account the potential limitations and 
the following chapter details the specific changes, results and discussion for this second 
experiment.  
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Chapter 9 – Experiment Two 
9.1 Experiment Two Introduction 
  There is some evidence in experiment one for participants considering their privacy when 
salient information is present. However, due to limitations in the experimental design it is 
unclear if decreases in disclosure are due to other factors. As such, this chapter details a 
second experiment with modifications to the experiment design. 
9.2.1 Design Changes 
  First, the control group potentially did not make the option of disclosure clear enough to 
participants meaning the decreases in disclosure in the treatment groups may not have been 
due to privacy related decision making. In order to provide this, two changes to the UI will be 
added; first, red asterisks (figure 56) will be added to the first page of the experiment process. 
These are to show which fields are required at the start and to demonstrate that the remaining 
fields are optional, these are added specifically because participants are used to seeing them in 
similar online forms as demonstrated by an interview response from experiment one. 
 
   
  On the profile builder page, a second notice is added to ensure it is clear on all pages (figure 
57). 
Figure 56 – Making choice clear 
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  Note also, the Salford Network is changed to the NTU network as this experiment is 
conducted with students at Nottingham Trent University rather than the University of Salford. 
As such, convenience sampling is still to be used and the researcher has ready access to 
students at this University. This does itself raise some limitations which are to be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
  The second change deals with the question groupings. Responses in the green category may 
be due to participants simply not having an answer to the question leading to reduced 
disclosure in a low-sensitive category. Hence, some questions are altered in order to increase 
the chance they will be answered as they may be more applicable to more participants. 
Favourite quotes will therefore be changed to favourite TV Shows and Favourite Books will 
be changed to Favourite Music. Also, in order to compensate for the number of binary 
questions in the more sensitive question groupings, the green category will have two 
questions added asking users whether they are on the donor list and whether they donate to 
charity. The question dealing with downloading media explicitly says “illegally download…”. 
Two extra questions will be added to the yellow grouping to bring up the number also; this 
will ask the participant for their sexuality and personal email address. These are added as the 
yellow category in some groups in the previous experiment was answered highly, in some 
cases more so than the green category. Indeed, according to table 24 (below) the green 
category is more answered in experiment two compared to the other categories of 
information. Furthermore, the descriptors for the categories have been broadened to low, 
medium and high impact risks instead of social, professional and legal risks (although a 
statement is included to mention that they include these as potential, specific risks).  
Figure 57 – Making choice clear 
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  Furthermore, the settings have been adjusted, with interest, city and education being brought 
out of the connection settings and into the privacy settings. This is because these settings 
relate to content potentially being submitted during the experiment and thus may require 
protection. Furthermore, the photos and videos settings are altered to protect the contextual 
questions submitted with photos and videos being covered by status updates option. These 
profile settings are used to test H2, H4 and H6 and the connection link is kept only to see if 
participants explore it in privacy salient groups as a result of heightened concern. 
  The third change deals with the Subjective Norms treatment. It was noted that the conflicting 
information may have caused confusion for participants leading to unclear disclosure trends 
(across the groupings) and a decrease in privacy settings when compared to the control group. 
Hence, the advice containing information about what other users of the network are doing is 
removed leaving only the expert advice in the popup box. This expert advice advises against 
disclosing information in the yellow and red categories of information.   
 
 
  Finally, three extra experiment groups will be added to change the experiment design to a 
factorial 2x2x2 design. This will involve a number of groups with combinations of the 
treatments presented to the user during the experiment. For example, one group’s treatment 
will contain both the personal attitude and the subjective norms UI elements, one group with 
personal attitude and perceived control and so on. This gives the benefit of exploring the 
relationship between the treatments when implemented together. However, a full design will 
not be utilised (specifically there will not be a group containing all three treatments) as the UI 
in such a group may be too confusing and busy for the participants making it difficult to 
examine effect of the treatments; furthermore, there are limits in the number of participants 
available to include such a group.  
9.2.2 Post-Experiment Changes 
  The exit–survey will have extra questions dealing directly with participant perceptions of the 
treatments they were exposed to. As such, all treatment groups will have an extra bank of 
Figure 58 – SN single advice 
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questions addressing how useful participants believed the UI elements to be and if they 
perceived themselves to be affected by them (figure 59). 
 
 
  Furthermore, the treatment groups based on factorial design will have added questions to 
ascertain which salient feature (if any) participants preferred as well as an extra two statement 
examining whether having two sources of information is confusing or beneficial. Each group 
has an added question asking participants whether they considered their privacy when 
answering questions during the experiment; this will be further explored in the qualitative 
interviews after survey participation.  
  The post-experiment interviews will take the form of focus groups in order to encourage 
discussion from participants. These will focus on the aspects of disclosure that cannot be 
satisfactorily explored through quantitative measures alone; namely, whether deception or 
withholding information is preferred from a user perspective and what the relationship is 
between disclosure and control (settings application). The focus groups will still be informal 
in nature and will address the following themes: Was your desire for privacy met? Did you 
think about your privacy when answering the questions? Did the salient features help you 
choose what to disclose and what was your perception of them? Is it better to leave out 
questions or answer “No”? Do you need to protect if you have not disclosed anything?  
9.2.3 Procedure Changes 
  As mentioned previously, participants will be recruited from students of the School of 
Science & Technology at Nottingham Trent University, again being approached at the end of 
their scheduled lab sessions and asked if they would like to sign-up to a new social network 
just for NTU students (voluntary recruitment). Participants will be randomly allocated to a 
group and told not to discuss the process with others during it. The target sample size is 
Figure 59 – Added Exit-survey questions 
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increased in order to provide greater power to the statistical tests ran; specifically, group sizes 
of around 20 are aimed for with the single treatment groups taking priority. This is to ensure 
sufficient numbers are obtained for these groups to allow for a thorough exploration of the 
singular treatments. The interviews will take place immediately after the experiment in order 
to maintain the context of the experiment and their perception of privacy within it as much as 
possible. These will be with around 2-3 participants from each of the groups involved.  
  The hypotheses being tested remain the same as found in chapter 7.  
 9.3.1 Initial Results – Single Factor Groups 
    In total 85 participants volunteered to take part in the single factor experiment and were 
randomly assigned to one of the seven groups; a breakdown of participant details can be 
found in appendix 10.  
  The total levels of disclosure are detailed in table 21 for all single factor groups in 
experiment two. 
Table 21 - Disclosure summary for experiment 2 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
non-disclosure 
Standard Deviation Total % of questions 
answered 
% of Yes answers 
when responded (total 
answered) 
Control 20 5.8 7 82% 39% (201) 
PA 23 11.3 4.6 66% 28.2% (174) 
SN 21 14.2 6.8 57% 55.2% (125) 
PC1 21 8.3 8.5 74% 62% (156) 
PC2 21 16.7 9.6 48% 51% (95) 
 
  Of note here are the ratio of yes responses in the treatment groups SN and PC (pre-review) 
when compared to the control; although, the total amount of questions answered has 
decreased. It could be that participants are more likely to disclose if they have something to 
say and will leave it blank if not (given the higher ratio of positive responses).  
  Table 22 provides the same analysis with “No” answers counted as non-disclosure for the 
contextual binary questions. 
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Table 22 - Disclosure when only counting “Yes” responses 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
disclosure 
Standard Deviation Total % of questions 
answered 
Control 20 11.9 5.9 63% 
PA 23 16.9 4.2 50% 
SN 21 16.4 5.6 49% 
PC1 21 11.9 7.0 63% 
PC2 21 18.9 7.9 41% 
 
  Table 23 details the results of statistical tests ran on the groups when comparing them the 
control. The non-parametric Mann Whitney U test is again utilised throughout the analysis of 
experiment two in this chapter as the data for some of the groups is not normally distributed 
for either levels of disclosure or settings scores.  
Table 23 - Statistical Tests for levels of non-disclosure: treatments compared to control 
Group Test P-Value (Total 
Questions answered) 
P-Value 
(Discounting No 
Answers) 
PA Mann Whitney <0.0001 =0.009 
SN Mann Whitney <0.0001 =0.008 
PC1 Mann Whitney =0.272 =0.948 
PC2 Mann Whitney <0.0001 =0.003 
 
  An initial review would suggest that there is a statistically significant difference in behaviour 
between the groups, both with and without “yes” answers and that H1, H3 and H5’s null 
hypotheses can be rejected. However, pre-review data within the perceived control group 
(PC1) did not decrease from the control group with statistical significance; this is unlike the 
initial experiment where both PC1 and PC2 held a statistically significant decrease when 
compared to the control. A difference may be expected given that participants in PC1 are 
exposed to the treatment before answering much of the questions asked of them. For example, 
a participant in PC1 will start at the welcome screen and answer the questions asked of them 
as in the control. Unlike the control, they will then review their question responses in the 
treatment screen before continuing with the experiment. Exposure to this review screen before 
visiting the proceeding question page (containing the majority of the questions) may influence 
their behaviour as they could be aware that they will again be asked to review their answers 
by the treatment. 
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Table 24 - Location of Disclosure across groupings (red highlights the least responded to category) 
Group % of “Green 
questions answered 
% of “Yellow” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Red” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Yellow” 
questions, only yes 
% of “Red” 
questions, only yes 
Control 83% 82% 81% 60% 47% 
PA 81% 66% 51% 48% 21% 
SN 78% 50% 42% 40% 28% 
PC1 77% 73% 73% 60% 52% 
PC2 65% 41% 37% 32% 25% 
 
  Note there is no column in the table for “Only Yes” responses for the green category despite 
there now being yes/no questions in this category. This is as answering “No” to the green 
category yes/no questions is still considered an act of disclosure within this study and so 
counts as an answered question. For example, answering “No” to the green category question 
“Do you donate to charity?” reveals a potentially negative character trait about a participant, 
unlike answering “No” to the red category question “Have you ever downloaded illegal 
media?”. Indeed, one participant stated that they felt it was worse to answer “No” to the green 
questions, so any response in the green category can be considered an act of potentially 
sensitive data disclosure. 
Table 25 compared each of these groupings to the control to examine for statistically 
significant results.  
Table 25 - Comparison of treatment categories to control categories 
Group Test Green Yellow Red Yellow, only 
yes 
Red, only 
yes 
PA Mann Whitney =.523 =.001 <.0001 =.005 <.0001 
SN Mann Whitney =.311 <.0001 <.0001 =.004 =.004 
PC1 Mann Whitney =.242 =.192 =.175 =.937 =.317 
PC2 Mann Whitney =.027 <.0001 <.0001 =.001 =.008 
 
  Unlike experiment one, the decreases in the green category are not large and the major 
decreases did occur in the more sensitive yellow and red question groupings providing further 
evidence for H1, H3 and H5. This could be due to the changes in questions asked of 
participants that attempted to make them more applicable and more likely to be answered. The 
red category of questions hold the largest amount of percentage decreases from the control 
group (total amount of questions answered) which would initially suggest that participants are 
conscious of their privacy where the treatments are present; or at least persuaded by them to 
be more private. It is unclear whether they are implementing their privacy needs or those they 
perceive as required of them by the treatment (i.e. persuaded) and this will be explored further 
in the discussion. 
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  The Perceived Control group, again, held the highest amount of non-disclosure when 
compared to the control; however, this is only after the review of data (PC2). Interestingly, 
the pre-salient review data is broadly similar to the control group. This may be expected given 
that the SNS aspects of the groups UI is not altered in any way from the control but does 
differ from behaviour observed in experiment one where the pre-review data was also 
significantly different from the control. 
  The average settings scores are detailed in table 26. These are now out of a total of 260 given 
the inclusion of the extra settings.  
Table 26 - Average Settings per Participant 
Group Privacy Settings (St. 
Dev) 
Connection 
Settings 
Control 139 (116.5) 6 
PA 147 (104.7) 2.6 
SN 149 (113.2) 4 
PC1 160 (95.3) 0 
PC2 181 (92.7) 45.7 (53.4) 
 
  All groups held an on average increase from the control. Table 27 details the results of 
statistical tests ran on the above settings scores to examine if there is significant difference 
from the control group. Again, the Mann Whitney U test is used to assess significance.    
Table 27 - Settings Statistical Tests 
Group P-Value 
PA P = 0.860 
SN P = 0.718 
PC1 P = 0.543 
PC2 P = 0.250 
 
  Much as in the first experiment, the changes in settings scores is not increased from the 
control with statistical significance. Participant perception of any potential relationship 
between these two variables is further explored through the post-experiment focus groups. 
    So, H2, H4 and H6’s null hypotheses cannot be rejected within this experiment as there is 
no statistically significant difference when compared to the control much as in experiment 
one. 
9.3.2 Initial Results – Factorial Groups 
    In total 42 participants were obtained for the factorial groups and split randomly between 
them. A summary of this group’s behaviour can be found in table 28. 
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Table 28 - Factorial Groups Disclosure Overview 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
disclosure 
Standard Deviation Total % of questions 
answered 
% of Yes answers 
when responded (total 
answered) 
PA + SN 14 14 8.8 56% 31% (93) 
SN + PC1 14 12.3 7.6 62% 39%(110) 
SN + PC2 14 17.4 7 46% 34%(73) 
PA + PC1 14 12.7 7.7 61% 49%(105) 
PA + PC2 14 19.8 4.5 38% 57%(38) 
  
    Initially, it would appear that the results obtained are broadly similar to the single treatment 
groups that make up the relevant two factor treatments here. For example, the single factor SN 
group answered 57% of questions in total compared to SNPC1’s 63%. Both the SNPC2 and 
PAPC2 scores (47% and 39%) are reduced compared to single factor PC2 (48%); albeit, only 
just in the case of SNPC2.  
  The levels of disclosure when only considering “Yes” responses are detailed in table 29. 
Table 29 - Disclosure overview with only "Yes" responses 
Group Number of 
Participants 
Average Total 
Amount of 
disclosure 
Standard Deviation Total % of questions 
answered 
PA + SN 14 17.1 6.5 45% 
SN + PC1 14 15.4 5.3 51% 
SN + PC2 14 19.6 4.7 38% 
PA + PC1 14 14.4 5.7 53% 
PA + PC2 14 19.5 4.6 35% 
 
  Notice the difference between the two PC based groups is not as pronounced as the single 
factor treatments; again, as participants may have already made privacy choices after being 
exposed to the SN and PA treatments prior to review and resubmission.  
  Table 30 details the results of the test for statistical significance ran on the factorial groups in 
comparison to the control.    
 
 
 142 
 
Table 30 - Factorial Disclosure Stats 
Group Test P-Value (Total 
Questions answered) 
P-Value 
(Discounting No 
Answers) 
PA + SN Mann Whitney =0.004 =0.030 
SN + PC1 Mann Whitney =0.010 =0.033 
SN + PC2 Mann Whitney <0.0001 <0.0001 
PA + PC1 Mann Whitney =0.008 =0.158 
PA + PC2 Mann Whitney <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
  H1, H3 and H5 test true after an initial examination of these results when considering the 
culmination of the experiment (i.e. PC2). Unlike experiment one, groups including PC1 held 
reduced disclosure with statistical significance when compared to the control, perhaps as they 
have been exposed to the PA and SN treatment prior to reviewing their data. Interestingly, 
PAPC1 did not hold statistically significant difference compared to the control when only 
considering “Yes” responses, perhaps due to group variation. Table 31 breaks down the 
disclosure into the sensitivity categories.  
Table 31 - Factorial Disclosure across categories (red highlights the least answered category) 
Group % of “Green 
questions answered 
% of “Yellow” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Red” 
questions 
answered 
% of “Yellow” 
questions, only yes 
% of “Red” 
questions, only yes 
Control 83% 82% 81% 60% 47% 
PA + SN 66% 58% 43% 46% 23% 
SN + PC1 79% 61% 46% 48% 25% 
SN + PC2 68% 40% 29% 32% 14% 
PA + PC1 80% 55% 47% 46% 33% 
PA + PC2 72% 23% 18% 20% 12% 
 
Table 32 - Comparisons of treatment categories to control categories 
 Group Test Green Yellow Red Yellow, only 
yes 
Red, only 
yes 
PA+SN Mann Whitney =.197 =.012 =.002 =.064 =.001 
SN+PC1 Mann Whitney =.569 =.027 =.012 =.138 =.004 
SN+PC2 Mann Whitney =.192 =.001 <.0001 =.003 <.0001 
PA+PC1 Mann Whitney =.500 =.007 =.009 =.071 =.061 
PA+PC2 Mann Whitney =.231 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
   
  It would appear that the reduction in disclosure took place in the more sensitive question 
areas with the red category mainly having the least amount of questions answered. However, 
when considering only the “Yes” responses the reduction in the yellow category is not 
 143 
 
significant when compared to the control (for initial submission in groups including the PC 
treatment). This is unlike the single factor treatments; it is unclear if this is due to group 
variation.  The settings for the factorial groups are detailed in table 33. 
Table 33 - Factorial Settings Summary 
Group Privacy Settings (St. 
Dev) 
Connection 
Settings 
PA + SN 156 (83) 10 
SN + PC1 188.6 (107.2) 0 
SN + PC2 240 (41.7) 57.9 (52.1) 
PA + PC1 204.3 (98.2) 25 
PA+PC2 228.6 (63.5) 76.4 (59.2) 
   
  The after review settings held higher on average increases than the single factor group of 
perceived control and the before review scores are also higher than the comparable single 
factor groups. This could be as their awareness of privacy was increased due to the 
combination of both the salient features present leading to a higher initial score that was then 
modified higher again.  
Table 34 - Factorial Settings Stats 
Group P-Value 
PA + SN 
=0.931 
SN + PC1 
=0.306 
SN + PC2 
=0.017 
PA + PC1 
=0.110 
PA+PC2 
=0.025 
 
  Behaviour within the factorial groups containing perceived control did seem to hold 
statistical significance with P values < 0.05. There is, therefore, some evidence here for H6 
given that upon salient review (PC2) there was statistically significant results but only when 
combined with PA and SN. This will be further explored within the discussion section    
9.4.1 Discussion 
  The following discussion examines each group in turn to further explore the hypotheses 
presented in chapter 6 and will use the extra exit-survey data and participants responses in 
interviews to aid discussion.  
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9.4.2 Control Group 
  Table 24 would suggest that participants within the control did not consider the potential 
impact of disclosing sensitive information and therefore did not consider their privacy during 
the experiment. This is as disclosure was high across all sensitivity groupings; overall 
question responses were fairly consistent across the groups with 83%, 82% and 81% (60% 
and 47% for only “Yes” answers) response rates recorded.  
  When asked in the post-experiment review about whether they considered their privacy or 
not, participants responded: I didn’t think, having realised now, I think I would act differently. 
This would appear to be a sound example of the privacy paradox at work and is in line with 
wider research where a similar response was recorded (Strater and Lipford 2008). As in 
experiment one, it may be that privacy is indeed a secondary goal problem and as wider work 
suggests (Bonneau, Anderson et al. 2009) and once reminded of it they wished they had 
considered it.  
  Despite participants being aware that disclosure was optional (indeed, all but three 
participants left something out) it was high in the group. In further exploration participants 
clarified: It felt good to be able to fill in all the fields and complete my profile and I don’t 
know why I answered the questions. This would suggest that there is a sense of reward to 
being able to answer the questions asked of them; indeed, a study exploring disclosure and 
reward (Tamir and Mitchell 2012) found that the tendency to disclose information about the 
self is linked to the intrinsic value placed on it and that doing so releases dopamine making it 
a potentially addictive process. Hence, participants may wish to answer as much as possible 
due an ingrained desire driven by a subconscious process and the thought of privacy does not 
enter to the decision process unless reminded (as in the treatment groups). 
  For the settings, 57% of those participants who applied settings adopted an all-or-nothing 
approach and applied “Friends only” to all options and the connection settings were only set 
by one participant. This participant also held the highest amount of non-disclosure in the 
control group with 30 questions unanswered; suggesting that perhaps if there is a pre-defined 
notion of privacy concern, users will seek out risk-coping mechanisms as suggested by wider 
work (Youn 2009). When asked in the focus group if participants noticed the extra link they 
responded: I didn’t see it, I just went straight to the questions and I remember a link but it 
didn’t register that it might be important. Again, the concept of goal driven behaviour may 
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play an important role in the interaction with the experiment interface. The link was not 
noticed or given little thought as it was not seen as necessary to the process being engaged 
with. Furthermore, it would appear that promotion of increased system engagement is also 
required rather than just promoting awareness of the general concept of privacy; for example, 
where are the control features that would enable better privacy protection? Users must be 
enabled to find them as well as be encouraged to use them and, indeed, the Perceived Control 
group seeks to explore this further. 
9.4.3 Personal Attitude 
  The Personal Attitude (PA) treatment was not modified from the previous experiment. 
Disclosure was less than the control with statistical significance, both in terms of total amount 
of questions answered and when only considering the “Yes” responses to binary questions. It 
is reasonable to expect disclosure to be lessened in the higher sensitivity areas (highlighted by 
the treatment) compared to the control as participants consider their privacy. Indeed, looking 
at table 24 would suggest that this is the case with 81% (green), 66% (yellow) and 51% (red) 
total questions answered across the three question groupings; of note, is that the amount of 
questions answered in the green category is not reduced by much compared to the control. 
When considering only “Yes” responses there is a dramatic difference in the yellow and red 
categories with 48% and 21%. However, whether or not disclosure is still occurring when 
answering is “No” is debateable and explored in greater depth in the focus group discussion 
later in the chapter. 
  Further evidence for participants within this group behaving in accordance to privacy 
concerns is provided through the exit-survey where 75% of participants in the group agreed 
with the statement “I acted differently due to the privacy information’s presence”. 
Table 35 - Exit-Survey Summary - PA 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
75% 19% 6% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
63% 25% 12% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
75% 25% 0% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
81% 19% 0% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
75% 25% 0% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
75% 25% 0% 
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  Post-experiment, a participant stated: they did highlight ones that could cause problems, like 
address. The focus on disclosure of Address potentially highlights the view of traditional 
privacy items highlighted in wider research (Stutzman 2006); although, this could have been 
used by the participant as a quick example. When asked if they agreed with the placement of 
the traffic lights (i.e. that the red items were the most sensitive etc.) the response included: I 
could see why but I used that to make my own mind up and I made my decisions based on my 
own common sense. In terms of H1, this would suggest that the treatment reminded 
participants of their own privacy desires rather than informing them in this particular case.  
  Interestingly, from table 35, 81% of participants felt the treatment would be beneficial in the 
long run of system use. This would suggest that these participants feel that this treatment may 
influence their decisions within such systems should their presence be a persistent one. 
Indeed, the focus group clarified: it made me think twice about some of the information I put 
on Facebook, this perhaps will give participants a privacy nudge as suggested by wider 
research (Wang, Leon et al. 2013). 
  H1 would appear to be well-founded based on results here. Participants disclosed 
significantly less than the control group and this disclosure was the least in the higher 
sensitivity ratings. Participant responses in the exit survey also show that a number of them 
perceived themselves to be affected by the treatment.  
  H2’s null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on results here. Of those participants who 
filled in their settings, 44% selected “Friends Only” for all settings. One participant did select 
all settings that had an amber rating or higher but here is little evidence that this was the case 
throughout the group. However, 63% of participants did state that the treatment helped them 
fill in the settings so, while there is not statistically significant evidence that there was an 
effect, there is a large portion of users who perceived it to be useful based on the exit-survey 
results.  
  Furthermore, only one participant in the group chose to change any of the connection 
settings in the separate link. It would appear, therefore, that the UI treatment held some effect 
on participants decision of what to disclose but did not encourage greater engagement with 
the system itself. The treatments would seem to offer influence over clear interactive elements 
of the UI but not the more ambiguous aspects that would require a greater degree of desire to 
explore and understand; a driving reason to explore is needed from the user. 
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9.4.4 Subjective Norms 
  The Subjective Norms (SN) group held an advice pop-up with a single piece of expert 
direction telling the participants what to do for each question. This differed from the original 
experiment were there were two, often conflicting, pieces of advice making it unclear as to 
which the participant might be following (if any). For both the “Yellow” and “Red” categories 
of questions, the elements advice was to “not disclose” as the feature represents the advice of 
a privacy conscious “expert”. 
  The group exhibited a statistically significant decrease compared to the control for both the 
total amount of questions answered and when only considering “Yes” responses to binary 
questions. The group also had lower disclosure than the personal attitude group; although, this 
is not a statistically significant decrease (p=0.126 for total questions answered and p=0.887 
for only “Yes” responses). Much as in the previous groups the green category of questions 
were the most answered with a total of 78%, a small reduction of 5% from the control group 
for the same category (not statistically significant: see table 25). The more sensitive questions 
saw the largest reduction in question responses with the red category being the lowest. This 
would suggest that participants are considering their privacy during interaction with the 
system given the smaller reduction in the green category and the larger reduction in the other 
categories compared to the control. 
The responses to the survey questions (table 36) are somewhat different to the PA group. 
Table 36 - SN Exit Survey Responses 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
72% 17% 11% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
56% 39% 5% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
72% 22% 6% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
83% 11% 6% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
55% 11% 34% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
61% 39% 0% 
 
  Despite holding less disclosure than the control and PA group, fewer participants felt that the 
privacy information was useful or felt that they acted differently due to the treatments 
presence. In the focus group a participants stated: I did think about my privacy because of it 
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but I don’t think I followed its advice. This may suggest that the advice offered by the 
treatment was too strict in its privacy assertion yet still made participants consider their 
privacy. However, the strength of the effect may further suggest that the persuasiveness of the 
property influenced participants to follow its advice despite their personal interests. Perhaps, 
the more the natural inclination to disclose is subverted the more participants resent being 
influenced.  
  Unlike the PA treatment, this UI element held a specific direction (rather than a general 
classification) that some participants may have found abrasive: I thought it was too strict in 
general. It is important to note that the focus group participants may not be representative of 
the whole sample. Furthermore, the majority of participants, according to the exit-survey, did 
feel that the UI feature was helpful (72%) and 83% felt that it would be beneficial in the long-
run. Also, privacy is individually oriented, what may be private to one may not be to another 
so some of the yellow category questions may not have been sensitive for some individuals to 
disclose. However, the amount of disclosure within the yellow category was less than the PA 
group, perhaps as the treatment explicitly advises against disclosure as oppose to the moderate 
warning of a yellow light. 
  Much as in the previous group the settings scores were increased from the control on average 
but without statistical significance and, again, only one participant elected to change their 
privacy settings. It is worth noting, however, that 72% of participants felt that the treatment 
did help them select what settings to apply. Whether this provided justification for a choice 
they would make regardless (offering them with validation) or persuaded them when they 
were unclear is not apparent.   
  In summary, the group saw significant decrease in the levels of disclosure observed, 
particularly in the more sensitive categories of questions. However, participants within this 
group felt less effected by the treatment than in the PA group despite it actually having a 
stronger impact on their behaviour overall. Again, the settings were increased without 
statistical significance but participants did report finding the treatment a useful guide in 
choosing their privacy settings.    
9.4.5 Perceived Control 
  The Perceived Control (PC) group allowed participants to review their information after 
submitting their responses. This review was intended to highlight sensitive information and 
give participants the chance to edit. In the previous experiment both PC1 (before review) and 
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PC2 (after review) saw a decrease in disclosure that held statistical significance. Here, 
however, only PC2 saw a statistically significant decrease from the control. PC1’s 
observations are broadly similar to the control with only a 8% decrease in total questions 
answered. This could be expected given that PC1 is essentially the control interface with 
review screens added; i.e. the actual social network sections are the same as the control. The 
reason for the difference from the original experiment is unclear; however, the time between 
the two (variation in context) and variation in the sample used in each experiment could 
account for it. Furthermore, it could be due to the change in questions from experiment one 
where they are now designed to more applicable and therefore more likely to be answered by 
participants. 
  After review, both the total amount of questions answered and those including only the 
“Yes” responses were reduced with statistical significance with the green category of 
questions being the most answered (65%) and both the yellow and red holding the highest 
reduction in questions answered (41% and 37% respectively). This provides further evidence 
for H5 as participants would seem to be more selective and private with what they ultimately 
disclosed. This decrease when reviewing data is statistically significant with a Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks score of p<0.0001 for both total questions answered and for only “Yes” 
responses. This is lower than the PA group also with a statistically significant difference 
(p=0.042) and lower than the SN group but without statistical significance (p=0.385). 
However, when only considering “Yes” responses there is no statistically significant 
difference compared to the PA and SN groups (p=0.572 and p=0.442 respectively). An initial 
review of these statistics would suggest that these participants are acting in accordance with 
strong privacy concerns for their information. However, this is only when reviewing their 
information so they may have been reminded of privacy when their interaction was placed in 
a privacy focussed context.   
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Table 37 - PC Exit-Survey Results 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
58% 32% 10% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
63% 32% 5% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
58% 37% 5% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
42% 47% 12% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
42% 37% 21% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
58% 32% 10% 
    
  Despite this group seeming to have the greatest effect on participant behaviour (largest 
decrease in disclosure compared to the control) the perception of how useful the privacy 
information/mechanism was lower than the other treatment groups detailed thus far. There 
appears to be a dissonance between accepting that a participant has acted differently and 
admitting to accepting aid. For example, 63% of participants agreed that the treatment was 
helpful; however, only 42% agreed that they acted differently due to it. It is also worth noting 
that every participant within this group modified their original submissions in some way so 
were, indeed, affected by the treatment. This highlights the difficulty in using self-reported 
perception to explore privacy that was originally identified in the survey chapter. 
  Statements post-experiment also suggest that the changes in the group are as a result of being 
driven by the dynamic elements added to the UI, particularly the changing “P-Score”: it was 
like a game, I wanted to get the high score. It would therefore appear that participants may 
have been persuaded by the treatment to be more private but not necessarily to enact their 
privacy preferences; this persuasion by the treatment may be one way of overcoming the 
secondary goal problem privacy has been proposed as having (Bonneau and Anderson et al. 
2009). However, the green category of questions did not see the same level of reduction as the 
other categories so it would appear that participants are still being selective of precisely what 
they are editing. The change in levels for the “P-Score” may have played a role in this as 
experiment one required a higher level of non-disclosure to obtain the “low risk” privacy 
rating.    
  This is the only group, much as in the first experiment, to set the connection scores. 
However, this is only upon review of their information when it is presented to them during the 
flow of interaction; that is, no participants followed the extra link before review. This would 
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suggest that participants will interact with what is put in front of them, particularly if there is 
sufficient motivation to do so as provided by the dynamic “P-Score”. The settings score are 
also increased from the control but not with statistical significance.  
  In summary, this group held the largest decrease in disclosure when compared to the control 
and this is mainly in the more sensitive categories of information; although, the green also 
saw a reduction post-review. However, participants appeared to have been motivated by 
achieving a low “P-Score” rather than protecting their privacy. This is demonstrative of the 
power of persuasion using this type of UI element and there is evidence here that it can be 
used to force participants to act more privately. Although, if the goal is to encourage 
participants to enact their own privacy needs it is perhaps too persuasive; however, it is 
debatable as to whether participants will actually lose out if they are too private.  
9.5.1 Two-Factor Groups 
  In order to explore the effect of the treatments further, this section discusses the results from 
the two-factor groups using focus group and exit-survey responses. 
9.5.2 Subjective Norms & Personal Attitude 
  This group combined the SN and PA treatments so participants had both the traffic lights 
and an explicit piece of advice for each interaction. The advice and category definitions from 
the single factor treatments remain the same within the two-factor treatment found here.  
  Table 30 shows that both the total number of questions answered and disclosure where only 
“Yes” answers are counted held statistically significant reductions when compared to the 
control group. The total amount of questions answered stood at 56%, lower than the PA group 
at 66% and around the same level as the SN group which stood at 57%. Similarly, when “No” 
responses are discounted the groups level of disclosure stands at 48%. The location of this 
disclosure was least in the higher sensitivity ratings as in the single factor treatments from 
which this group was derived. The green category was also lower than the related single 
factor groups (66% compared to 83% and 78% respectively). There is no statistically 
significant difference between the 2-factor treatments and its respective single factor 
treatments (p=.429 for PA and p=.829 for SN in terms of total questions left unanswered) 
  It would appear that the two factor group held a similar affect over participants as the related 
single factor treatments and participants were making choices based on their privacy needs.  
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Table 38 - PASN Exit-survey results 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
42% 42% 16% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
33% 58% 9% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
33% 50% 17% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
67% 25% 8% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
42% 33% 25% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
67% 25% 8% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was confusing 
33% 58% 9% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was better than one 
36% 55% 9% 
  Participants here reported a more neutral view of the UI features than in the single factor 
groups despite being as affected by them, if not more so. In particular, participants reported 
that they did not feel affected by the treatments with only 33% agreeing with the statement 
regarding the helpfulness of it. However, 67% liked the privacy information in general and 
perhaps felt that it validated choices that they wanted to make.  
  Of the two salient UI changes 60% of participants preferred the Traffic Lights over the 
advice pop up, with the remaining participant stating neither had an impact. This is in line 
with the thoughts of the PA group who seemed to prefer their treatment over the SN group 
(when comparing the perceptions of the two). Indeed, the post experiment statements also 
highlighted this: I preferred the lights, they were right next to each question so I was always 
aware of them even when not looking right at it and when asked what they thought of the two 
at the same time: I found the pop-up to be annoying making the site too busy. There seems to 
be a general preference for the treatment introduced based on the Personal Attitude aspect of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour; perhaps as it provided a suggestion rather than an order 
(Fogg 2003). The treatment may have allowed users to think about privacy without being too 
invasive in its intentions; i.e. not subverting their pre-defined goals as much allowing them to 
maintain a degree of autonomy over their own decisions. 
  The settings score was increased from the control but without statistical significance. It was, 
however, higher than the single factor groups barring PC2 which may suggest that 
participants held a heightened sense of privacy and made specific selections as a result. 
However, table 38 shows that only 33% of participants felt that the treatment helped them 
choose particular settings. Participants may have been subconsciously persuaded to act with a 
higher regard to their privacy (throughout the experiment) yet be unwilling to admit, or 
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unaware, that they were influenced by it. This may be similar to the third person effect were 
people tend to believe that mass communication plays a more significant influence over others 
than themselves and underplay the influence it actually has over the individual (Debatin, 
Lovejoy et al. 2009).   
  The connection settings were actually applied by three participants in this group. However, 
this could be due to variation within the sample rather than due to an increase in system 
engagement and participant self-efficacy given the lack of interaction in other groups. 
9.5.3 Perceived Control and Personal Attitude 
  This treatment combined traffic lights of PA with the review pages of PC allowing 
participants to make initial selections of what to disclose based on the privacy salient 
information and then review and edit this information again. The levels of disclosure observed 
were least in the higher sensitivity ratings than in the green category suggesting participants 
were selective in terms of what they answered and either followed the advice of the treatment 
or regarded their own privacy during the experiment. The initial results in this group (before 
the PC treatment) are not statistically different from the single factor PA group suggesting 
similar behaviour (p=.546 and p=.914 for only “Yes” responses). It was also not statistically 
different from single factor PC1 (p=.127 and p=.096). Unlike single factor PC1 however, 
there was a statistically significant decrease when compared to the control (although, not 
when only considering “yes” responses). This would suggest that participants are making a 
selective decision over what to answer based on the PA treatment before submitting their data 
to the PC treatment. Having already made these choices would they then reconsider them 
based on the PC treatment? Disclosure was decreased post-review and the change in the group 
is significant for both yes and no responses (Wilcoxon p=.028 and p=.001) and PAPC2 was 
statistically reduced from the PA group (Mann Whitney p<.0001 for both counts of 
disclosure) suggesting that participants made their choices and were then persuaded to protect 
further by the control mechanism. However, despite there being a decrease compared to PC2 
with a seemingly large reduction in the yellow and red categories (23% and 18% respectively) 
this is not statistically significant (p=.175 and p=.325). 
  Table 39 details the exit survey results. 
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Table 39 - PAPC Exit-Survey Results 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
46% 
38% 15% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
54% 
23% 23% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
38% 
31% 31% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
54% 
31% 15% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
38% 
38% 23% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
46% 
38% 15% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was confusing 
31% 
46% 23% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was better than one 
23% 
62% 15% 
   
  Much as in the PA and SN treatment group, participant responses are reduced in the agreed 
column from the single factor groups; despite the apparent effect of the treatment being 
greater than those groups. Participant’s appreciation for the treatment seems to diminish the 
higher the potential effect of the treatment is. Again, perhaps being unwilling to admit the 
extent of its influence or finding the combination of the two an annoyance. Indeed, the focus 
group highlighted: I’d already made my decision about what to disclose before reviewing, it 
was overkill. In relation to this, 62% of participants in this group preferred the traffic lights 
over the review form (23% the review and 15% neither) suggesting that, for those 
participants, the added review may have provided an annoyance rather than an aid. So similar 
to the previous two factor group there appears to be a preference for the more suggestive 
traffic lights rather than the more explicit advice box. The reason for change despite already 
making privacy conscious decisions according to a participant echoes the response from the 
single PC group: I wanted to get the score low. Participants, despite potentially already 
making their privacy decisions, endeavoured to disclose less than perhaps they would have 
done otherwise and this seems to be due to the persuasiveness of the dynamic score giving 
them something tangible to aim for. Again, the influence of a sub-conscious goal may be 
playing a part in informing and influencing their behaviour as mentioned earlier; in this case 
the goal of getting a low score which may not be representative of actual participant desire. A 
Participant post-experiment felt that their choices were based on their own common sense 
rather than because of the treatment yet did not elaborate on whether they were reminded of 
their common sense due to the treatment of not. Indeed, they felt they may have been but 
could not say for certain. 
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  Interestingly, the settings scores increased with statistical significance within this group 
when compared to the control; this and the other combined PC treatment were the only groups 
were this was the case. This statistical increase occurred upon the review of data after 
participant changed their originally submitted scores. Despite this, only 38% of participants 
agreed with the statement that the treatment helped them choose their settings and 31% 
outright disagreed with it. Furthermore, the group did not change the connection settings until 
reviewing their data when the settings are explicitly presented to the participant by the 
treatment; they may have felt that, when presented, they can choose the settings but that the 
treatment did not aid in that. Again, it maybe those participants are unaware of the effect that 
the treatment potentially held over them and felt that it did not play a role at all. 
9.5.4 Perceived Control and Subjective Norms 
  This treatment provided participants with a pop-up advice box that they could follow while 
answering the questions and the PC review form to enable the modification and deletion of 
their responses. Disclosure in the group was statistically reduced when compared to the 
control with significant results. Compared to the single factor groups that make up this 
treatment the levels of disclosure is fairly similar with 62% prior to review (compared to 57% 
in the single factor SN) and 47% after review (compared to 48% in the single factor PC2). 
This similarity is also present when only considering “Yes” responses to questions. Indeed, 
there is no statistically significant difference to SN for either totals of disclosure (p=.516 and 
p=.960) nor is there compared to PC2 (p=.727 and p=.495) proving some confirmation of the 
results found in the single factor groups.  
  There is statistically significant difference post-review of submission for both yes and no 
counts of disclosure (Wilcoxon p=.002 and p=.002) and that final disclosure is not as 
pronounced as the previous PAPC group (however, no statistically significant difference: 
p=.376, p=.734).  
  This disclosure was more reduced in the yellow and red sensitivities of questions were 
participants were told not disclose information and the green seems to be fairly well answered 
at 79%. It would appear therefore, that participant did consider their privacy during the 
experiment and made their choices based on that consideration. The reduction in disclosure, 
upon participant review, is not as pronounced as the PA&PC group discussed previously 
perhaps as participants felt more confident in their responses due to the explicit order of the 
treatment SN. Indeed, participants did state post-experiment: I got it right before review and 
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did not really need it, but wanted to get the score down. This comment is very similar to a 
comment from the previous group showing some consistency of perception and the 
introduction of a clear privacy-related goal that the PC treatment provides. 
  The participant perceptions of the combined treatment can be found in table 40. 
Table 40 - PCSN Exit Survey Results 
Statement Agreed Neutral Disagreed 
I found the privacy information 
helpful 
73% 
23% 0% 
The privacy information helped 
me select what to fill in 
73% 
23% 0% 
The privacy information helped 
me select which settings to 
choose 
64% 
27% 9% 
I believe the privacy 
information would be beneficial 
in the long-run 
73% 
18% 8% 
I acted differently due to the 
privacy information’s presence 
45% 
28% 27% 
I liked the extra privacy 
information 
55% 
36% 9% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was confusing 
45% 
55% 0% 
The presence of two sources of 
information was better than one 
45% 
45% 10% 
 
  Unlike the previous combined treatment the participants in this group seem to have more 
favourable attitudes toward privacy information found within this experiment with less stated 
disagreement with the survey statements. However, it is unclear precisely which source of 
privacy information participants might be referring to in the combined treatments. However, 
73% of participants felt that the treatments helped them choose what to fill in but only 45% 
felt that they acted differently due to its presence echoing findings in other groups. There is 
also no clear idea of which treatment participants preferred with 27% stating the review form 
and 27% the SN box (remained stating neither).  
  The settings scores in the group, after review, are statistically significant when compared to 
the control group (as in the other two factor group containing the PC treatment) and again the 
connection settings were applied upon presentation to the user on review. The standard 
deviation for the post-review settings stands at 42, the lowest of all the groups within the 
experiment suggesting fairly consistent behaviour across this treatment group and the 
majority of participant had settings at the highest possible score. This is an increased score 
with changes applied during the review of information. So, participants did make changes 
based on the salient information and mechanism provided by the treatment. Unlike the other 
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groups, 64% of participants agreed that the treatment did help to select their settings. This 
acceptance of the influence of the treatment is perhaps due to the treatment itself (direct order, 
clear behavioural reaction) or due to variation in the sample.  
  Again, the connection settings were only interacted with and altered upon review of data as 
seen in other treatments where PC mechanism is present. Hence, participants were not 
encouraged to explore the system to ensure their privacy needs were met and the treatments 
were review was not present did not aid in this. This could be due to their self-efficacy, so 
they were not confident in exploring the full features of the system or because exploring that 
link is simply not an obvious part of their goal and is therefore left alone and given low 
priority.  
9.5.5 Focus Groups Discussion 
  The focus groups aimed to explore the more qualitative aspects of the experiments in greater 
detail. Specifically, examining participant perceptions on the link (if any) between disclosure 
and the application of privacy settings and whether there is a preference between lying or 
withholding information. Notes from these focus groups can be found in appendix 11.  
  First, it is unclear from these results what the relationship is between disclosure and privacy 
settings. Wider research suggests that there is no relationship (Christofides 2012) but an 
assumption could be made that if participants have disclosed very little they do not need to 
apply strong protection to their profiles. However, participants still applied high protection, 
even in the treatment groups that held less disclosure than the control. Indeed, one participant 
in the control focus group stated: I chose out of habit, saw friends only and chose that. This is 
an ongoing theme identified in the chapter 5 survey, where it seems that users of social 
networks, by default, want to apply the higher levels of settings protection and will do so 
when presented with them. The issue, perhaps, in social networks is that to change these 
settings requires effort on the part of the user that they are unwilling to give unless it is part of 
their regular interactions. 
  In response to the question “do you still need to protect even if you have not given any 
information”, the response from all focus group participants was that it is necessary with on 
participant noting: yes, things might change and you don’t know what other people might say 
about you. There is some evidence in these statements for participants thinking about the 
shifting context of privacy, acknowledging that the settings perhaps should be set to cover all 
eventualities that could occur in the future. It would appear therefore, that a relationship 
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between disclosure and settings should not be expected as they are each in pursuit of their 
own, different goals.  
  The second point the focus groups aimed to explore further dealt with whether participants 
prefer to withhold information or lie in response to questions asked of them in both the 
experiment and similar real world applications. The question was phrased thus: “Is it better to 
lie about your information or not answer the questions?” Particular focus was placed on the 
binary response questions. There was a general consensus within the focus groups that leaving 
questions unanswered is the better strategy when given the choice with one participant noting: 
you are accountable for anything you put on there even if it is lie so just don’t say anything. 
Another participant stated: if the data is being viewed then leave them blank as people will use 
that to judge you in some way. This second response came from the PA group, the participant 
specifically stated that the lights helped show what people may use to judge me on. These 
views are in line with theories of social capital that suggest that any information about an 
individual can be used to form social ties and therefore, data should be withheld as much as is 
possible.  
  The data granule of address was chosen as a discussion point and when asked why 
participants did or did not disclose it a response was: NTU does not need to know. This was a 
common response to a variety of other data granules when asked. This would suggest that 
participants were making decisions based on what to disclose to the entity rather than their 
network. Participants also stated they held a similar approach to existing applications such as 
Facebook. However, it is important to note that this is only for information asked of them; i.e. 
the NTU network asked them these questions, not what they want to tell their friends using 
the system as a social mediator.  
  However, another participant stated: It made me think carefully about the information I put 
on other social network sites such as Twitter and Facebook and how that information could 
be used by others. This would suggest that the treatments did have the effect of informing 
participant awareness of privacy issues and them then using that awareness in their decision 
making process and hence may play a role in longer term use where disclosure is driven by 
user goal rather than the system goal.   
9.6.1 Limitations 
  There is the potential that participants realised the purpose of the research and acted 
according to how they felt they were expected. Hence, participants chose not to disclose in the 
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higher sensitivities as they felt that was what was expected from their participation in an 
experiment rather than based on their own thoughts and perceptions on appropriate behaviour.  
  Also, the extent of the role of trust in the institution is unclear and could play a role in 
influencing the results of disclosure. That is, the amount of trust placed in NTU or Salford 
could mean participants disclose information that they would not normally do so to a similar 
service such as Facebook. However, a number of participants in the focus groups stated that 
they chose not to disclose certain pieces of information because NTU does not need to know, 
suggesting that participants were making a consideration based on the guardian of the data. 
However, the strength of the results may suggest that participants were enacting in accordance 
with perceived desirable behaviour.   
  The exit-survey highlighted that a number of participants felt that the privacy information 
provided by the treatments could be beneficial in the long-run. The experiment provided 
participants with a fixed context and a goal based on one that was given to them (to sign-up); 
hence, the experiment may not be representative of disclosure behaviour where the goal is 
derived by the user during long term system use. For example, a user may post on a timeline, 
not because Facebook asks them to, but because they wish to vent frustration or to inform 
their peer group of news. The exit-survey results suggest that participants may be reminded of 
their privacy if the information is present during longer term system use however.  
  As this is a post-test only control group design experiment, there is no gauge for pre-
experiment behaviour from participants. Hence, any potential, pre-existing difference between 
the groups due to variation is unknown. A pre-test would be difficult to implement in these 
experiments as it may have the effect of priming participants to the idea of privacy and thus 
influence the results; again, Hawthorne effect. However, the size of effect on each group 
compared to the control (and the fact each group was different compared to the control) would 
suggest that any difference is caused by the treatment rather than variation.   
  Again, the exit-survey exploring differing perceptions of privacy concern and intention 
(based on Westin and the TPB) found no difference between the groups, much as in the first 
experiment; results can be found in appendix 10. This may be due to the survey not offering 
the level of granularity required to study the perception of discrete behaviour or due to the 
sample size not being sufficient in highlighting differences when using a survey as a data 
collection method.  
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9.8.1 Experiments Summary 
  Disclosure in the treatment groups was reduced when compared to the control sample with 
statistically significant results. Disclosure was the least in the more sensitive questions 
groupings with green seeing less decreases in disclosure compared to the first experiment. 
This could be due to the changes made to the questions were efforts were made to make the 
questions more applicable and therefore more likely to be answered by participants. However, 
the time between the two experiments could also be a factor and participants could be more 
engaged with the concept due to increased attention placed on privacy and the Internet (see 
PRISM (Greenwald and MacAskill 2013) etc.).  
    Regardless, as participants in this second experiment disclosed the least in the more 
sensitive questions groupings which would suggest that they were influenced by the 
treatments to consider their privacy. Hence, it would appear that H1, H3 and H5 tested true 
within this second experiment with participants reacting to the UI and disclosing less as a 
result. However, it is debatable as to the extent of influence the treatments held over 
participants in terms of meetings their own privacy needs. The Perceived Control groups, for 
example, seemed to be influenced by the dynamic mechanisms provided by the treatment and 
made their choices in pursuit of a goal of getting their P-Score as low as they could. Pursuit of 
this goal would provide the by-product of protecting a participant’s privacy; however, 
participants cannot be said to be making choices based on their perceptions of privacy. 
Indeed, in the two factor groups, participants still made changes when reviewing their data 
despite already having made decisions based on the PA or SN treatment suggesting they were 
persuaded to be more private due to the PC treatment.  
  Participants seemed to favour the traffic lights when comparing perceptions across the 
groups (from the exit-surveys) and within the two-factor groups. This treatment is less 
tangible in it advice and is more of a general classification of question sensitivity: a 
suggestion. As such, it perhaps informs and reminds participants of their privacy desires while 
leaving them a degree of autonomy over their behaviour. Participants did follow the advice of 
the SN group but seemed less enamoured of the treatment compared to the PA group; perhaps 
not appreciating being told what to do.  
  The settings across the groups were not increased with statistical significance except for the 
in the two-factor PC groups were it was upon participant review. Hence, H2, H4 and H6 null 
hypotheses cannot be rejected for all groups. The settings are far less granular than the 
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disclosure levels and as such gaining statistically significant results is difficult based on the 
measures used.   
  Finally, the connection settings were only applied with consistency when presented to 
participants when reviewing their data and selections. This would suggest that engagement 
with the system was not heightened although engagement with the concept of privacy was 
increased. As in experiment one, the self-efficacy of participants when presented with a new 
system may be low and so they are unwilling to explore beyond the obvious bounds presented 
to them. Treatments applied here did not encourage this exploration and so participant privacy 
may have suffered as a result.  
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10.1 Conclusions  
  This chapter will review and answer the research questions posed in the introduction and 
literature review. It will review the approach taken within this study and propose 
recommendations for future iterations of such approaches within the research field. Finally, it 
will review the general contribution to the research field and propose further study 
possibilities based on the findings presented within this thesis. 
10.2 Concluding the Method 
  This work has presented a method of exploring privacy behaviour and its relationship to the 
user interface using an experimental approach. This has proved a useful tool in examining 
whether there is a potential relationship between interface elements and what participants 
choose to answer. However, the settings application was less successful and perhaps is ill-
suited to exploration using such an approach due to the lack of variation available in the 
measure. That is, participants tended to select an all-or-nothing approach to settings 
application and there are limited options available so measuring difference is difficult.  
  Such work requires a specific and difficult-to-design question bank to test levels of 
disclosure. These must be general enough to encourage answers from most participants to 
increase the likelihood that they have an answer to them (some participants may answer 
certain questions and other participants different questions). A consistent and fair question set 
is difficult to achieve within such a study. Despite this however, treatments groups can be 
compared to a control with the same question set to determine statistically significant 
differences.  
  A sub-aim of the experiment to assess self-efficacy through a separately kept connection 
settings was not successful and these were usually only set when directly presented to 
participants in the PC treatments. This came about as wider research suggests that participants 
are more likely to seek out risk-coping mechanisms when their concern is heightened (Youn 
2009). However, this may be over a longer time period when the user is completely used to 
the system and aware of the wider risks of its use; indeed higher settings are associated with 
long term and active systems use (Lewis, Kaufman et al. 2008). Hence, the time-frame for 
exploring self-efficacy may be too short in this experiment or self-efficacy cannot be 
influenced in such a short time frame. It may be that prolonged exposure to the kinds of UI 
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elements described in this thesis may promote behaviour to seek out risk-coping mechanisms 
more. 
  The work deals with a controlled context of privacy and participants may act differently if 
they are outside of that context.  For example, if users wish to post on their wall, they are 
directed under their own pre-defined goal instead of being asked an invasive question with a 
potential external goal. It is unclear whether such interface elements as those proposed within 
this thesis would have a similar, long term effect and be able to inform in such user-oriented 
situations. Certainly, some exit-survey responses suggest that there is some long term benefit 
to the privacy information added. As such, a longitudinal study would be appropriate where 
the same features are expanded into participants every day and less controlled routines. This 
perhaps could be achieved through Facebook’s API or browser extensions. The features 
explored here could also form the basis for privacy recommender and personalisation systems.  
  The use of surveys based on general measures of intention and concern have been 
demonstrated to be ineffectual in exploring and predicting behaviour. The experiments 
included elements of surveys based on the TPB that were not granular or contextual enough to 
add to the dataset obtained. Perhaps a specific data item could be presented and participants 
asked for their perception of associated behaviour. However, the context would be lacking 
and difficult to recreate when testing if the perception was a predictor of behaviour. There is 
therefore a need for deeper qualitative enquiry to go along with the experiment. A full use of 
discourse and thematic analysis could reveal interesting participant perceptions about their 
behaviour within the experiment. For example, a phenomenographic analysis of participant 
responses post-interview could show that the groups with privacy salient information 
embedded hold deeper and more sophisticated qualitative responses to questions due to their 
exposure.   
10.3 Impact and Contributions of the Work  
 The work has explored the concept of privacy behaviour from concern through to behaviour. 
The survey was designed to assess where the paradox occurs and to examine whether there is 
a relationship between concern, intention and behaviour finding that a disconnect occurs 
between users stated desires and their actual level of visibility in the network. This survey is 
also an exploration of the method in examining privacy and finds that it is perhaps not 
granular enough to examine the nuance of privacy. The Theory of Planned Behaviour is 
introduced and fitted to the causes of the poor privacy behaviour to demonstrate how they can 
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potentially be address by the UI. These were embedded into experiments aimed at exploring 
what happens when users interact with the system when there is a privacy salience in place, 
exploring varying types of reminder features. Findings indicate that where there are privacy 
focused mechanisms, participants will disclose less information about themselves when asked 
direct questions. In experiment two in particular, there appeared to be a focus on more 
sensitive questions where non-disclosure was concerned. This would suggest that users of 
social networks could be reminded or persuaded to be more private through simple UI 
features that introduce privacy salience. Ultimately, this work has made the following 
contributions: 
1. A holistic exploration of the privacy paradox using a survey approach. 
2. The Theory of Planned Behaviour is explored as a behavioural change mechanism for 
privacy behaviour. 
3. Definitions of privacy salience are generated based on the TPB that address the causes 
of poor privacy behaviour as defined in literature. 
4. A method is presented to explore the potential effect privacy salience might have on 
privacy behaviour. 
5. This method is utilised and results presented of this effect within a controlled context. 
This work has impact on HCI, user interface design and social psychology as well as making 
contributions toward privacy and technology work.  
10.4 Directions for Further Research 
  The conclusions reached here raise some further questions for examining privacy behaviour 
in web services. First, do users of social networks have carefully crafted models of privacy to 
which they refer but which are subverted by the system they are interacting with, or are users 
simply victims of context and reacting to each individual situation they find themselves in? 
Secondly, is it simply the technology setting the context or are privacy preferences more 
stable in the offline world? Finally, would, therefore, the paradox be impossible to solve due 
to the instability of privacy preferences and the ease with which they are influenced by 
context?  
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  The role of UI metaphors is also a recommended area for this work to move into and was 
touched upon briefly in the design of the salient features. Specifically, what are the potential 
metaphors for conceptualising privacy in such a way that system use can be quickly 
understood and privacy preferences easily implemented? Consider the real world, where 
privacy preferences are thought to be stable. The visualisation of privacy is obvious; closed 
doors and windows, thick walls, the ability to whisper etc. Such concepts are difficult to 
design through a system UI while maintaining the clarity of their intention. Technology which 
attempts to implement similar ideas such as encryption, tend to make the use of computer 
systems too complicated for most users to successfully utilise (Furnell, Jusoh et al. 2005). The 
goal then, is to examine ways in which these ideas can be modelled and implemented into a 
social network system and what effect would they have? 
  Building on this, how can salience evolve to become more effective? It is suggested that 
metaphors could also utilise tactile and audio based features making the user more productive 
(or in this case more private) (Marcus 1998). Hence, further questions could explore the 
effective or various interpretations of salience and examine there are varying degrees of 
influence depending on the sensory input.  
  A significant focus for this work was the actual interaction as it happens in real time. 
Observations during the course of the experiments were used to expand on the how users 
interact with the system but this is by no means all-encompassing or exhaustive. A similar 
study could be conducted using eye-tracking software to determine exactly what users are 
engaging with the most during interaction. Do they focus mostly on the actual form elements 
and ignore the surrounding UI elements? Do users in effect limit their contextual 
understanding of the system through this focus? 
  Finally, with increasing use of mobile devices the question is raised regarding how the 
recommendations put forward previously can be embedded within a more minimal UI of a 
mobile device. The previous point regarding a range of salient types could be incorporated 
with this point; sound in particular maybe worth exploring in conjunction with such devices. 
Furthermore, based on the discussions of context, are habits of disclosure different for mobile 
devices compared to their full system versions? This is an interesting thought, given that 
disclosure itself is easier when using a mobile system and that the context and setting within 
which the device is used could be far more changeable and also possibly play a role.          
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10.5 Concluding Remarks 
  This work has explored the potential effect of the User Interface on acts of behavioural 
disclosure by social networking users finding that the UI can play a role in producing more 
privately oriented behaviour through the use of cognitive models embedded within them. In a 
range of privacy contexts this could be an impossible task; however, the UI can persuade and 
subvert any other context as the final interaction point the user deals with. Whether or not the 
user’s needs are being met in such circumstances is not answered and, indeed, it is debatable 
whether such a question can be answered given the complexity of privacy, the technology and 
users themselves. Hence, as designers of computer systems the fact that users misperceive 
system goals and their own goals must be taken into account and, ultimately one point must 
be kept in mind; that the only predictable aspect of end-users is that they are unpredictable. 
The Privacy Paradox phenomenon is the embodiment of such unpredictability; this thesis has 
proposed a way forward in designing UI’s which allow for but limit the damage this 
unpredictable behaviour can potentially do.  
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Appendix 1 – Privacy Perceptions Survey 
Dear Student, 
As part of my PhD on Data privacy in Web Based Services I am conducting research into user 
perceptions of privacy at a granular level and how their understanding of this affects their behaviour 
and therefore their own end data privacy. Granular Privacy means the individual fields and 
parameters (e.g. Date of Birth, address etc.) which relate to the users of a web service; in particular 
a Social Networking System. 
I am writing to ask for your consent to take part in this questionnaire survey about your thoughts on 
the information held about you should you use a Social Networking System such as Facebook. 
All information received and recorded through the use of this survey shall be used for no other 
purpose other than that related to the research and any related, possible publications. All data will be 
stored safely and confidentially during the study. 
The research study is set to investigate user perceptions of privacy at the granular level and how 
private they believe the granular parameters to be and compare this to relevant action with regard to 
protection behaviour. Your contribution will be vital in examining the idea of privacy from a new 
perspective and enable myself and other researchers to develop privacy protection mechanisms which 
provide holistic and contextual aid to the user when deciding on appropriate privacy safeguards. It will 
demonstrate the complexity and individuality of privacy; also aiding in the understanding of what 
users actually think about their own privacy helping to provide the evidence for the need of 
individually tailored tools. 
Some participants may be selected for follow up studies which include; an expert analysis of 10% of 
the participant’s social network settings (this will be entirely anonymous and absolutely no personal 
data shall be recorded) and a follow-up focus group which explore further the themes of this survey. If 
you are happy to take possible take part in these further studies please make this clear on the next 
page. 
At any stage of the research you have the rights to withdraw your information. Throughout the 
study you also hold the complete rights to ask any further questions regarding the study which 
occur to you. 
When the study is concluded you will be given access to a summary of the findings of the study 
and these shall be made available on request where publication has not been possible. 
If this is agreeable to you, please sign the attached research consent form. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time to help me with my research. If 
you have any queries, please feel free to contact me at the following email; T.Hughes-
Roberts@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
PhD Student 
The Computer Networking and Telecommunications Research Group 
School of Computing, Science and Engineering 
University of Salford 
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User Awareness/concern of Privacy Granules in Social Networks and Corresponding Behaviour 
for Protection 
Principal Researcher: Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
School of Computer Science and Engineering 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have 
these answered satisfactorily.   
 
2. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving reason and that this will not affect my legal rights.  
3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study shall be kept 
entirely confidential.  
 
4. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
5. I would be willing to take part in any relevant follow-up research regarding this project 
and am happy to be contacted regarding this. 
 
Researcher Name: Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
 
 
 
 
Signature: 
Date: 
Participant Print Name: 
 
Email:  
 
 
Signature: 
Date:  
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Appendix 2 - Privacy Awareness Survey 
Section 1 – Participant Information 
Are you Male or Female? 
A.  Male 
B.  Female 
 
Age: 
A.  18 – 21 
B.  22 – 25  
C.  26 – 28  
D.  29 – 32  
E.  33+ 
 
Please specify your home country; 
 
 
 
 
Do you actively use a Social Networking Site? 
 
A.  Yes 
B.  No 
 
 
 
If no, please only complete sections 2 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 182 
 
Section 2 – Privacy Opinion and Concern Assessment 
 
For the following statements please select the option which most applies to you by placing a tick in the 
appropriate box; 
1. Users have lost all control over how their personal information is collected and used by social 
networking sites. 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
    
 
2. Social Networking sites handle personal information they collect in a proper and confidential way. 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
    
3. Existing laws and site policies/practices provide a reasonable level of protection for user privacy 
today. 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
    
 
Concern 
1. How concerned are you about your personal privacy when using a social networking site? 
Very Concerned Somewhat 
Concerned 
Not very 
concerned 
No 
concern 
Do not 
know 
Refused 
      
 
2. Have you ever been the victim of a perceived invasion of your personal privacy? 
Yes, myself No, but someone I know Not at all Do not know 
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Section 3 – Social Network Use 
Please write a brief sentence on what you believe privacy means to you; 
 
 
 
 
 
How regularly do you use a Social Networking Site? 
 
E.  Many times a day 
F.  Once a day 
G.  Many times a week 
H.  Less than once a week 
 
Have you read the privacy policy related to the Social Network System? 
 
C.  Yes  
D.  No 
 
Why do you use it (select as many as apply)? 
 
J.  Keep in touch with friends 
K.  Keep in touch with colleagues 
L.  Get to know new people 
M.  Easily obtain information regarding work/university 
N.  Show information about myself/advertise 
O.  Make it convenient for people to get in touch with me 
P.  Build relationships   
Q.  Find Jobs 
R.  Other, please specify; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How many friends do you have listed in the Social Network System? 
 
F.  0-50 
G.  50-100 
H.  100-200 
I.  200-400 
J.  400+ 
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What type of people do you add as a friend on Social Networks (select all that apply)? 
 
I.  Close friends 
J.  Family members 
K.  Friends you may not consider close 
L.  Colleagues you may not consider friends 
M.  People you know but do not consider friends 
N.  People you have met but once 
O.  People you have never met 
P.  Other, please specify; 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you use the “custom” feature to group you friends list into types of people? 
 
C.  Yes         
D.  No 
 
If no, why not (select all that apply)? 
 
F.  Unaware of ability to do so 
G.  Aware but do not know how 
H.  Do not want to utilize feature 
I.  Too time consuming to do so 
J.  Other, please specify; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What would a person not on your friends list be able to see do you believe (select all that apply)? 
 
H.  My Friends 
I.  My Groups/Networks 
J.  My Info 
K.  My Pages 
L.  My Photos 
M.  My Wall 
N.  Do not know 
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Section 4 – Granular Privacy Perception 
Please rate the following pieces of information according to how likely it is that you would share that 
information with the following groups (1 being not likely at all and 5 being very likely). 
Directly Personal Information 
Full Name         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Date of Birth         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Address            Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Email and Messenger        Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Phone Number         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Home Town          Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Current Location         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Family Members         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
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Relationship details         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Activities                     Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Favourites (films, books)                 Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Religious & political views        Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Universities & Schools         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Work Place                Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Sexuality                         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Information posted by others 
Photos by others         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Videos by others         Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Posts & Comments by others        Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
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Information posted by yourself 
Wall Posts & Comments        Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Status Updates          Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Photo albums             Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
Videos                        Not Likely                             Very Likely 
                Strangers                1           2               3               4                5 
                Work/School Colleagues          1           2               3               4                5 
    Close Friends                1           2               3               4                5 
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Section 5 – Privacy Settings you have 
 
The following are a list of the privacy controls available in Facebook. For each please select which 
you use to protect your information. If you are unsure at all please select “Not Sure”; do not guess 
which one you believe to be correct. 
 
Please Note; FOAF means Friend of a Friend. 
 
 
Factors How do you protect your information? 
Primary Information Everyone Friends and 
Networks 
FOAF Only Friends Custom Not Sure 
Full Name       
Date of Birth       
Address       
Email address       
Phone Numbers       
Home Town       
Instant Messenger       
  
Contextual Information Everyone Friends and 
Networks 
FOAF Only Friends Custom Not Sure 
Personal Info (activities, etc.)       
Religious & Political Views       
Education and Work       
About Me       
Family & Relationships       
  
Unintentional Disclosure Everyone Friends and 
Networks 
FOAF Only Friends Custom Not Sure 
Photos and Videos of me       
Who can comment on your 
profile? 
      
Posts by Others       
  
Intended Disclosure Everyone Friends and 
Networks 
FOAF Only Friends Custom Not Sure 
Posts by me (links, updates 
etc.) 
      
Photo Albums       
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Section 6 – Policy Awareness 
 
Are you aware that Facebook owns any information uploaded into the site (i.e. are you aware 
that it owns your information)? 
 
A.  Yes  
B.  No 
 
If yes, does this affect your behaviour on the site (i.e. are you less likely to put certain 
information on there)? 
 
A.  Yes  
B.  No 
C.  Do not know 
 
If no, will you now modify your behaviour (i.e. are you less likely to put certain information on 
there)? 
 
A.  Yes  
B.  No 
C.  Do not know 
 
Finally, select which option most applies to you; I am very concerned that Facebook owns the 
information I give it and can do with it what they want. 
 
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree 
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Appendix 3 – Survey Results and charts 
 
Overview and Breakdown of Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  DipN and DipN2 include students from the same module studied; however, data collection took place 
over two days with DipN on the first and DipN2 the second. 
  The following table breaks down the participants according to their international status; allowing 
students from the UK to compared to those who are not. 
Degree * Gender Crosstabulation 
   Gender 
Total    Male Female 
Degree Nursing Count 11 50 61 
% within Degree 18.0% 82.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.2% 14.7% 17.9% 
Spanish Count 9 25 34 
% within Degree 26.5% 73.5% 100.0% 
% of Total 2.6% 7.4% 10.0% 
Law Count 17 53 70 
% within Degree 24.3% 75.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 5.0% 15.6% 20.6% 
English Count 13 43 56 
% within Degree 23.2% 76.8% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.8% 12.6% 16.5% 
DipN Count 12 36 48 
% within Degree 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.5% 10.6% 14.1% 
DipN2 Count 8 63 71 
% within Degree 11.3% 88.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 2.4% 18.5% 20.9% 
Total Count 70 270 340 
% within Degree 20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 20.6% 79.4% 100.0% 
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Degree * UKOrNot Crosstabulation 
   UKOrNot 
Total    International Home 
Degree Nursing Count 10 49 59 
% within Degree 16.9% 83.1% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.0% 14.9% 18.0% 
Spanish Count 16 18 34 
% within Degree 47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
% of Total 4.9% 5.5% 10.4% 
Law Count 17 53 70 
% within Degree 24.3% 75.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 5.2% 16.2% 21.3% 
English Count 4 51 55 
% within Degree 7.3% 92.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.2% 15.5% 16.8% 
DipN Count 3 41 44 
% within Degree 6.8% 93.2% 100.0% 
% of Total .9% 12.5% 13.4% 
DipN2 Count 5 61 66 
% within Degree 7.6% 92.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.5% 18.6% 20.1% 
Total Count 55 273 328 
% within Degree 16.8% 83.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 16.8% 83.2% 100.0% 
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  The following breaks down the participants according to their age; participants over the age of 21 are 
listed as mature as per the university classification. 
Degree * Mature? Crosstabulation 
   Mature? 
Total    Non Mature 
Degree Nursing Count 28 33 61 
% within Degree 45.9% 54.1% 100.0% 
% of Total 8.2% 9.7% 17.9% 
Spanish Count 22 12 34 
% within Degree 64.7% 35.3% 100.0% 
% of Total 6.5% 3.5% 10.0% 
Law Count 58 12 70 
% within Degree 82.9% 17.1% 100.0% 
% of Total 17.1% 3.5% 20.6% 
English Count 42 14 56 
% within Degree 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 12.4% 4.1% 16.5% 
DipN Count 16 32 48 
% within Degree 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 4.7% 9.4% 14.1% 
DipN2 Count 35 36 71 
% within Degree 49.3% 50.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.3% 10.6% 20.9% 
Total Count 201 139 340 
% within Degree 59.1% 40.9% 100.0% 
% of Total 59.1% 40.9% 100.0% 
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Extra Figures – Concern & Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No of Friends across Westin Ratings (chi-square p=.007) 
No of Friends across Self-Reported Concern (chi-square p=.023) 
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Westin Rating and Perceived Victim of Attach (chi-square p<.0001): 1=Yes, 2=Someone I know, 
3=Not at all and 4=Do not Know 
Self-Reported Concern and Policy Engagement (chi-square p=.002) 
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Self-Reported Concern and Reported use of Custom Settings (chi-square p=.043) 
Self-Reported Concern and Reported Unsure of at least 1 setting (chi-square p=.019) 
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Statistics of modal responses to reported settings 
  FullName DoB Address Email Phone HomeTown IM PersonalInfo RelPol 
N Valid 286 285 267 279 263 281 267 280 278 
Missing 65 66 84 72 88 70 84 71 73 
Mode 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
  Second table; 
 
  Each of these tables shows that the modal response to the reported settings was 4 in every category 
(bar full name) which represent “Friends Only” (1 is everyone, 2 is Friends and Networks, 3 is FOAF, 
5 is custom and 6 is unsure). 
 
 
 
Statistics 
  
EducationWork AboutMe 
FamilyRelation
ships PhotosOfMe WhoComment PostsByOthers PostsByMe PhotoAlbums 
N Valid 280 280 281 282 282 279 281 281 
Missing 71 71 70 69 69 72 70 70 
Mode 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Self-Reported Concern and Concern over Data Ownership (chi-square p<.0001) 
 197 
 
Appendix 4 – Experiment Screenshots 
Control Group 
First, the initial sign-up screen; 
 
Which leads to the following screen with more personal profile building questions: 
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And finally, 
 
Completion of this page leads to the following page where the participants can set their privacy profile 
settings; 
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  Note, the first link leading to the setting of the connection portion of the participants profiles (these 
are automatically set to open by default). These can only be changed by following the link thus 
measuring the level of engagement with the UI. The second button sets all profile settings to the 
default which is the most open. These extra settings are as follows: 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The page also contains the following for general settings (taken from Facebook); 
 
Pressing the submit button completes the sign-up process and finishes the UI experiment portion of the 
research leading to the exit survey. 
Personal Attitude Group Screenshots 
  The group follows the exact same structure as above with the following added as the experimental 
treatments. First, the participants view the following pop-up as an introduction to the system: 
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The privacy traffic lights are present as the following indicators of information sensitivity (green for 
low impact, yellow for medium and red for the highest): 
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  Participants are given a further pop-up for setting their profile privacy: 
 
  The connection settings: 
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And the profile settings: 
 
The Subjective Norms Group 
  This group contained advice and peer choice incorporated into the selection UI for each questions. 
Participants are greeted with the following pop-up when starting the experiment; 
  
  When highlighting a particular data item the following pops up with the two pieces of information for 
the participant to use in the decision making; 
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  This is present for each data item and the two pieces of information can be found in the complete 
data item table at the end of this appendix.  
   At the settings screen, participants are given a similar pop-up informing them of the separate 
connection settings: 
 
  Each setting also has a pop-up advice box (again, full details can be found in the table at the end of 
the appendix), the advice here gave a recommended setting and the most selected from peer users; 
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The Perceived Control Group 
  The Perceived Control group has the same screens as the control group. However, these screens are 
interspersed with a review screen highlighting the data being submitted by the user. For example, 
following the sign-up screen the user can review their submissions; 
 
   A further example: 
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  Note, the information sensitivity highlighting each piece of data for its level of risk (this is the same 
as the privacy traffic lights and a full list is found in the table at the end of this appendix). 
  Finally, the settings: 
  
  Note, this is the only experiment where the connection settings are explicitly displayed to the 
participant; i.e. the settings are shown to the user without their choice to follow the extra link.  
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Appendix 5 - Information requested 
 
Page 1 – Sign-up 
Data Item Sensitivity P-Light P-Light 2 
User Name N/A N/A  
First Name N/A N/A  
Last Name N/A N/A  
Password N/A N/A  
Gender N/A N/A  
Date of Birth Medium Amber Amber 
Page 2 – Profile Builder 
Home Address High Red Red 
Term Address Medium Red Red 
Hometown Low Green Green 
Phone Number High Red Red 
Enable Tracking? High Red Red 
School Low Green Green 
Work Place Low Green Green 
Course details Low Green Green 
Favourite Films Low Green Green 
Favourite Books (TV 
Shows) 
Low Green Green 
Favourite Quotes (Music) Low Green Green 
Are you political, if so 
which? 
Medium Amber Amber 
Are you religious, if so 
which? 
Medium Amber Amber 
Relationship Status Medium Amber Amber 
Partner Name Medium Amber Amber 
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Drinking Regularity Medium Amber Amber 
 Age Started Drinking Medium Amber Amber 
Drinking Effects Medium Amber Amber 
Drug Use High Red Red 
Pirated Media High Red Red 
Stolen High Red Red 
Cheated High Red Red 
Piercings Medium Amber Amber 
Tattoos Medium Amber Amber 
Lied on a CV High Red Red 
Faked Illness High Amber Red 
Spending habits Low Green Green 
Favourite Shops Low Green N/A 
Interests Low Green Green 
Personal Email Medium N/A Amber 
Sexuality Medium N/A Amber 
Donor Low N/A Green 
Charity Low N/A Green 
Page 3 – Profile Settings 
Status Update, Photos, 
Posts 
High Red  
Bio and Quotes Low Green  
Family and Relationships Medium Amber  
Photos and Videos High Red  
Religion and Politics Medium Amber  
Birthday Medium Amber  
Permission to comment Low Green  
Current Location High Red  
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Contact Information High Red  
Page 4 – Connection Settings 
Who can search Medium Amber  
Who can request 
friendship 
Low Green  
Who can send messages Medium Amber  
Who can see friends list Medium Amber  
Education and Work info Low Green  
Current Hometown Low Green  
Likes and Activities Low Green  
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Appendix 6 – Consent Form and Instructions 
Dear Student, 
As part of my PhD research I am conducting experiments using a signup process for social network 
systems.  
I am writing to ask for your participation in a series of experiments revolving around social network 
use. The social network being tested is a Salford University version of Facebook and shall look and 
feel very similar. All the information required during the experimentation process is entirely optional 
and shall be kept in secure, encrypted databases.  
Each group taking part in the experiment will have differences in the system where the actions of the 
groups involved will be compared for differences; you will be randomly assigned to a group before the 
experiments begin. 
The information stored in the databases from the experiments shall not be viewed by anyone other 
than researcher and shall be immediately destroyed after the research has been completed. 
Furthermore, the research shall not analyse the data itself but instead shall look at what data is present 
and what is absent; therefore, the actual information stored shall not be analysed within a deeper 
context than that. You will have the opportunity to set who can see what information or not 
divulge any information you do not wish to. It is important to note that you will be given a 
participant number which will be used to relate to the experiments rather than your name; this is to 
assure anonymity from the data involved. 
At any stage of the research you have the rights to withdraw your information. Throughout the 
study you also hold the complete rights to ask any further questions regarding the study which 
occur to you. 
 When the study is concluded you will be given access to a summary of the findings of the study 
and these shall be made available on request where publication has not been possible. 
If this is agreeable to you, please sign the attached research consent form. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time to help me with my research. If 
you have any queries, please feel free to contact me at the following email;  
T.Hughes-Roberts@edu.salford.ac.uk  
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
PhD Student 
The Computer Networking and Telecommunications Research Group 
School of Computing, Science and Engineering 
University of Salford 
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User Behaviour in Online Social Networks; an Examination of User Action during the Sign-up 
Process 
Principal Researcher: Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
School of Computer Science and Engineering 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information provided for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have 
these answered satisfactorily.   
 
2. I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time, without giving reason and that this will not affect my legal rights.  
 
3. I understand that any personal information collected during the study shall be kept 
entirely confidential.  
 
4. I agree to take part in the study. 
 
Researcher Name: Thomas Hughes-Roberts 
 
 
 
 
Signature: 
Date: 
Participant Print Name: 
 
 
 
Signature: 
Date:  
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Instructions for Experiments 
You have been asked to join a brand new social network aimed exclusively at NTU students. 
You will be following the account creation process for your new account which creates your 
specific network based on how much information about yourself you supply. To begin follow 
the instructions below and sign the back of this form to agree to your participation. 
1. Open a web browser. 
 
2. Enter the following in the address bar of the browser; Variable address 
 
3. Follow the sign-up process and create your account 
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Appendix 7 – Experiment  One Results  
Group Gender (M/F) 
Control 8/2 
Personal Attitude 8/3 
Perceived Control 11/1 
Subjective Norms 7/5 
 
The following tables indicate the amount of questions left out in each category asked of participants during the experiment, giving a total number for each 
participant (provided in the “Total” column). The total amount of settings is also provided out of a maximum of 200.   
Control           
 
    
Users Signup Contact Eduinterest Context Marketing Total Settings Connection 
1 0 0 6 0 0 6 200  0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 80  0 
3 0 0 4 0 0 4 0  0 
4 0 1 0 0 0 1 200  0 
5 0 2 0 0 0 2 0  0 
6 0 2 5 1 2 10 0  0 
7 0 1 0 0 0 1 200  0 
8 0 3 6 1 2 12 200  0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
10 0 1 0 0 0 1 200  0 
     Total 37   0 
     
Average 3.7  
 
     
St.Dev 4.295993 
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Attitude 
         Users Signup Contact Eduinterest Context Marketing Total Settings Connection 
1 0 5 6 1 0 12 150 0 
2 0 5 6 0 0 11 200 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 
4 0 4 8 0 3 15 0 0 
5 0 5 8 9 3 25 200 0 
6 0 0 4 0 0 4 110 0 
7 0 4 8 0 1 13 200 0 
8 0 0 4 1 0 5 200 0 
9 0 4 2 3 0 9 100 0 
10 0 1 4 1 2 8 200 0 
11 0 4 1 0 0 5 200 0 
      Total 107 
  
      
Average 9.727273 
 
      
St.Dev 6.739301 
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P-Control1 
          Users Signup Contact Eduinterest Context Marketing Total Settings Connection 
1 0 1 3 1 0 5 200 0 
2 0 3 5 4 2 14 200 0 
3 0 2 2 0 0 4 140 0 
4 0 1 8 2 0 11 200 0 
5 0 0 8 0 0 8 200 0 
6 0 4 8 9 3 24 0 0 
7 0 4 8 9 3 24 0 0 
8 0 4 2 0 0 6 200 0 
9 0 4 3 0 1 8 180 0 
10 0 4 4 0 0 8 200 0 
11 0 4 6 9 3 22 200 0 
12 0 4 4 3 1 12 200 160 
      Total 146 
      
Average 12.16667 
      
St.Dev 7.321616 
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P-
Control2 
           Users Signup Contact Eduinterest Context Marketing Total Settings Connection 
1 0 1 3 0 0 4 200 0 
2 2 4 6 12 2 26 200 170 
3 2 5 8 11 3 29 80 60 
4 2 5 8 12 3 30 200 210 
5 2 1 8 0 0 11 200 0 
6 2 5 8 12 3 30 200 210 
7 0 4 8 9 3 24 0 0 
8 2 5 2 0 0 9 200 0 
9 0 4 3 1 1 9 180 150 
10 0 5 4 0 0 9 200 0 
11 0 4 6 9 3 22 200 150 
12 0 4 5 10 1 20 200 160 
      Total 223 
      
Average 18.58333 
      
St.Dev 9.596006 
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Subjective 
           Users Signup Contact Eduinterest Context Marketing Total Settings Connection 
1 0 1 1 0 0 2 200 0 
2 0 3 1 0 1 5 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4 0 4 5 10 3 22 200 120 
5 0 3 0 3 0 6 0 0 
6 0 4 5 0 0 9 0 0 
7 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 
8 1 4 6 11 1 23 200 0 
9 0 3 6 0 1 10 190 0 
10 0 2 6 0 1 9 0 0 
11 0 5 7 6 2 20 0 0 
12 0 3 7 0 0 10 80 0 
      Total 122 
  
      
Average 10.16667 
      
St.Dev 7.541803 
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Appendix 8 – Interview Notes 
 
Potential Interview Questions 
  The following are a set of individual questions which could be asked following participation in the 
experiments; note, that these are informal and deviation from the questions are encouraged should an 
interesting observation be made and pursued.  
1. What did you think of the system? 
2. Did you disclose all the fields asked of you? 
3. If so, why? 
4. If not, why? 
5. What did you think of the changes to the User Interface? 
The following are notes taken during the observations and interviews. 
Control Group Notes from Observations and Interviews 
“I have been honest” – participants view it as a competition to see who could be the most risqué about 
themselves, disclosing very sensitive information in droves. 
“I gave everything because the system asked me to” – participants believed that they had to disclose 
all the information asked of them in order to appease the system and complete the goal of signing up. 
“I thought information was optional as there was no red asterisk next to the field” – despite this the 
participant gave a lot of information.  
“I hope the police don’t see this” – aware that they are disclosing information about themselves that is 
extremely sensitive and yet are still seemingly happy to do so.  
In terms of the privacy settings applied; participants mainly (except for two instances) applied friends 
only protection. Around 50% of participants applied no protection at all and seemed to be “clicking 
through at this point as they looked to see that some settings had already been applied by default and 
chose to leave it in order to finish the task at hand. Furthermore, participants who did select settings 
seemed to do so quickly without apparent awareness of what they were applying that setting to. 
“Friends only” was selected with practiced ease and obvious familiarity from those that did apply 
settings. This would suggest that participants feel they know what should be selected and did so 
habitually and without obvious thought in a new environment. HCI metaphors and self-efficacy could 
both be used to explain the two described observations here.  
Participants were also very focussed on each specific question, scrolling across what asked of them 
with the cursor; suggesting that each question was taken granularly and not seen in the wider context 
of what has been asked of them i.e. they seemed more concerned with getting the answer right than 
deciding if they should answer.  
Personal Attitude Group Notes 
Initial results from some interviews – Did you agree with the lights? Generally, yes; “made you 
realise that there was the option of disclosing information and helped to choose what to disclose”. 
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Participants had the most concern about directly relatable information (Address, phone no. etc.), least 
concern regarding contextual questions – “lies on CV is ok, everyone does it, so it’s ok to tick the box 
and disclose it”. Through further probing the participants also said; “People can just lie about these 
questions so I see no reason not to answer them”. This came about when it was explained that, even if 
lied about, there is still information present which can be used to form an opinion about the user so 
why not just leave it black. This did not seem to be an option when in system was the response from 
the participant.  
However each participant felt that the lights were beneficial overall, providing the prompt reminding 
the participants of choice.  
Perceived Control Notes 
Participants were heard saying the following things - “does this mean the data is optional then?” 
“Should I give it?” and “I’ll delete this to get my P-Score down”. 
This shows that participants were thinking more than other groups about the pieces of data within a 
privacy context, actually asking themselves the question of whether or not they should disclose it.  
One participant after being interviewed felt that the salient feature made very little difference to how 
they behaved within the network (this was participant #12). This is despite a change in the total 
number of disclose field to 20 from 10. So his mind was clearly changed through the course of the 
process.  
In the after interview one participant stated that he felt “if it’s easy to disclose I will” which gives 
some indication of how Facebook might persuade people to disclose information.   
Subjective Norms Notes 
When asked why they gave some pieces of information a participant responded – “I gave it but wish I 
didn’t, I just answered the easy ones, they required less time/effort”. This is response specifically to 
the response given to the contextual questions which were mainly tick boxes. When asked why 
admitted to the various activities these question dealt with the above was used to explain their actions. 
Again this shows how the UI can be persuasive in getting the user to disclose information. 
Participants seemed to be put off by the initial screen lock and thought there was an error in the way 
in which they were using the system. One participant was heard exclaiming; “what have done?”. The 
behaviour of “clicking through” was also clear here with participants simply filling in and clicking in 
order to get to the next screen. Did the message affect their efficacy? 
As seen in the control group, participants were very engaged with each question individually, 
scrolling over it with the cursor and ensuring they filled it in correctly. The problem seemed to be that 
when the initial popup advisor appeared it caused some concern but was quickly ignored as an 
affectation of the system. Through the focus on each question the information contained in the pop-up 
was not taken on board. Participants literally got closer to the screen and tackled the question on its 
own completely isolated from the rest of the UI. The fact that the information appears away from the 
information request did not help; perhaps it should appear next to it like in personal attitude which had 
a greater effect (perhaps due to its simplicity and conceptualisation of a traffic light metaphor).  
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A further point can be made for conceptualising the system which demonstrates the importance of 
self-efficacy; a participant said “I wasn’t sure how to handle it until I just thought of it as Facebook” 
This was in response to being asked how they decided what to disclose to the system. 
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Appendix 9 – Participant Information, Westin Tables and Exit Survey 
Data for Experiment Two 
 
Group Gender (M/F) 
Control 16/4 
Personal Attitude 17/6 
Perceived Control 17/4 
Subjective Norms 19/4 
PA+SN 11/3 
SN+PC 13/1 
PA+PC 12/2 
 
Spread of Westin Ratings Across Experiment 2 Groups 
Group Fundamentalist 
(number/%) 
Pragmatist 
(number/%) 
Unconcerned 
(number/%) 
Control 12.5% 87.5% 0% 
PA 18.75% 75% 6.25% 
SN 33.3% 61.1% 5.6% 
PC 26.3% 73.7% 0% 
PA+SN 41.7% 50% 8.3% 
SN+PC 36.4% 54.4% 9.1% 
PA+PC 42.9% 28.6% 28.6% 
Wider 
Research 
25% 57% 18% 
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  It is interesting that the treatment groups held far higher privacy fundamentalists than the 
control group which mainly held pragmatist rated participants. This could be due to 
participants being influence by the treatments present in the experiment and their level of 
privacy being raised. However, it could also be due to variation among the groups and it is 
not clear from this measure alone what the effect of the treatment is on participant’s privacy 
perception.  
The following summarises the TPB measures of intention, attitude, subjective norms and 
control for the experiment two groups. 
 
 
  As before a higher score would suggest that participants wish to disclose as little as possible 
and it is interesting the PAPC group which disclosed the least in the experiment declared held 
the lowest intention score. Again, this may be due to variation as there is no statistically 
significant difference compared to the control (p=.536). As such, there is further evidence 
here that a generic survey approach is inefficient in exploring privacy intention. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Group Intention Scores 
Average
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    A larger attitude score would suggest that the there is a positive attitude toward disclosure. 
There is very little difference between the groups; although, the PC groups are the lowest 
which also had the lowest levels of disclosure when compared to the control.  
 
    It is interesting that the groups which held the lowest levels of disclosure have the lowest 
attitude scores (PC and PAPC) (which suggest an unwillingness to listen to advice). 
However, these differences are not statistically significant.  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Group Scores for Attitude 
Average
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Group Scores for Subjective Norms 
Average
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  A higher score would indicate that it was easy to identify and protect sensitive information. 
Notice the similarity between the single factor groups where disclosure was lessened 
compared to the control. The factorial groups, however, are broadly similar to the control 
despite also having less disclosure as in the single factor treatments. These elements of the 
survey then suggest a need for a more granular prediction if a survey measure is used. 
However, it may very difficult to create a context that mirrors reality in order to specific 
behavioural predications regarding privacy behaviour and hence a survey method may not be 
the most efficient way of exploring the privacy phenomena.  
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Group Scores for Control 
Average
 224 
 
Appendix 10 – Experiment Data Overview 
Control 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160 
2 0 2 2 1 0 5 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 120 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 
6 0 4 4 1 1 10 0 260 
7 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 260 
8 0 1 4 0 0 5 0 0 
9 0 6 7 12 4 29 120 260 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 2 7 1 0 10 0 260 
12 0 5 6 5 0 16 0 0 
13 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 100 
14 0 1 5 1 1 8 0 0 
15 0 0 1 1 2 4 0 40 
16 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 240 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 260 
18 0 1 3 0 0 4 0 260 
19 0 5 0 1 4 10 0 260 
20 0 5 0 1 0 6 0 260 
     
Group 
Average 5.75 
     
St.Dev 7.010331 
 225 
 
Personal Attitude 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 3 2 7 0 12 60 180 
2 0 1 1 2 0 4 0 260 
3 0 2 2 7 0 11 0 0 
4 0 3 3 1 0 7 0 260 
5 0 1 6 10 1 18 0 260 
6 0 4 5 10 1 20 0 260 
7 0 2 5 2 1 10 0 0 
8 0 3 4 2 0 9 0 0 
9 0 4 4 5 1 14 0 0 
10 0 3 6 3 4 16 0 80 
11 0 4 3 8 0 15 0 260 
12 0 3 4 7 0 14 0 110 
13 0 3 2 9 0 14 0 120 
14 0 2 0 1 0 3 0 120 
15 0 4 1 1 1 7 0 40 
16 0 3 2 11 0 16 0 260 
17 0 2 2 2 0 6 0 0 
18 0 5 5 1 4 15 0 180 
19 0 5 6 1 0 12 0 160 
20 0 3 2 1 0 6 0 220 
21 0 5 2 1 3 11 0 260 
22 0 4 1 9 0 14 0 260 
23 0 3 2 1 0 6 0 80 
     
Group 
Average 11.30435 
 
     
St.Dev 4.63617 
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Subjective Norms 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 5 2 9 0 16 0 260 
2 0 5 2 2 0 9 0 50 
3 0 5 2 10 4 21 0 260 
4 0 5 8 10 4 27 0 0 
5 0 1 3 3 1 8 0 260 
6 1 5 3 3 0 12 0 90 
7 1 5 8 12 1 27 0 260 
8 0 5 2 9 1 17 0 260 
9 0 4 2 9 4 19 0 0 
10 0 2 2 11 0 15 0 140 
11 1 5 2 10 1 19 0 190 
12 0 6 8 2 0 16     
13 0 2 5 1 0 8 0 260 
14 0 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 
15 0 2 0 11 0 13 0 90 
16 0 2 2 0 1 5 0 260 
17 0 2 2 9 0 13 0 10 
18 0 4 2 13 0 19 0 0 
19 0 2 2 0 0 4 0 70 
20 0 5 1 1 0 7 80 260 
21 0 6 2 10 1 19 0 260 
     
Group 
Average 14.19048 
     
St.Dev 6.845576 
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Perceived Control 1 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120 
2 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 180 
3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4 0 6 8 10 4 28 0 260 
5 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 
6 0 0 3 2 0 5 0 260 
7 0 0 2 12 0 14 0 140 
8 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 80 
9 0 1 4 1 0 6 0 140 
10 0 0 4 8 0 12 0 260 
11 0 3 1 0 0 4 0 40 
12 0 2 5 1 1 9 0 0 
13 0 3 8 13 4 28 0 260 
14 0 1 4 10 0 15 0 260 
15 0 1 6 1 0 8 0 140 
16 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 160 
17 0 1 6 10 4 21 0 150 
18 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 130 
19 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 260 
20 0 5 0 1 1 7 0 260 
21 0 1 0 1 1 3 0 260 
     
Group 
Average 8.333333 
     
St.Dev 8.463648 
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Perceived Control 2 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 5 2 13 0 21 120 240 
2 0 2 3 10 0 16 120 260 
3 1 6 8 14 4 33 120 260 
4 0 6 8 13 4 31 0 260 
5 0 1 3 0 0 6 0 0 
6 0 0 4 2 0 7 0 260 
7 0 1 2 13 0 16 80 120 
8 0 2 2 11 0 15 0 80 
9 0 5 6 8 1 20 0 150 
10 0 0 6 8 0 14 30 260 
11 0 4 3 0 0 8 0 40 
12 0 3 7 10 1 21 0 0 
13 1 6 8 13 4 32 120 260 
14 0 4 4 13 0 21 90 260 
15 0 1 6 1 0 8 0 140 
16 1 5 3 13 0 22 100 160 
17 1 6 8 13 4 32 0 150 
18 1 6 0 1 1 9 0 130 
19 0 1 0 0 0 1 120 260 
20 1 5 0 2 1 9 60 260 
21 1 5 5 3 1 15 0 260 
     
Group 
Average 16.71429 
 
     
St.Dev 9.623632 
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PASN 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 3 2 9 0 14 40 170 
2 0 4 1 0 0 5 0 130 
3 0 6 8 9 4 27 0 0 
4 0 3 5 0 4 12 0 110 
5 0 2 6 10 4 22 0 150 
6 0 4 6 9 4 23 0 120 
7 0 1 1 1 0 3 0 260 
8 0 5 8 10 4 27 0 160 
9 0 0 3 1 0 4 0 0 
10 0 1 0 3 0 4 0 160 
11 0 1 2 2 0 5 0 180 
12 0 5 2 11 0 18 100 240 
13 0 4 2 9 0 15 0 260 
14 0 4 3 10 0 17 0 240 
     
Group 
Average 14 
 
     
St.Dev 8.753021 
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PAPC1 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 3 2 8 0 13 0 130 
2 0 5 2 9 0 16 120 260 
3 0 4 6 1 0 11 120 260 
4 0 6 3 12 0 21 0 260 
5 0 5 8 10 0 23 0 260 
6 0 5 4 11 0 20 110 260 
7 0 5 6 10 1 22 0 260 
8 0 5 0 1 0 6 0 260 
9 0 4 3 8 0 15 0 260 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 130 
11 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
12 0 3 8 2 1 14 0 260 
13 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 
14 0 2 2 7 0 11 0 260 
     
Group 
Average 12.57143 
 
     
St.Dev 7.713268 
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PAPC2 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 5 2 11 0 18 120 130 
2 0 6 2 11 0 19 120 260 
3 1 6 8 1 0 16 120 260 
4 1 6 3 12 0 22 120 260 
5 1 6 8 11 0 26 0 260 
6 1 6 8 12 0 27 110 260 
7 1 5 6 11 1 24 0 260 
8 1 6 2 11 0 20 120 260 
9 0 4 6 11 0 21 0 260 
10 0 0 0 11 0 11 0 130 
11 1 5 2 7 0 15 120 260 
12 0 3 8 12 1 24 120 260 
13 0 3 1 12 0 16 0 80 
14 0 4 2 12 0 18 120 260 
     
Group 
Average 19.78571 
     
St.Dev 4.543441 
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SNPC1 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 2 0 3 0 5 0 260 
2 0 4 5 3 1 13 0 260 
3 0 5 2 12 1 20 0 260 
4 0 5 3 1 0 9 0 260 
5 0 5 2 7 0 14 0 220 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 160 
7 0 4 2 8 1 15 0 260 
8 0 4 3 10 4 21 0 260 
9 0 0 6 0 1 7 0 0 
10 0 4 2 8 0 14 0 260 
11 0 4 3 1 0 8 0 180 
12 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 
13 0 5 8 10 4 27 0 260 
14 0 5 2 10 0 17 0 0 
     
Group 
Average 12.28571 
   
     
St.Dev 7.620101 
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SNPC2 
ID SignUp Contact EduInterest Context Marketing Total Connection Settings 
1 0 2 2 11 0 15 60 260 
2 0 4 5 3 1 13 20 260 
3 1 6 2 12 1 22 30 260 
4 1 6 4 8 0 19 120 260 
5 0 6 2 13 0 21 0 190 
6 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 130 
7 0 5 8 12 1 26 0 260 
8 0 4 7 11 4 26 40 260 
9 0 5 8 0 1 14 60 260 
10 1 4 2 10 0 17 120 260 
11 0 5 3 9 0 17 0 180 
12 1 0 0 1 4 6 120 260 
13 0 4 8 10 4 26 120 260 
14 1 5 2 10 0 18 120 260 
     
Group 
Average 17.35714 
   
     
St.Dev 6.979168 
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Appendix 11 – Post-Experiment Interview Notes 
The following is a summary of the notes taken during the post-experiment discussions. 
Control Group 
-Is it better to not answer questions, lie or is it OK to answer No? 
With placement applications coming up in the next few years, I don’t want any information 
about me to be out there so I think it is better to leave them blank.  
-Did you? 
No! I know I could have and I don’t know why I answered them but now I wouldn’t. 
Some participants said lie is an appropriate method to protect themselves but would rather 
leave questions out. 
-Do you need to protect your data if you’re not answering questions?  
I do it by habit, just see friends only and know that that is the one to pick. 
You might end up submitting something in the future so should set it when you can. 
-Why did you answer questions? 
Because I could, I’m a “completionist”. Felt good to be able to fill in all the fields. 
Don’t know, they were in front of me so I answered. Now we’re talking about it I wouldn’t 
have answered some of them. 
-Connection settings 
I didn’t see the connection settings, I just went straight to the question bits. 
I remember a link but didn’t register it as important. 
Personal Attitude 
-What did you think of the lights? 
They were useful in making me think about my privacy and what people will see and judge 
me on.  
They did highlight things I wouldn’t tell a stranger, like address. 
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It made me think about the information I put on social networks like twitter and Facebook 
and how that information could be used by others.  
I get it, put I made up my own mind. 
Made me think about what I want placement employees to see. 
I didn’t look at them but did leave things blank. 
-Why did you leave things blank? 
NTU doesn’t need to know. I might tell my friends but not Facebook, there is no reason for it 
to know.  
-Why did you answer things? 
I answer the things that everyone is going to respond to so (“everyone does”) 
I left stuff out that I didn’t want people to know the answer to.  
-Do you need to protect even when not answering questions? 
Yes, your profile is always changing, might be stuff there in the future. 
Subjective Norms 
-Do you need to worry about answering questions with a “No”? 
Yes, I was embarrassed to answer no to some of them, people might think I am boring.  
You are accountable for everything you put on there and the network could sell that 
information about you to someone else.  
If the data is being view then leave it blank, people will use it judge you. 
-Did you agree with the advice? 
It reminded me to not answer everything but I don’t remember following the advice. 
I thought it might have been too strict. 
Perceived Control 
-Did you change your answers? 
Yes, I wanted to get the score down – bit like a game. 
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Yes, it seemed to want me to. 
-Better to not fill in questions or answer no (lie)? 
Leave them out, if I have to answer them I will lie but if the choice is there. 
-Do settings require application if no questions filled in? 
Yes, I set everything to Friends Only. 
You can’t control what other people will post about you so it doesn’t matter what you say. 
 
PASN 
-Did you prefer the lights or the advice? 
The lights, they highlighted clearly what was bad without having to pay them too much 
attention. 
The two together made me feel a bit anxious as there was too much to consider sometimes. 
Made the screen too busy. 
-Need for privacy met? 
Yes, I didn’t answer what I thought was not relevant at the time. 
A lot of this stuff is already on the web about me anyway, so I may as well fill it out again. If 
people want to find this information they can. 
-Better to lie or withhold information? 
Any data forms an opinion when others look at you.  
-Still need to protect even when not answering questions? 
Don’t know, but I still put the highest for anything anyway. 
Yes, things might change 
PAPC 
-Which did you prefer? 
The lights; didn’t need to review and go through all the extra screens. 
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-Did you change stuff then? 
Yes, but not because I got anything wrong. Wanted low risk. 
SNPC 
-Did you change information? 
Yes, but I’d already made my decision, didn’t need to review but still made changes to alter 
the score. 
It was overkill. 
Just wanted to get the P-Score down. 
 
 
 
 
 
